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Resume
Le crime d'agression se veut etre un des quatre crimes internationaux sous la
juridiction de la CPI. Lorsque les delegues ala Conference de Rome n'eurent point
atteint de consensus sur une definition du crime, celui-ci resta, depuis, indefini en
droit. En consequence, la CPI n'aurajuridiction pour entendre des causes portant
sur Ie crime d'agression qu'une fois la definition sera adoptee par l'Assemblee des
Etats Parties au plus tot en 2009.
Ce memoire traite trois problematiques liees au crime d'agression : la question de la
responsabilite penale individuelle, Ie role du Conseil de securite de I'ONU, et les
parametres du crime en tant que tel. La responsabilite penale individuelle est
analysee, inter alia, du point de vue du principe des sources du droit international.
Quant al'eventuelle implication du Conseil de securite dans Ie champ de
competence de la CPI sur Ie crime d'agression, l'auteure soutient tel que suit: Si Ie
Conseil de securite se voit accorde un pouvoir plus large que celui dont il est
presentement dote en vertu des articles 13(b) et 16 du Statut de Rome, chaque
membre permanent aura un veto sur toute situation d'agression qui serait autrement
portee devant la Cour. Ceci aura pour consequence de politiser la CPI en ce qui a
trait au crime et rendra hypothethique toute definition eventuelle. Si la definition est
bien con9ue et redigee, on fait valoir, qu'il n' est point necessaire de limiter
davantage la competence de la CPI. Les parametres de la definition du crime
proposes par l'auteure sont etablis selon les conclusions d'une analyse des notions
composantes de l'agression. L'essentiel du concept se veut un recours illegal et
non-necessaire qui constitue une rupture ala paix. A moins qu'il ne soit exerce en
« legitime defence» ou en vertu d'un mandat du Chapitre VII, Ie recours ala force
constitue prima facie une agression et s'il est suffisamment grave, il s'agira d'un
crime d'agression. Ce memoire termine avec un projet de definition du crime
d'agression en vue d'avancer Ie discours vers un consensus sur ces problematiques
majeures. Non seulement est-il possible d'arriver aun consensus sur la defInition,
croit l'auteure, mais nous sommes plus que jamais al'aube d'y parvenir.
MOTS-CLES:
« Droit international »; « Droit international penal »; « Cour penale internationale »;
« CPI »; « Conseil de securite de l'OND »; «Agression »; « Crime d'agression »;
«Definition »; "Responsabilite penale individuelle »; « Champ de competence »;
« Politicisation »; « Recours ala force »; « Legitime defense »; « Legitime defense
preventive »; «Responsabilite de Proteger »; «Defenses »; «Rationae personae ».
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Abstract
The crime of aggression is one of the four international crimes under the jurisdiction
of the ICC. When delegates at the Rome Conference were unable to agree on the
content ofa definition, the crime was left undefined. As a result, the ICC can only
begin prosecuting individuals for the crime of aggression once a definition is
adopted by the Assembly of States Parties in 2009, at the earliest.
This thesis examines three issues associated with the crime of aggression: the
question of individual criminal responsibility, the role of the UN Security Council
and the general scope of the definition ofthe crime ofaggression itself Individual
criminal liability is reviewed, inter alia, from the perspective ofinternational
sources doctrine. Regarding the role of the Security Council in relation to the crime
ofaggression, the author concludes: if the Security Council is vested with more
powers than it already has under Articles 13(b) and 16 of the Rome Statute, each
pennanent member will have a veto over any situation of aggression that might
otherwise be brought before the Court. This would result in a complete
politicization of the ICC and render moot any future definition of the crime of
aggression. If a definition for the crime ofaggression is properly conceived and
constructed, it is argued, there is no need to further limit the Court's exercise of
jurisdiction. The author proposes general parameters for the scope of the definition
based on conclusions reached in the analysis of the conceptual components of
aggression. At its essence, the act of aggression is the unnecessary, unlawful use of
force which constitutes a breach ofthe peace. Unless employed in "self-defence" or
under a Chapter VII mandate, the use of force constitutes prima facie an act of
aggression, and if it is sufficiently grave, a crime ofaggression. This thesis
concludes with a working definition of the crime of aggression to promote dialogue
and ultimately a consensus on these core issues. Not only is a definition is within
reach, the author believes, we are closer to it than we ever have been before.
KEYWORDS:
"International law"; "International criminal law"; "International Criminal Court";
"ICC"; "United Nations Security Council"; "Aggression"; "Crime ofaggression";
"Definition"; "Individual criminal responsibility"; "Jurisdiction"; "Politicization";
''Use of force"; "Self-defence"; "Anticipatory self-defence"; "Responsibility to
Protect"; "Defences"; "Rationae personae".
OUTLINE
INTRODUCTION 1
v
Chapter 1 Why Criminalize Aggression? 7
1.1
1.2
1.3
The Precedent Argument
The Supreme International Crime
Deterrence
7
14
18
Chapter 2: Individual Criminal Liability 23
2.1
2.2
2.3
International Criminal Law
Historical Developments
Legal Premises
26
29
35
Chapter 3: Role of the Security Council 48
3.1 Security Council Jurisdiction 54
3.2 The Inevitable Link of Complementary Jurisdictions
56
3.3 SC & ICJ: A Case Study 70
3.4 The Crime ofAggression is Not Unique 84
3.5 The Role of the Security Council 86
Chapter 4: General Scope of the Crime ofAggression 91
Chapter 5:
4.1 The Prohibition on the Use ofForce 93
4.2 Established Exceptions 95
4.3 Anticipatory Self-Defence 109
4.4 Defences 123
4.5 Rationae Personae 128
4.6 Parameters for the Scope ofthe Crime ofAggression
132
A Proposed Working Definition for the Crime ofAggression
134
CONCLUSION
Bibliography
142
145
To the memory ofKatia Boustany
VI
Vll
I would like to thank Dean Anne-Marie Boisvert for her enthusiastic support,
encouragement, her most insightful comments and generous supervision of this
thesis.
I would also like to give posthumous thanks to Katia Boustany, the first supervisor
of this thesis, whose presence was felt until it was completed. Her contribution to
intemationallaw was as great as her love and passion for it, unconditional. She still
had so much more to give, and she is sorely missed. May she be at peace knowing
her rich legacy. You may say she's a dreamer, but she's not the only one...
V111
In the sphere ofmunicipal law we do not usually object to defining murder or
manslaughterfor the reason that a definition may on occasions prove insufficient or
unjust. We put our trust in the skill ofthe draftsman and the wisdom ofthe Courts.
It is therefore to be hoped that international lawyers will devote their attention less
to piling up objections based on somewhat ingeniously devised possibilities showing
the difficulties ofa definition than to assisting progress by helping to frame a
definition ofaggression so as to provide, as far as the nature ofthat taskpermits, for
unforeseen contingencies, including the unavoidable residuum ofdiscretion for the
adjudicating agency
- Hersch Lauterpacht (International Law: Collected Papers, 442)
INTRODUCTION
It used to be that war was regarded as a legitimate way of resolving international
disputes: a necessity. By the tum of the twentieth century however conflicts were
no longer only being fought in the battlefield between soldiers; they moved into our
cities and our homes. International conventions were signed marking the
realization that rules were needed to protect civilians from the scourge of war. At
the end of World War I countries began officially renouncing war as a way of
conducting international affairs and the movement took on momentum. The
announcement of the creation of the League ofNations at the Paris Peace
Conference had as its main purpose the prevention of war. For the first time in
modem history states espoused non-aggression as a policy and signed treaties
outlawing war.
Then World War II happened, and when it ended the international community
responded with two solutions: one legal and the other political. A growing sense of
urgency to see that justice was rendered resulted in the creation of two International
Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo ("IMTs"). For the first time in modem
history, individuals were prosecuted for crimes against peace, war crimes and
crimes against humanity. To this day however the prosecution of individuals for
crimes against peace (i.e. aggression) remains shrouded in controversy as there is
no crime unless there is a law in force to that effect. When the war ended, "crimes
against peace" were not "on the books" so the Allied Powers decided to create a law
making aggressive war a crime, and applied it to the defendants at the Nuremberg
and Tokyo IMTs expostfacto.
The political response to the Second World War sparked the creation of the United
Nations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations ("UN Charter"). In
general, the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force among member states,
and vests the UN Security Council and the General Assembly with the duty to
2maintain and restore international peace and security. I The sole exception to the
general prohibition on the use of force by individual member states is self-defence.2
The UN Security Council however is empowered to authorize collective use of
force for the purposes ofmaintaining or restoring international peace and security.3
This system of collective security has had its failings. The UN Security Council,
for example, has been unable to handle situations of international crises in an
effective or consistent manner, largely as a result of the political imbalance created
by the five permanent veto-carrying members on the Council ("P-5"). This state of
affairs has led to the virtual paralysis that has prevented the Council from carrying
out its duty especially if the threat or breach ofpeace is perpetrated by a P-5
member or one of its allies.
The crime of aggression is the Achilles' heel of international criminal law. For
decades, individual states and international organizations have grappled with draft
definitions, by and large, without much success. The lack of a clear definition and
the absence of a recognized forum in which to prosecute the crime have rendered
the crime of aggression unenforceable on a consistent and effective basis. The
reason usually proffered for the absence of a coherent definition is that the matter of
reaching a consensus is laden with political issues. No doubt, this has made the task
of reaching a definition suitable to a large number of states extremely difficult.
I Articles 2(4) and 24, UN Charter in regard to the Security Council, and Articles II and 12 in
relation to the General Assembly.
2 Article 51, UN Charter.
3 Articles 39 and 42 ofChapter VII, UN Charter. While the UN General Assembly is not vested
with these specific powers, it may nonetheless make recommendations on collective action under a
"Uniting for peace" resolution should the Council be unable to reach agreement on an urgent matter
(UNGA resolution 377(V) Uniting for Peace, adopted 3 November 1950 at the 302nd plenary
meeting.). Article II of the Charter evidences the non-exclusive nature of the Security Council's
primary responsibility. It empowers the General Assembly with the complementary duty to consider,
discuss and make recommendations on any questions that relate to the maintenance of international
peace and security. Only when the same question or matter has been submitted to the Security
Council for its consideration is the General Assembly precluded from exercising this responsibility.
Article 10 additionally provides that the General Assembly may discuss and make recommendations
regarding any matters within the scope of the Charter and regarding the powers and functions of any
organs provided for in the Charter. Article 11(2), United Nations Charter. "The General Assembly
may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the
powers and functions ofany organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in
Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security
Councilor to both on any such questions or matters." Article 10, United Nations Charter.
3Aggression has been referred to as a "Gordian Knot" whose only solution is to be
severed from the statute from whence it came.4 A central theme of this paper is that
the concept of aggression is something that can be defined by applying existing
principles of international law. By way of preliminary comment, even if the
allegory of the Gordian Knot is tenable, which arguably it is not, the analogy
between it and the crime of aggression is a false one. The knot is said to be
impossible to undo, and so too is aggression said to be "impossible to define". The
only solution to undoing the knot is to take a sword and slice right through it.
Similarly, the analogy holds, the only way to address aggression is to cut it out of
the Rome Statute. A knot is an intertwining of a rope with itself or another to fasten
it together. A knot can always be undone, albeit with varying degrees of difficulty.
Similarly, though aggression is arguably a more complex concept it is not
impossible to define as it is notion with which we are not only intuitively familiar,
but one that we understand. Defining it should be no more difficult than defining
assault. 5
Since the Second World War there have been parallel efforts to codify the crime of
aggression and to define the act of aggression. In connection with the latter, the
1974 Consensus Definition ofAggression which was touted as a major development
is problematic.6 It conflates major issues relating to international law, it was not
arrived at by consensus, and most importantly, it does not define aggression. 7 For
4 Matthias Schuster, "The Rome Statute and the Crime of Aggression: A Gordian Knot in Search of
a Sword" (2003) 14 Crim'l Law Forum 1.
5 "Assault" is defined in the Criminal Code ofCanada as: "265. (I) A person commits an assault
when (a) without the consent of another person, he applies force intentionally to that other person,
directly or indirectly; (b) he attempts or threatens, by an act or a gesture, to apply force to another
person, ifhe has, or causes that other person to believe on reasonable grounds that he has, present
ability to effect his purpose; or (c) while openly wearing or carrying a weapon or an imitation
thereof, he accosts or impedes another person or begs. (2) This section applies to all forms of
assault, including sexual assault, sexual assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing
bodily harm and aggravated sexual assault. (3) For the purposes of this section, no consent (... )".
6 The Definition ofAggression, UNAGOR, 29th Sess., A/Res./3314 (XXIX) (1974), Definition of
Aggression, Annex.
7 One example of how Res. 3314 conflates the issues is the fact that it calls the act ofaggression "an
international crime" even though aggression was not. On the absence of consensus, see Nicholas
Nyiri, The United Nations' Search for a Definition ofAggression, (New York: Peter Lang Publishing
4these reasons, it does not figure prominently in any particular discussion in this
paper.
In July 1998 the International Criminal Court ("ICC") came into existence and the
crime of aggression was included among the international crimes under its
jurisdiction. No consensus however had been reached on its definition and it
therefore remains undefined to this day. The goal of this paper is to clarify some of
the issues surrounding and advance the debate on the definition of the crime of
aggressIOn.
And so, we find ourselves at this critical juncture. Either we can repeat our
mistakes of the past and go on contaminating aggression with politics, or we can
entrench it in the judicial arena where it has recently been placed, albeit on
tenterhooks. The future of the crime of aggression as a law with any practical force
at all, is uncertain, as it remains to be decided whether each permanent ("P-5")
member of the Security Council will have a veto on all potential matters of
aggression. Upon defining the crime of aggression, would-be perpetrators should
be on notice once and for all that they will be held accountable for their decisions
and actions. But this is not likely to happen unless the ICC exercises the same
jurisdiction over this crime as it has over the other three international crimes.
Anything short of a clear definition that the ICC alone can use in the exercise of its
unfettered jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, will seriously compromise the
Court's integrity. As Hersh Lauterpacht says, let us put our trust in the skill ofthe
Ltd., 1989); Julius Stone, Conflict Through Consensus; United Nations Approaches to Aggression
(Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977); and, Aluned M. Rifaat, International Aggression
(Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1979). The Consensus Definition does not define
aggression as it fails to describe its essence. It is also problematic for other reasons. In 1996 the US
representative on the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court ("PrepCom") stated, "[t]he definition of aggression, undertaken by the General Assembly in
its resolution 3314 of 1974 had' ducked' several serious issues by stating that nothing should
prejudice the right to self-determination and independence, and in recognizing the right to self-
defence. (... )." "Legal Prosecution of Aggression Required Agreed Definition, Preparatory
Committee on International Criminal Court Told", United Nations Press Release L/2765 (27 March
1996), online: The United Nations http://www.un.org.
5draftsman and the wisdom ofthe Courts. 8 Let us not bend to the dubious arguments
of the most powerful states who are more interested in retaining control over their
own unilateral use of force than in the international collective good.
Just as "assault" constitutes a tort / delict and a potential crime, understanding the
essence of aggression requires us to conceive of it as both an internationally
wrongful act (tort / delict), and possibly an international crime. Only upon doing
this will we acquire a firm grasp of the concept. Aggression is an unlawful use of
force that is unnecessary and that constitutes a breach of the peace. Like assault,
the concept of aggression encompasses an incredibly broad range of unlawful uses
of force. And again, as with the case of assault, this is not to say that individuals
will or should be prosecuted for the crime aggression every time an act of
aggression occurs. The de minimus rule and practical reality prevent this from
happening.
This paper seeks to address the core issues relating to the crime of aggression. The
first is a preliminary and general concern regarding current discourse on either
removing aggression from the Rome Statute or eliminating any possibility that it
might be prosecuted without the highly political interference of the UN Security
Council. I begin therefore with a critique under Chapter 1 of the analogy drawn
between the crime of aggression and the Gordian Knot. This discussion will
address and refute the claims made against the philosophical premises for
criminalizing aggression. Chapter 2 examines the broader issue of individual
criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression. This is undertaken from the
perspective of international developments that led to its codification and from
8 See pre-introduction quote. "Attempts to define aggression have been described as impractical; as
leading to absurd or unjust situations; as being a 'trap for the innocent and a sign-post for the guilty';
as rendering it difficult to apply the intention of the law to complicated facts; as necessarily leaving
possible criminal acts outside the purview of the definition; and as savouring of the Continental
passion for definition and logic in contradistinction to the English tendency to elasticity. (... ) The
objections to a definition ofaggression are in the long run calculated to make more difficult the
establishment ofan effective system of international obligations in the domain ofobserving and
securing the observance ofpacific settlement." Hersch Lauterpacht, Sir Elihu Lauterpacht ed.
International Law: Being the Collected Papers ofHersch Lauterpacht, Volume 5: Disputes, War
and Neutrality (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 442.
6sources doctrine, generally. Here, we will review the complex manner in which
international criminal law has evolved, as well as the more specific issue ofhow the
concept of state aggression is adaptable to individual penal characterization.
Chapter 3 addresses my gravest concern: excessive Security Council powers over
the ICC, and specifically in relation to the latter's exercise ofjurisdiction over the
crime of aggression. It provides an analysis of the role, if any, the UN Security
Council should play in regard to the crime of aggression. I argue that the Council
already has the power to intervene in the Court's docket, in discharging its duty to
maintain international peace and security, with a referral power under Article 13(b)
or a deferral power under Article 16 of the Rome Statute. Any additional powers
granted to the Council regarding matters of aggression will usurp the jurisdiction of
the ICC and tarnish its integrity.
The following chapter analyses the definitional parameters of the crime of
aggression beginning with the major component notions involved in the concept:
unlawful use of force; self-defence; anticipatory self-defence; Chapter VII use of
force or Security Council use of force mandates; humanitarian intervention or the
responsibility to protect; possible defences and rationae personae considerations.
Conclusions drawn from these discussions will inform the content of the proposed
working definition. The crime of aggression, it will be seen, lends itself to a
composite provision formula made up of a series of sub-definitions.
Finally, Chapter 5 opens with a critical review of the draft proposed definitions
currently on the negotiating table and proposes a new working definition for the
crime of aggression. In the process of reaching a consensus on the definition, it is
understood that certain policy decisions will have to be made in establishing the
scope of discretion that will be left to the Court in its determination of whether an
individual is guilty of the crime of aggression. It is hoped, however, that the
tendency will be to lean towards allowing the Court sufficient leeway so that it may
make enlightened decisions based on the facts of each given case.
Chapter 1 Why Criminalize Aggression?
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Why criminalize aggression? What reasons underlie its inclusion in the Rome
Statute? While much has been written about the political and definitional aspects of
aggression, relatively little has been said about the premises underlying its
criminalization. Matthias Schuster is among the few who have made some
ostensibly convincing arguments against criminalizing aggression. In his article,
"The Rome Statute and the Crime ofAggression: A Gordian Knot in Search of a
Sword",9 Schuster suggests the recent debate on the crime of aggression has
focused more on a definition than it has on the premises on which aggression was
included in the Rome Statute in the first place. lo Three of the premises he explores
provide a useful framework for this opening discussion: the precedent argument; the
supreme international crime, and the deterrent value. I I
1.1 The Precedent Argument
The first premise for including the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute relates
to the so-called precedent argument taken from an article by von Hebel and
Robinson. 12
With respect to the inclusion of the crime of aggression, one of the most
compelling reasons advanced in favour of its inclusion was that to exclude it
would be a retrogressive step, given that the Nuremberg and Tokyo
Tribunals had held persons criminally responsible for this crime more than
50 years ago. 13
9 Schuster, supra note 4. The title of this thesis was inspired by Schuster's article as well as the
work of numerous other writers who have argued with less force against defining (the crime of)
aggression. It is the view of the writer that the definition of the crime of aggression is not a Gordian
knot; and if it is viewed as a complicated matter by some, this is not to say that it can not or should
not be defined.
10 Ibid. at 9.
II Ibid. Personal accountability does not figure among the premises examined by Schuster. We can
only speculate that he is less critical of this premise than he is of those mentioned above.
12 Herman von Hebel and Darryl Robinson, "Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court" in R.S.
Lee, ed., The International Criminal Court: The Making ofthe Rome Statute, (The Hague: Kluwer
Law International, 1999) 79 at 82.
13 Ibid.
8This premise breaks down into two component issues. The first relates to the
appropriateness ofusing the Nuremberg and Tokyo judgments to justify the claim
that aggression is an international crime. The second pertains to whether events
since WWII support the contention that the international community has
consistently recognized aggression as an international crime.
The "Precedent" Argument
According to Schuster "[w]hile the Nuremberg and Tokyo proceedings were
certainly groundbreaking in many aspects (sic), it should not be overlooked that the
most contested provision of their respective charters was the one dealing with the
crimes against peace.,,14 He quotes an aide memoire in which the United Kingdom
argued that aggression was, in fact, not a crime but should be punished anyway. IS
Until the drafting of the London Charter aggression, or crimes against peace, was
not a recognized international crime. At the July 1945 International Conference on
Military Trials representatives from the U.S., Great Britain, France and Russia met
to prepare the statute that would serve as the source for the indictments against the
Germans. 16 On 19 July 1945 the United States and France tabled for discussion
their respective proposals for the definition of the crime of aggression. The minutes
of the conference illustrate the divergent views held by the representatives of the
U.S. and the French delegations, Justice Jackson and Professor Gros, respectively. I?
14 Schuster, supra note 4 at 10.
15 The author's quote of the aide-memoire reads as follows: "Reference has been made above to
Hitler's conduct leading up to the war as one of the crimes on which the Allies would rely. There
should be included in this the unprovoked attacks which, since the original declaration of war, he has
made on various countries. These are not war crimes in the ordinary sense, nor is it at all clear that
they properly be described as crimes under international law." Ibid. at 11.
16 International Conference on Military Trials, London 1945.
17 Gros: "We do not consider as a criminal violation the launching ofa war ofaggression. If we
declare war a criminal act of individuals, we are going farther than the actual law. (... ) We do not
want criticism in later years ofpunishing something that was not actually criminal, such as launching
a war ofaggression. (... ) We think it will tum out that nobody can say that launching a war of
aggression is an international crime - you are actually inventing the sanction." Jackson: "( ... ) This
language is not suggested as perfect, but I think the idea ofdefining "aggressor" is very important
and that we shall have to face it at some point in this prosecution. We either have to define it now,
in which case it will end argument at the trial, or define it at the trial, in which case it will be the
9France did not recognize crimes against peace as an international crime for which
individuals could be punished, whereas the U.S. was of the view that it had to be. 18
Schuster notes that the Nuremberg Tribunal tried its best to "dispel any doubt as to
the criminality of aggression". 19 He claims that while it did not succeed in defining
aggression, the Tribunal still managed to conclude that aggression had been
committed by the defendants against twelve different states.20 Article 6(a) of the
Nuremberg Charter, however, had defined the offence of crimes against peace as
"planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances; or participation in a
Common Plan or Conspiracy for the accomplishment ofany of the foregoing. ,,21
Schuster then cites Rifaat as warning that a cautionary approach should be taken if
Nuremberg and Tokyo are to be regarded as precedents: "It is very serious to
accept such a precedent which only applies as an instrument of the victors after a
successful end of a war, even if [their adversaries] were the aggressors." 22 Placed
in its proper context, Rifaat's quote explains how the judicial option of the military
tribunals marked a clear departure from the way aggression was handled in the past
by the international community. He is also suggesting that there will be no real
benefit to using Nuremberg and Tokyo as precedents unless future developments
subject of an argument in which the Germans will participate; and it seems to me that it is much
better that we face it now and preclude all ofthat argument." Emphasis added. Minutes of
Conference Session 19 July 1945; Report ofRobert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the
International Conference on Military Trials: London 1945; International organization and conference
series; II; European and British Commonwealth 1; Department of State Publication 3080;
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office 1949 [London Conference Minutes].
18 Ibid.
19 Schuster, supra note 4 at 11.
20 The author cites Julius Stone, Aggression and World Order, 28 (1958). Ibid.
21 Nuremberg Charter 1946. "In this text aggression was considered as a subcategory of crimes
against peace, which were all subjected to the same regime. Thus, the precise definition of
aggression in relation to other crimes against peace was immaterial." Giorgio Gaja, "The Long
Journey towards Repressing Aggression" in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones
eds., The Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court: A Commentary, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002) Volume 1,427 at 428 [Cassese, The Rome Statute).
22 The author cites A.M. Rifaat, supra note 7 at 179. Schuster's quote is partial and inaccurate: "A
cautionary approach is also supported by Rifaat who warns that 'it is very serious to accept such a
precedent which only applies as an instrument of the victors after a successful end ofa war, even if
[their adversaries] were the aggressors"'. Schuster, supra note 4 at 12.
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see to it that all aggressors, be they the victors or the vanquished, are subject to
prosecution.
[I]t is a very serious procedure if it is to be considered a precedent. If the
post-war trials and principles in connection with crimes against peace are to
be considered a precedent, without further development to make it function
in regard to all future aggressors irrespective oftheir positions - victors or
vanquished - the outcome, which we now witness, will be completely
contrary to what was hoped.23
Since Nuremberg and Tokyo, there has been one major development in this regard:
the creation of the ICC having the jurisdiction over both victors and vanquished.24
Calling the reference to the Nuremberg and Tokyo decisions a "precedent
argument" is also somewhat misleading.25 On its face it assumes, or invites the
reader to assume, that a precedent is required for a crime to be formally recognized
as such. It is not clear that this is so. Aggression needs a definition before it can be
prosecuted26 however it does not necessarily require a precedent before it is
officially recognized as an international crime.27 While the Rome Statute affirms
the ICC's jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, there
was still no agreement on how the crime of aggression should be defined.28 There
did not appear to be any suggestion, however, that the crime of aggression required
a precedent.
23 In light of such a rule ofconduct, which does not apply unless there is a vanquished party, it is to
be expected that "the Nuremberg Trial will be claimed by victorious nations of the future as a
welcome political precedent for the trial and punishment of their adversaries." AM. Rifaat, ibid.
24 Unfortunately, the ICTY and the ICTR do not exercise the same kind of "blind justice". Though
the ICTY Statute does not limit the tribunal's jurisdiction to specific nationalities, the Prosecutor's
Office will not prosecute individuals involved with the 1999 NATO bombing campaigns, for
example, despite the existence of ample evidence suggesting that war crimes were committed at that
time. Additionally, the Prosecutor's Office at the ICTR made it clear that it would not be
prosecuting anyone associated with the FPR. See Michael Mandel, How America Gets Away with
Murder, Illegal Wars, Collateral Damage and Crimes Against Humanity, (London: Pluto Press,
2004) generally.
25 Von Hebel and Robinson, supra note 12. Note the authors do not use the word "precedent" in
their text.
26 Article 5(2), Rome Statute and the principle of legality require that the crime of aggression be
clearly defined so that it can be prosecuted.
27 See Chapter 2 below.
28 See Philippe Kirsch & Darryl Robinson, "Reaching Agreement at the Rome Conference" in
Cassese, The Rome Statute, 67.
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The solution that emerged was to specifically recognize the crime of
aggression within the Court's jurisdiction (Article 5) but with the proviso
that the Court may not exercise jurisdiction over this crime until a definition
and preconditions are adopted by a review conference (Article 5(2)). At the
same time, the Preparatory Commission has been given a mandate to begin
discussions with a view to developing a definition. Thus, for the time being,
the ICC has what might be called a 'dormant' jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression. 29
Excluding Aggression "Retrogressive"
The second part of the "precedent" premise suggests that it would be retrogressive
to exclude aggression from the ICC's jurisdiction. In Schuster's view, this is
questionable given that,
- There is no international treaty dealing with aggression for which
individual liability attaches (as is the case with the other core crimes);
- The statutes the Yugoslavia or Rwanda tribunals do not contain a provision
concerning aggression even though armed force was used in both conflicts;
and,
- Very few countries have provided for the prosecution ofaggression in their
domestic legislation. 30
That there is no international treaty providing for individual liabilityprior to the
Rome Statute, in Schuster's opinion, demonstrates a lack ofwillingness on the part
ofthe international community to recognize aggression as an international crime.
However, crimes against humanity never had an international convention calling for
29 Ibid. at 78. See also Philippe Kirsch and John T. Holmes, "The Rome Conference on an
International Criminal Court: The Negotiating Process" (1999) Am. J. In1'l L. 2 at 10: "Most of the
provisions [in the Rome Statute] reflected options in the bureau's previous proposal. In a few areas,
the bureau developed solutions of its own to bridge gaps and accommodate concerns in such a way
as to broaden support for the court. This approach explains, for example, the reference to the crime
of aggression despite the absence of agreement over its definition." Ibid.
30 Schuster, supra note 4 at 12-13. The author gives the example of Germany having included
aggression in its domestic legislation but does not specify whether the law is civil or penal in nature.
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individual responsibility either.31 Von Hebel and Robinson report that during the
period leading up to the Rome Statute, there were two general categories over
which the ICC might have jurisdiction: "core crimes" and "treaty crimes"; the crime
of aggression always figured among the core crimes.32
Schuster's second argument is based on the fact that neither of the two ad hoc
tribunals contained a provision for aggression. At the time these tribunals were
created, however, it was widely held that the main purpose ofestablishing the
tribunals was to address crimes against humanity and genocide. 33 Moreover, if the
lack ofjurisprudential value ofNuremberg and Tokyo on crimes against peace
turned on the fact that they constituted ex post facto law, then what's sauce for the
goose is sauce for the gander. The Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals would have
been subject to the same criticism as that levied against the IMTs. In any event, the
United States did not want the ICTY to exercise jurisdiction over this offence as it
might hamper eventual military interventions similar to its 1989 invasion of
Panama.34
31 "Genocide and crimes against humanity, with their special elements ofcriminality, encompass the
most atrocious of acts - those, respectively, committed with the intent to destroy specific ethnic,
religious, racial, or national groups; or carried out in a systematic or mass manner based on the
victims' political or other identification. Genocide remains the clearer of the two offences in terms
of the specificity and certainty of its definition under the Genocide Convention, but it addresses a
narrower set ofcrimes. Crimes against humanity covers (sic) a broader range of acts, though its
evolution through customary law leaves certain ofits elements and constituent acts the subject of
some debate (even the inclusion ofa definition in the Rome Statute)." Steven R. Ratner & Jason S.
Abrams, Accountabilityfor Human Rights Atrocities in International Law, 2nd ed. (New York,
Oxford University Press, 200 I) at 333. Emphasis added.
32 "The International Law Commission (ILC) Draft Statute recognized two categories ofcrimes over
which the Court might exercise jurisdiction. The first category consisted of the crimes of genocide,
aggression, serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflict, and crimes
against humanity. The second category consisted of a list of crimes established under relevant treaty
regimes and included grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional
Protocol I thereto, apartheid, torture, and certain acts of terrorism and illicit traffic in narcotic drugs.
In later discussions, the two categories of crimes came to be known respectively as the 'core crimes'
and the 'treaty crimes'. Von Hebel and Robinson, supra note 12 at 80.
33 "The Security Council resolutions that established the two ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals
did not include aggression among the crimes for which the Tribunals have jurisdiction. This is not
very significant, because the primary reason for creating the two Tribunals was the need to repress
crimes against humanity and war crimes." Gaja, supra note 2 I at 430.
34 Mandel, supra note 24 at 177.
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Third, Schuster maintains that because the international crime of aggression is only
found in the domestic legislation of a handful of states this, too, indicates a lack of
international will to repress the crime. 35 This would presume that domestic
legislation is necessary to recognize the crime of aggression. Typically however
states enact laws to mirror treaty provisions after the ratification process, that is,
after they sign on to a convention.
Developments regarding aggression since WWII appear to both support and dismiss
the argument that it would be retrogressive to exclude the crime of aggression. In
1946 and 1950 the General Assembly endorsed the IMT principles that declared
aggression the "gravest of all crimes against peace and security throughout the
world,36 and four years later the International Law Commission listed it among the
crimes contained in the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of
Mankind. 37 According to Ratner and Abrams, it was governmental attitudes that
more clearly expressed a hesitation to prosecute individuals.38 The authors suggest
that four factors explain the apparent confusion over crimes against peace:39 the
debate over the precedent value ofNuremberg and Tokyo; the "elusiveness" of an
agreement on a definition specific enough for aggression, to try individuals; the
question as to the level of involvement of the individual (rationae personae); and
how "ill-equipped" the courts are to conduct the necessary factual inquiries to make
a determination of aggression.4o
While some cases of aggression are as clear as the Nazi invasions in Western
Europe41 or Iraq's invasion ofKuwait, other incidents demand more careful
35 Schuster, supra note 4 at 12-13.
36 GA Res. 380(V), UN GAOR, 5th Sess., UN Doc A/1775, at 13 (1950).
37 19541LC Report at 151 (Art. 2(1».
38 Ratner and Abrams, supra note 31 at 125-6.
39 Curiously, although their text was published in 2001 the authors use the term aggression sparingly
preferring instead to use "crimes against peace".
40 Ratner and Abrams, supra note 31 at 125-6.
41 In relation to the Nazi invasions of Westem Europe, Justice Jackson was quoted as saying, "1
really think that this trial, if it should get into an argument over the political and economic causes of
this war, could do infinite harm, both in Europe, which 1 don't know well, and in America, which 1
know fairly well. If we should have a prolonged controversy over whether Germany invaded
Norway a few jumps ahead of a British invasion ofNorway, or whether France in declaring war was
the real aggressor, this trial can do infinite harm for those countries with the people of the United
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scrutiny. The shortcomings in the handling of the question of aggression by
the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case (which did not even
concern implication of criminal conduct) cast some doubt upon the ability of
tribunals to handle crimes against peace responsibly,42 although the
Yugoslavia Tribunal has nonetheless handled similarly difficult issues in the
context of command responsibility. The result is that states have been
reluctant to place legal constraints ofa criminalform on their use afforce,
so that jus ad bellum has remainedfar more immune to criminalization than
. . b II 43JUs In e o.
Even if the foregoing reasons, with the possible exception of the fourth, explained
the current state of affairs with respect to the crime of aggression, this hardly
demonstrates a "general unwillingness of states" to place constraints of a criminal
form on their use of force. At best, it might explain why the permanent members of
the Security Council are so inclined.
1.2 The Supreme International Crime
In 1947 the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg held,
War is essentially an evil thing. [... ] To initiate a war of aggression,
therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international
crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the
accumulated evil of the whole.44
As much as it may resonate with some readers, this excerpt is still obiter dictum,
and referring to aggression as the "supreme international crime" does not make it
States. And the same is true of our Russian relationships. The Germans will certainly accuse all three
of our European Allies of adopting policies which forced them to war. The reason I Say that is that
captured documents which we have always made that claim-that Germany would be forced into war.
They admit they were planning war, but the captured documents ofthe Foreign Office that I have
examined all come down to the claim, "We have no way out; we mustfight; we are encircled; we are
being strangled to death." in London Conference Minutes, supra note 17. Emphasis added.
42 The authors do not explain what they mean by "shortcomings" nor do they offer examples.
43 Supra note 31 at 125-126. Emphasis added.
44 "Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial ofMajor German War Criminals"
(1947) 41 Am. J. InCl L. 172 at 221 [the "Nuremberg Judgment"].
15
so. The exercise Schuster embarks on to prove that "waging war" is not the
supreme international crime, therefore, is pointless. Still, he makes the claim that
aggression is not the worst crime of all, and this, based on two principle arguments.
First, he asserts that it is futile to inquire into whether war is waged in an aggressive
or defensive manner because parties will inevitably provide self-serving
justifications.45 And second, any real consequences or "atrocities" are only
committed after the decision to use armed force. Thus, Schuster maintains that it is
not aggressive war that is the cause of all evil, rather, it is the crimes that
accompany it.46 The atrocity or mala in se is the damage that is inflicted and
suffered during the course ofthe armed conflict, and the fact that the armed conflict
began in the first place is apparently irrelevant.47 Curiously, Schuster bases his
argument on the following quote by Justice Jackson and not on the actual excerpt
from the Nuremberg Judgment.48
Any resort to war - to any kind of war - is a resort to means that are
inherently criminal. War inevitably is a course ofkillings, assaults,
deprivations ofliberty, and destruction ofproperty. An honestly defensive
war is, of course, legal and saves those lawfully conducting it from
criminality. But inherently criminal acts cannot be defended by showing
that those who committed them were engaged in a war, when war itself is
illegal.49
To the extent that Jackson is claiming on the one hand, that every resort to armed
force is criminal and, on the other, that the resort to armed force for defensive
purposes is not criminal, Schuster's criticism of inconsistency is valid. Even so, it
45 This is akin to suggesting that there is no need for criminal law at all, as defendants will always
come up with excuses or justifications for their actions.
46 "This demonstrates that it is not necessarily aggressive war that is the cause ofall 'evil' and that is
the 'mala in se' but rather, as Professor Sadat Wexler has pointed out, 'the crimes committed against
life and property that accompany it - there will always be war crimes and crimes against humanity
where there is aggression." Schuster, supra note 4 at 13-14. It is uncertain whether Schuster would
similarly argue that the "worst thing" about murder is that the victim ends up dead, and not the fact
another person killed the victim. In any event, it would seem to Schuster, the criminal system should
not concern itself with the murderer's motive.
47 Schuster, supra note 4 at 13-14.
48 It is not clear why Schuster proceeds on this basis; perhaps it is to avoid directly criticizing the
Tribunal.
49 Schuster, supra note 4 at 13-14.
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is only valid insofar as the armed force is used before a state is attacked.so He
asserts that Jackson conceded, "a war that is waged in defence (whatever the
definition of a defensive war might be) would exculpate those who ordered it: 'An
honestly defensive war is, of course, legal and saves those lawfully conducting it
from criminality.",sl The words "wage" and "resort" are problematic. Unless
accompanied by a temporal qualifier (e.g. "before" or "after" an armed attack) it is
unclear what they mean. As neither person is very clear, the two can easily be
talking about two entirely separate contexts for the use of force. At best, each
person's choice of words is equally ambiguous. Given that the issue of self-defence
is central to any discussion on the use of force, or the crime of aggression, critical
discourse requires that we specify whether we are talking about use of force before
or after an armed attack.s2
Regardless ofwhat Jackson intended, Schuster assumes that he meant any use of
armed force (i.e. before or after an armed attack): "if the emphasis is placed on the
idea of war as the source of all evil, then it surely should not matter whether it is
waged in an aggressive or a defensive manner."S3 When we refer back to the
Nuremberg Judgment, it did not say that "war" or "armed conflict" was inherently
criminal; it said that the "initiation of a war of aggression was the supreme
international crime."S4 Nevertheless, Schuster's remark invites further comment on
the important issue of vocabulary in aggression discourse. "War" as a term is more
confusing than the "resort to war" or the "waging of war" as it not attributable to
any particular party; it neutrally describes the state of armed conflict.ss This is only
helpful if in the course of a discussion we are trying to discern whether we are
50 We do not know whether by "resort to armed force for defensive purposes" Jackson was referring
to the a) resort to military force in anticipation ofan armed attack, or b) taking up ofanns following
an armed attack.
5! Schuster, supra note 4 at 13. Emphasis added.
52 The importance ofthis distinction will become clearer in Chapter 4 below.
53 Schuster, supra, note 4 at 13.
54 The exact wording: "To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it
is the supreme international crime (... )." Supra, note 44.
55 By way ofanalogy, if we were trying to define "murder", "knife plunged into belly" describes a
gruesome event but hardly contributes to a definition. Similarly, "war" describes on-going
hostilities but fails to describe the essence of"aggression".
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referring to the period prior to or following the initiation of hostilities. In the final
analysis, however self-contradictory the quote by Jackson, if at all, it is peripheral
to the obiter statement made by the IMT.
Schuster then claims that it is pointless to inquire into the reasons why a war was
waged and points to the example of Vietnam.56 Because both the United States and
Vietnam alleged they were acting in self-defence,57 according to him, it serves little
purpose to inquire into the reasons why a state goes to war; the grounds for using
military force against another state are simply, irrelevant.
The very suggestion that what counts is limited to what takes place during an armed
conflict is no doubt meant to steer our attention away from the task at hand:
identifying cases of and defining aggression. On the contrary, the circumstances
surrounding, and the motivation for using force are the crux of the question of
aggression in that they go to the very heart of the matter.58 To conflate
"aggressive" and "defensive" war, or "use of force", denies the mutual exclusivity
of the two notions and renders any pretext to use force, meaningless.
The failure to distinguish aggression from defensive action essentially places them
on the same continuum. With appropriate definitions of "use of force" and "self-
defence" (and a fair understanding of their nature and criteria), a distinction can be
drawn between aggressive and defensive action. It is not necessary to describe a
particular use of force as falling "somewhere" on the continuum. With objective
criteria, sound judgment and common sense, the law will apply and a particular use
of force will be characterized as either "aggression" or self-defence. Whether
Schuster sincerely believes that there is nothing undesirable about starting a war
(for any reason), or he is resigned to the "reality of war" - or realpolitik, his
analysis suggests that international law has no role to play in the decision to use
56 Schuster, supra note 4 at 13.
57 In the case of the United States, it argued that it engaged in collective self-defence, while Vietnam
was acting in individual self-defence.
58 See discussion on general scope of the crime of aggression in Chapter 4 below.
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force on behalf of or against another state.59 Thus, he is denying that prohibition on
the use of anned force isjus cogens. 60
Schuster concludes his critique with the suggestion that if aggression was ever the
supreme crime, then its importance in a legal context has certainly faded by now
with the other Nuremberg crimes having risen to the "undisputed status of
customary internationallaw.,,61 Such a claim, however, is not supported by the
work ofthe International Law Commission62 and the academics who have debated
the subject for the last half century.63
1.3 Deterrence
Although the concept of deterrence is key in matters of international relations and
national security, for the following discussion on the deterrent effect of
international criminal law its meaning is limited to the definition provided by
Schuster, namely, the "ability of a legal system to discourage or prevent certain
59 Schuster actually refers to realpolitik in his section on "deterrent value" premise for including
aggression in the Rome Statute.
60 See Chapter 2 below.
61 Schuster, supra note 4 at 13. It should be recalled that genocide, itself, was not an international
crime for which individuals could be held criminally responsible until it was included in the ICTY
Statute.
62 Inter alia, 1954 and 1996 Draft Code ofOffences (Crimes) against the Peace and Security of
Mankind; 1993 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Report of the International Law
Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, 2 May-22 July 1994, Chapter II.B.I., United
Nations General Assembly Official Records, Forty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 10, Al49/1 0
(1994),29-140 [hereinafter ILC Draft Statute]. See also Report by Ricardo J. Alfaro, Special
Rapporteur "Question oflnternational Criminal Jurisdiction" in which he writes: "But, after all, the
atrocities resulting from the actual conduct of hostilities and the occupation of invaded countries
were an effect of the basic crime ofplanning and waging a war in violation of international law.
This crime constitutes the root of the problem. It is this crime that the community of States must
stamp out of international life." ILC Document AlCNA/15 (incorporating document
AlCNA/l5/Corr. I) 3 March 1950 at para. 6.
63 "The crime of war is the cause and the parent of war crimes and of misery on a vast scale. It is the
greatest menace to civilization and to the survival of mankind. We would have failed in our duty if
we had not done our share in putting it beyond doubt that aggressive war is a crime under
international law." Lauterpacht, supra note 8 at 83.
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conduct through threats of punishment or other expression of disapproval.,,64 In the
on-going effort to criminalize aggression, is it justified to assume that the crime will
actually have a deterrent effect?65 In the context of aggression, Schuster reminds
us, the threat of effective legal sanctions would be aimed at the decision-makers.66
He believes that the fact that it is decision-makers who would ultimately be held
responsible renders the entire process all the more complicated. And because it will
be "exceedingly difficult" to identify those responsible for aggression, there may be
little or no deterrent effect.67
In a work published fifty years ago, Julius Stone observed how "extremely
difficult" it was to ascertain exactly which individuals among the most powerful in
a country, were the decision-makers.68 Presumably, the argument goes, ifit is
difficult to identify the perpetrators, then this will diminish the deterrent effect, if
any, crimes would have on them. Put differently, the harder it is to catch would-be
perpetrators, the more inclined they are to engage in the undesirable behaviour.
This raises an interesting question: should we criminalize certain behaviour when it
is not likely to have a deterrent effect (or have little effect) on would-be
perpetrators? Or, should the level of anticipated deterrence not be a factor at all?
This assumes, of course, that we can measure the success rate of future prosecutions
and the consequential deterrent value. It may also be putting the cart before the
horse; by criminalizing behaviour we mean to send the message that certain
behaviour is not acceptable and will be punished.
To the extent that any deterrent effect is diminished in inverse proportion to the
level ofdifficulty identifying perpetrators, Schuster's argument stands to reason.
Depending on the government structure and hierarchy, it may not be evident who
wields the ultimate decision-making power. However, states do generally have a
64 The author cites P. Akhavan, "Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Fonner Yugoslavia?" 20 (1998)
Hum. Rts. Q. 737, 741. See Schuster, supra note 4 at 15.
65 Schuster, ibid. at 14.
66 Ibid. at 15.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid. Schuster is citing Stone, supra note 20.
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limited number of individuals who fit the description of "decision-makers" and so
the prospects of successfully identifying the individuals responsible for aggression
remain reasonably high. Implicit in this argument is that difficulty in identifying
the perpetrator is a feature unique to the crime of aggression. Crimes against
humanity and genocide however are also perpetrated by decision-makers, so the
same logic would apply to them.69
Schuster argues that because aggression has traditionally expressed itself in state
actions, the international criminal law targeting aggressors "will have to overcome
the [possibility that such leaders are acting under powerful pressures, and promises
issuing from the state community], something that is very unlikely.,,7o He suggests
that under the weight of such pressure, political and military leaders are not likely to
be very influenced by the prospect of violating international law. 71 This raises two
more important issues: state responsibility for aggression (civil or penal), and the
relevance of domestic political pressure in prosecuting the crime of aggression.72 In
connection with the latter, if a decision-maker can demonstrate that he or she used
force under such pressure, it is unclear whether this would constitute a defence (a
justification or an excuse). 73
Schuster then suggests that the supposed deterrent value74 could actually have the
opposite effect, leading decision-makers to intensify their efforts "to ensure victory
in war" and that no international tribunal would have the actual power to prosecute
69 Experience prosecuting the crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity at the ad hoc tribunals
for the Fonner Yugoslavia and Rwanda would be instructive in this regard.
70 Schuster, supra note 4 at 15 quoting J. Stone, "We certainly cannot confidently assume that at the
crisis ofdecision the deterrent pressure ofan international criminal law would usually prevail in this
struggle".
71 Ibid. "It is therefore difficult to even conceive the scenario that Professor Sadat Wexler envisages,
where 'at least in democratic States, a general or Chief of Staff may, in a particular case, feel that a
certain military action violates international law and raise objections before rather than after the
fact."
72 See Nina H.B. Jorgensen, The Responsibility ofStates for International Crimes (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2000) for a thorough examination of the issue of state responsibility.
73 See Antonio Cassese, "Justifications and Excuses in International Criminal Law" Chapter 24.1 in
Cassese, The Rome Statute at 951.
74 The author may have meant to say that criminalizing aggression "could actually have ... "
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them.75 However, ifmilitary efforts are intensified, as Schuster anticipates they
might, surely the extent of overkill would strengthen the prosecution's case and
possibly factor into sentencing. As victors are not shielded from possible
prosecution, a neutral ICC should be free to measure the degree to which the
accused intensified efforts to ensure a "slam dunk" victory. Schuster cautions that
we bear in mind what is possible when "lofty goals of international justice clash
with the cynical exigencies of realpoliti~,76and asks how behaviour can be
deterred, ifit cannot be defined.77 Criminal law does not purport to deter behaviour
that has not yet been criminalized, or that has not yet been defined. Suggesting
therefore that we cannot deter behaviour which has not yet been defined, is to state
the obvious. What is less obvious is that aggression cannot be defined.
In the final analysis, Schuster's examination of the premises underlying the
inclusion of aggression in the Rome Statute raises a number of issues, some of
which are more important to its definition than others. In short, he maintains that
because defining aggression is prohibitively complex, all efforts to this end should
be abandoned. What Schuster abandons in fact, is the challenge at the heart of
defining aggression or the crime of aggression: identifying its characteristic feature.
75 Schuster, supra note 4 at 16. The author concedes that this might be a "far-fetched calculation, but
one should keep in mind what is possibly when the lofty goals of international justice clash with the
cynical exigencies of realpolitik." The underlying assumption here is that the victor ofan armed
conflict will always go un-prosecuted. Perhaps this was the case with Nuremberg and Tokyo, but
the ICC promises to make a firm departure from this tradition. In this connection, see ICC news
release 12 August 2004 reporting that both sides in the DRC conflict (DRC and Uganda) are being
accused ofatrocities. It nevertheless behooves the ICC and the network ofgovernmental and non-
governmental organizations supporting it to impart a clear message that the Court is a neutral body
that will prosecute any individuals involved in matters that fall within its rationae materiae
jurisdiction.
76 Schuster, supra note 4 at 16. This rings ofa veiled warning.
77 Ibid. The author refers to Allegra Carroll Carpenter, "The International Criminal Court and the
Crime of Aggression" (1995) 64 Nordic 1. Int'I L. 223 at 227 who writes, "[i]n analyzing the 1993
draft of the Court, David Krieger postulates that the purpose ofestablishing a tribunal is "not so
much to punish the guilty as to provide a clear warning to would-be violators of international law
that their crimes will not be tolerated." With regard to the crime ofaggression this noble intention is
not likely to bear fruit. First, aggression results from the accumulation of forces originating in the
minds of individuals but ultimately come to life as the act of a sovereign. The individuals carrying
out the forces ofaggression may themselves not be aware that their actions are criminal. Entirely
aside form concerns about the judicial postulate this phenomenon may violate, it is a dynamic that
prevents deterrence from taking place. In short it is difficult to deter what cannot be defined."
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What makes aggression "aggression" and self-defence "not aggression"? What are
its essential and sufficient conditions or characteristics? These are the questions
this paper hopes to answer.78
The precedent value ofNuremberg and Tokyo will be reviewed in the next chapter
as we examine the legality rule, nullum crimen sine lege, and its application to the
crime of aggression. Issues such as whether perpetrators are likely to commit other
core crimes, and the relative "importance" of aggression, will not be examined
further. Aggression may be, but it does not need to be, the supreme international
crime. And the deterrent effect of the crime ofaggression will be what it will be, if
and when the time comes.
Finally, the other issues raised in Schuster's analysis are questions that are not
unique to the crime of aggression; crimes against humanity and genocide are just as
much "state-involving" or "leadership" crimes as is aggression. The questions that
relate to this aspect ofthe nature of the crime therefore apply to the two other core
crimes: for example, the difficulty to identify perpetrators; whether there are clear
and flagrant examples ofthe crime; and whether "public pressure" can constitute a
defence.
Although few, if any, of Schuster's criticisms ofthe premises for including
aggression in the Rome Statute withstand scrutiny, they emphasize the importance
of carefully framing our discourse using the proper vocabulary to avoid conflating
the issues.
78 See Chapter 4 below.
Chapter 2: Individual Criminal Liability
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Sources doctrine serves a number ofpurposes. It is the tool used to i) explain who
is authorized to make law; ii) determine when binding norms emerge; iii) confirm
those who are bound to comply with the rules; and, iv) explain how rules of
international law (soft law or hard law) acquire their legally-binding force. 79 When
it is defined, the crime of aggression will become a treaty-based rule of
international law that is legally-binding on the nationals of those states and other
entities over which the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction. Or will it?
While acknowledging that treaties, custom and general principles are the accepted
sources of international law, Anthony Arend challenges tradition arguing that two
criteria be used to determine whether a putative norm is genuine international law:
"authority" and "control".8o A rule of international law, he posits, is authoritative
when it is perceived to be legitimate or has opinio juris.8I It is controlling when
states actually comply. Even treaty law, Arend argues, is subject to these criteria.
It seems reasonable to argue, for example, that states have in practice
effectively withdrawn their consent from a particular provision of a treaty,
and hence, that it is not 'law,' if: 1) the provision is not believed by them to
be authoritative, and 2) there is very little compliance with the provision,
even though the treaty may remain technically 'in force'. Similarly, if a
putative general principle is not perceived to be authoritative and is not
controlling, it would be impossible to declare that it is truly a 'general
principle oflaw recognized by the civilized nations. In short, whatever the
traditional source ofa particular rule oflaw in question may be, the validity
ofthe rule will be determined by reference to its authority and control.82
79 Vaughan Lowe, "The Politics ofLaw-Making: Are the Method and Character ofNonn Creation
Changing?" in Michael Byers, ed., The Role ofLaw in International Politics; Essays in International
Relations and International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) 207.
80 Anthony Arend, International Law and the Use ofForce (New York: Routledge, 2003) at 8-9.
The author explains in a footnote that the concepts of"authority" and "control" have been
"prominently developed in the jurisprudence ofMyers McDougal, Harold Lasswell and the so-called
'New Haven School'." The author's understanding of the concepts differs slightly from that of the
New Haven School of thought in two respects (see footnote 47 ofChapter 1). The fonnal sources of
international law are listed under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
81 Ibid. For a thorough development of the concept oflegitimacy in relation to international rules,
the author cites Thomas Franck's The Power ofLegitimacy Among Nations (1990).
82 Arend, supra note 80 at 9-10. Emphasis added.
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Diverging from the traditional conception of international law sources doctrine, this
theory is based on legal positivism.83 Quoting Brierly, Arend writes: "the doctrine
ofpositivism ... teaches that international law is the sum of the rules by which
states have consented to be bound, and that nothing can be law to which they have
not consented.,,84 Accordingly, unless a norm restricting state behaviour comes
with a high level of authority, it is not a norm of international law and states can act
as they choose.85 For the use of force to be prohibited, therefore, there would need
to be an authoritative and controlling proscription against it.86
The major problem with this reasoning is in its underlying premise: that the law is
that there is no law unless it is authoritative and controlling. Arend's claim is itself
cloaked in normative language and purports to be a norm though it has no source at
law. This purported norm ofArend's falls short itselfof the criteria it espouses,
namely, that it be authoritative and controlling. A second weakness with his
position lies in the suggestion that because states are free to unsign treaties at will,
they can unsign any international legal obligation that no longer suits their fancy-
includingjus cogens norms such as the prohibition on the use of force. This is
false.
Although the legitimacy of a particular rule must never be taken for granted, it is
believed that a school ofthought that posits the two criteria outlined by Arend
not only reflects the view of a shrinking minority, but is a danger and a menace
to peace in the international community ifleft unscrutinized. It makes more
sense to suggest that a norm must be legitimate (i.e. and not necessarily
controlling87) as established by the notion of opinion juris. Undoubtedly, the
83 Ibid. at 10.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 There are several problems with the criterion of "controlling", not the least of which is trying to
measure the incidence of compliance with a particular norm.
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business oflaw-making and in particular international law-making must
conform to a minimum standard oflegitimacy. New rules of international law
do not just happen.
The direct, prophetic announcement ofnorms is a dangerous activity. Who
counts as a true prophet? Which norms are valid? It is natural that this
phrase should be accompanied by a concern to control the process and to
preserve the purity ofthe wells form which the norms flow. 88
Lowe's concern to "control the process" and "preserve the purity" ofthe law-
making system emphasizes the importance ofvalidating norms, particularly in the
international context. 89 A rule's legitimacy is all that needs to be established for an
international norm to constitute international law. Although states are traditionally
regarded as the entities responsible for the wrongful act of aggression, over the past
century the concept of aggression has been enlarged to accommodate the
characterization of aggression as a crime giving rise to individual criminal liability.
The process ofvalidating the crime of aggression therefore does not require us to
shift or transfer the concept ofliability from one entity to the other (i.e. from state
to individual); international law at once both outlaws aggression as it pertains to
state or non-state actors, and criminalizes it in relation to its individual perpetrators.
Traditional sources doctrine should confirm the legitimacy ofthe crime of
aggression once it is defined, based on the fact that it is codified in the Rome
Statute. Nevertheless, in anticipation of challenges to its legitimacy, and to bolster
its legal-binding force, this chapter examines its legitimacy of the crime of
88 Vaughan Lowe, at 223.
89 See M. CherifBassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, Second Revised Edition, 1999) at xi. The author observed there
outstanding questions regarding the legitimacy of holding individuals responsible for crimes against
humanity, and in his preface, recounts his experience as legal expert in the Canadian case ofR. vs.
Finta, Canada's first prosecution of"crimes against humanity" under a 1987 statute incorporating
this international crime into Canadian criminal law. Although his explanation of the crime was
accepted by the court but in the process of preparing for the case, he was left with more questions
than he had to begin with ("the case for the legal validity and viability of 'crimes against humanity'
needed to be made, Nuremberg and Tokyo notwithstanding").
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aggression under three rubrics: the evolution of international criminal law;
historical developments; and legal premises.
2.1 International Criminal Law
The process leading up to the creation of a legal system is made up of a series of
phases.
First, questions as to 'proper' courses of international conduct have arisen in
the day-to-day dealings of States, and solutions to the questions have been
consciously adopted, with the consciousness or intention that the solutions
should carry, as it were, a normative charge. Further, the solutions have
been recorded. (... ) At a later stage the solution in detached from the
problem and recorded separately - the rule is stated without the facts of the
precedents. And then a third stage is reached in which the solutions are
brought into order and coherence, and the relations between the rules
clarified and systematized. Finally, and crucially, there is the stage at which
the ordered solutions are recognized as constituting a legal system. That is
to say, it is recognized that the system of ordered solutions - the system of
rules - is capable of generating solutions to questions ofkinds that have not
previously arisen. The norms have a force that reaches beyond the scope of
the problems that gave rise to them. At this stage, there is an active, self-
generating system ofnorms, not simply a copybook of precedents. There is,
in Maine's words, 'a complete, coherent, symmetrical body of ... law, of an
amplitude sufficient to furnish principles which would apply to any
conceivable combination of circumstances.' 90
Current international criminal law straddles Lowe's third and fourth stage of
development. Specifically, solutions are stilI being brought into order and
coherence, and relations between the rules are being clarified and systematized.
Some rules are gradually being recognized by the international community as
applicable to questions that have not previously arisen.91 The rule holding
individuals responsible for the crime of aggression, for example, is in the process of
90 Lowe, supra note 79 at 209-210.
91 Ibid.
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being developed, and its opinio juris (authority or legitimacy) being established. In
this light, we might question the fairness ofArend's somewhat premature challenge
to the legitimacy the jus cogens norm prohibiting the use of force. Before the norm
has had a chance to evolve and develop into an established international legal rule,
it is already being denied its very existence.
Until the middle of the nineteenth century international criminal laws were virtually
non-existent but for piracy and slave-trading which were limited in scope and rarely
enforced.92 Ancient customary laws ofwar provided for individual criminal
responsibility for only narrowly defined breaches ofmedieval law, such as use of
the crossbow, poisoning ofwells, or wanton attacks on the civilian population.93
The evolutionary process through which international crimes have evolved over the
course of time is characterized by unevenness and lack of systematization.94
[I]ntemational criminal law norms have originated in diverse sources, and
developed unsystematically over time. The content and mode of
implementation of each norm reflect the immediate historical context ofthe
period in which the norm emerged and the way in which legal recognition
came about. International criminal law norms are neither uniform nor
consistent in application and often vary greatly as regards source oflaw,
form and legal status.95
92 Lyal S. Sunga, The Emerging System ofInternational Criminal Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law
International, 1997) at 3.
93 Ibid.
94 "International crimes have evolved over the course of time and have been embodied in a number
of multilateral conventions. Between 1815 and 1996,322 multilateral instruments have been
developed. These instruments fall within twenty-five categories of international crimes." Bassiouni,
supra note 89 at 253.
95 Sunga, supra note 92 at 2-3. See also Lyal S. Sunga, Individual Responsibility in International
Lawfor Serious Human Rights Abuses (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992) at 163-4
where the author writes, "As the general rule stipulating individual responsibility for serious human
rights violations has not yet emerged in international law, it is possible only to extrapolate what its
source and legal validity are likely to be. Thus far, implementation ofnorms in international law
stipulating individual responsibility for serious human rights violations has been very sparse,
perhaps because these norms taken together are complex and chaotic; they developed
unsystematically over a long period of time and originated in many legal sources. [... ] The content,
legal status and effect of the norms reflect, and are to a certain extent, constrained by, the particular
circumstances and times in which the prescriptive content emerged and legal recognition was
evinced."
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Just because it is called "international criminal law" does not mean that domestic
criminal law principles automatically or equally apply in the international setting.
In the case ofthe latter there is, theoretically, no hierarchical structure involving
subordination - no legislature that makes states its subjects.
The parallel drawn by part of the doctrine between the treatment to be
applied to serious violations by States and the treatment applied by domestic
law to breaches by individuals clashes however with the sharply different
structure of the two systems. In fact, criminal law, inspired by the principles
ofhierarchy and subordination, can hardly be used as a basis for
international law, which is governed by the principle of sovereign equality
. b 96among Its mem ers.
Leanza explains how the evolution of international practice on individual
responsibility for international crimes has always been accompanied by the
development ofdifferent theories aimed at establishing a special form of state
responsibility for the commission of international crimes.97 Such theories range
from the characterization of the so-called criminal (or "rogue") state, to the
recognition of international criminal responsibility for legal persons, among which
states would also be included.98 He adds that the initial efforts made by the United
Nations to establish an International Criminal Court possibly failed, in part, due to
the fact that "the issue ofrepression of individual crimes and the issue of
international responsibility of States were often the object ofuseless as well as
dangerous confusions.,,99
If international criminal law is characterized by a lack ofsystematization, then the
same can probably be said for other specialized areas of public international law.
96 Umberto Leanza, "The Historical Background" in Mauro Politi and Giuseppe Nesi eds., The
International Criminal Court and the Crime ofAggression (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited,
2004) ["ICCCA"] at 10-11.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid..
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The fact that the legal system from whence the crime of aggression evolved is not
strictly organized should not dilute, nor detract from its legitimacy.
2.2 Historical Developments regarding the Crime ofAggression
The idea of punishing individuals for aggression is not new. The first documented
prosecution for initiating an unjust war lOO is reported to have occurred in Naples in
1268 when Conradin von Hohenstafen was executed for that reason. 101 Most
authors would contend the "idea that the waging ofaggressive war, or 'crimes
against peace', or something resembling it, might be prosecuted" originated with
the British in 1918.102 At that time, the objective was to try Kaiser Wilhelm and
other leading Germans and to punish those responsible for the war or for atrocious
violations ofthe laws ofwar. 103
100 The notion of holding individuals responsible for aggression evolved from the antiquated
concepts ofjust and unjust war. See J.B. Scott, The Spanish Conception ofInternational Law and
Sanctions, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 1934) at 88-89: "Modem conscience
condemns in principle the use offorce for the settlement of any controversy, even if the State
resorting to war can prove that a wrong has been committed against it. This line of though is
strengthened by the fact that in the days ofold, wars were justified for the redress of wrong, because
there did not exist in the international community an authority vested with power to decide
controversies between States. 'The only justification for war, in the opinion of enlightened
theologians, from St. Augustine down, was that between equal states there was not and could not be
in the then state of affairs, a court of the superior. We of today have solved the difficulty by creating
a court of the superior, the superior in this instance being none other than the international
community and to this supreme tribunal all States of the world may appeal for a redress of their legal
wrongs.'"
IOJ Bassiouni, supra note 89 at 517. The author includes the following footnote: "Reported by
Remiguisz Bierzanek, War Crimes: History and Definition, in I Bassiouni and Nanda Treatise at
559-60 (1973). The original source is likely to be Emmerich de VatteI, Le Droit des Gens, bk. III
(1887)." At 514 the author writes, "The prosecutions for certain international crimes, as described in
this Chapter, are important precedents. In all of these, the principle of individual criminal
responsibility has been reaffirmed in much the same terms as it is with respect to criminal
responsibility in every national criminal justice system - the difference being that the source of
applicable law is international as opposed to national law."
102 William A. Schabas, "Origins of the Criminalization of Aggression: How Crimes Against Peace
Became the 'Supreme International Crime' in ICCCA, supra note 96, 17 at 20.
103 Ibid. The Kaiser had sought refuge in the Netherlands, a neutral country after World War I, and
there was a "growing feeling that war itself was a crime against humanity..." The author cites
David Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, Vol. I, London: Victor Gollancz, 1938,
pp.93-Il4.
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The 1919 Report of the Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors ofWar
and Enforcement ofPenalties for Violations of the Laws and Customs of War
established an elaborate scheme of international crimes and international liability
and is often touted as the greatest development in the area of individual
responsibility in international criminallaw. 104 While the report stipulated that it
was desirable for the future that penal sanctions follow such "grave outrages against
the elementary principles of international law," 105 it recommended that the crime of
waging war not be prosecuted. 106 In spite of this, the Treaty ofVersailles called
for the public arraignment ofWilhelm II ofHohenzollern. 107 The German
population protested the inclusion of this article and, surprisingly, the Allies readily
conceded that the indictment did not have "a juridical character as regards its
substance, but only in its form".108 This state of affairs led to Germany trying its
own alleged war criminals and the ultimate conviction of six, ofthe original eight
hundred and ninety-five people listed, for war crimes. 109
During the Second World War the London International Assembly was established
under the aegis of the League ofNations. The Assembly created a commission to
104 Bassiouni, supra note 89 at 520.
105 Ibid. at 238. Emphasis in original.
106 "The premeditation ofa war ofaggression dissimulated under a peaceful pretence, then suddenly
declared under false pretexts, is conduct which the public conscience reproves and which history
will condemn, but by reason ofpurely optional character of the Institutions at The Hague for the
maintenance ofpeace (International Commission ofInquiry, Mediation and Arbitration) a war of
aggression may not be considered as an act directly contrary to positive law, or one which can
successfully brought before a tribunal such as the Commission is authorized to consider under its
Terms ofReference... We therefore do not advise that the acts which provoked the war should be
charted against their authors and made the subject of proceedings before a tribunal", United Nations
War Crimes Commission, History ofthe United Nations War Crimes Commission and the
Development ofthe Laws ofWar, London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948 p. 237 ["History of
UN War Crimes"] as cited by Schabas, supra 102 at 20.
107 "The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II ofHohenzollern, formerly
German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of
treaties" Article 227 Treaty of Versailles, 1919, II Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 323. Emphasis
added.
108 Schabas, supra note 102 at 21. The Treaty essentially "declared" the individual responsibility of
the Kaiser. The Allies consented to let Germany prosecute the alleged war criminals, "a concession
that the Allies would subsequently regret". Within the framework ofthe Commission on
Responsibility, the Allies submitted a list of 895 names ofalleged war criminals. For political
reasons, and largely because Germany was reluctant to hand over accused war criminals, the list
shrunk to forty-five. In the end, a mere twelve individuals were tried before the Supreme Court of
Germany sitting in Leipzig, half of whom were acquitted. Bassiouni, supra note 89 at 520-1.
109 Ibid.
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study the question of "war crimes". This commission eventually agreed to a broad
definition ofwar crimes that included aggression. I 10 In 1943 the United Nations
War Crimes Commission came into existence, taking over the work ofthe
Assembly commission for the upcoming prosecutions. I I I The most important issue
at that time was whether aggressive war amounted to a criminal act. 112 Since 1942,
a Czechoslovakian barrister by the name ofBohuslav Ecer had been arguing that
the "paramount crime" of the Axis powers was the "launching and waging ofthe
war".J13 In 1944 the UN War Crimes Commission's Legal Committee favoured
Ecer's opinion, however, there were opponents to the idea. A sub-committee
created for the purpose of looking into the question issued two reports: one
supporting criminalization and the other, a minority position, rejecting the idea. By
the time the London Conference took place, no decision had been reached. I 14 Ecer
continued to maintain that the law on the waging of aggressive war had been
"transformed" since World War I, mainly as a result of the Kellogg-Briand Pact,
and that it was correct to state that "[a]ggressive warfare, in itself, even ifwaged
without 'atrocities' and in full compliance with the conventions ofThe Hague and
Geneva, is a crime. ,,115
Aggressive war is a crime, and by its character an international crime,
because it aims against peace and international order. The total aggressive
war started by Germany and her allies in 1939 is additionally an
international crime in its territorial extent and the number ofvictims ofthe
aggressIOn.
Not only the aggressor States as such, but also their rulers and military
leaders are personally responsible in the eyes of the law for the gigantic
110 Schabas, supra note 102 at 22.
III Ibid. The author reports that this Commission even drafted the statute ofa future international
criminal court. History of the UN War Crimes, supra note 106 at 107-118.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid. at 26.
115 Schabas, supra note 102 at 23. The author cites Bohuslav Ecer, "The Punishment ofWar
Criminals", confidential document dated 10 October 1942 submitted to the London International
Assembly, Commission II on the Trial ofWar Criminals, reprinted in George J. Lankevich, ed.,
Archives ofthe Holocaust Vol. 16, New York and London: Garland, 1990, pp. 1-4. See Chapter I
above for a discussion on how aggression is not the "supreme international crime", and how the
decision to wage war and the atrocities that follow are notionally inseparable.
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chain of crimes which compose this war and which are punishable under the
criminal laws ofthe countries affected.
The penalty according to all these laws is death. 1l6
It was this view that prevailed at the London Conference making "Crimes Against
Peace" the most important charge in the indictments against the defendants. Article
6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg defined Crimes
against Peace as follows:
(a) Crimes against peace: namely, planning preparation, initiation or waging of
a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy
for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing. 117
In 1945, the IMTs for Nuremberg and Tokyo handed down decisions holding
several individuals criminally liable for crimes against peace, crimes against
humanity and war crimes. According to Dupuy,
[E]ven before the existence ofUnited Nations law and prior to incorporation
ofthe principle stated in Article 2(4) ofthe Charter into customary law, the
Tokyo Tribunal had already handed down numerous condemnations for
plotting against peace between 1 January 1928 and 2 September 1945. 118
The two International Military Tribunals also handed down a number of
condemnations for crimes against peace stricto sensu. ,,119 Prior to Nuremberg and
116 Schabas, supra note 96 at 23-4.
117 Charter of the International Military Tribunal.
118 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, "International Criminal Responsibility of the Individual and International
Responsibility of the State" in Cassese, The Rome Statute, Volume 11,1085 at 1089.
119 Dupuy's text is ambiguous and may lead one to think that condemnations were handed down
between 1928 and 1945. Rather, it was indeed the conspiracies that occurred between 1928 and
1945. Dupuy references R. Maison, "La Responsabilite individuelle pour crime d'Etat en droit
international public', these Universite Paris 2,janvier 2000,69 et seq. The Maison text reads: "Le
Tribunal de Tokyo, en pronon9ant de nombreuses condemnations pour complot, a reconnu
I'existence d'un projet politique specifique, conduit sur une periode s'etendant entre Ie ler janvier
1928 et Ie 2 septembre 1945, et dont Ie but etait d'assurer la domination navale, politique et
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Tokyo, the classical rules of international responsibility of states essentially ignored
the role of the individual who acted on the state's behalf. 120 The Nuremberg
Tribunal handily reversed this trend by trying individuals accused of three
categories of international crimes, including crimes against peace (i.e. aggression).
In one fell swoop, the Tribunal rejected the classical rules.
Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the
. . f· . 11 b ~ d 121proVIsIOns 0 mternatIOna aw e enlorce .
In December 1946 the UN General Assembly affirmed "the principles of
iriternationallaw recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the
judgment of the Tribunal" and directed a Committee created for the codification of
international law to treat as a matter ofprimary importance plans for the
formulation of offences against the peace and security of mankind or an
International Criminal Code of the "principles recognized in the Charter ofthe
Nuremberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal.,,122
economique du Japon en Asie de l'Est et sur les oceans Pacifique et Indien." Maison, in tum,
provides the following footnote, "En vertu du premier chefd' accusation (complot) : 'All the
defendants together with divers (sic) other persons, between the Ist January 1928 and the 2nd
September 1945, participated as leaders, organizers, instigators, or accomplices in the formulation or
execution of a common plan or conspiracy, and are responsible for all acts performed by themselves
or by any person in execution of such plan. The object of such plan or conspiracy was that Japan
should secure the military, naval, political and economic domination ofEast Asia and of the Pacific
and Indian ocean, and of all the countries and islands therein and bordering thereon and for that
purpose should alone or in combination with other countries having similar objects, or who could be
induced or coerced to join therein, wage declared or undeclared war or wars of aggression, and war
or wars in violation of international law, treaties, agreements and assurances, against any country or
countries which might oppose that purpose.'''
120 The classic example is the case ofThe Netherlands refusing to surrender Kaiser Wilhelm
following World War I. The Netherlands replied to the victorious powers at the time, "L'offense
supreme contre la morale internationale et l'autorite des traits ... ne figurant pas dans les
nomenclatures des infractions penales inserees dans les lois de Hollande ou les traits par elle
conclus." (1920) 8 Revue de droit international 40, cited in William A. Schabas, supra note 102.
121 The Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 44.
122 UNGA resolution 95(1) II December 1946. The ILC submitted the Nuremberg Principles to the
General Assembly in 1950, however, pursuant to resolution 488 (V) the Assembly decided to neither
adopt nor reject ILC Nuremberg Principles. Principle VI (a) Crimes against peace: (i) Planning,
preparation, initiation or waging ofa war ofaggression or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances; (ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment
of any ofthe acts mentioned under (i). Note this is the same wording as Article 6(a) of the IMT
Charter but for the roman numerals.
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The following year, the Assembly requested the International Law Commission to
formulate the Nuremberg Principles and to prepare a Draft Code of Offences
against the Peace and Security ofMankind. 123 The original version of the Draft
Code of Offences published by the ILC in 1951 attempted to establish "a distinction
between crimes which could only be committed by the authorities ofa state and
crimes which could be committed by an individual.,,124
Article 1 ofthe final version of the Code of Offences established the connection
between international crimes for which the authorities ofa state would be
responsible, and individual accountability.
Offences against the peace and security ofmankind, as defined in this Code,
are crimes under international law, for which the responsible individuals
shall be punished. 125
In 1957 the General Assembly requested that the ILC defer its work on the Draft
Code of Offences until a definition for the crime of aggression was reached. 126 This
was an interesting development for the following reason: while the ILC Draft Code
provided for individual criminal liability, the work undertaken concurrently by a
Special Committee on the Question ofDefining Aggression related to state
responsibility. It took four consecutive Special Committees two decades to prepare
the draft the General Assembly adopted under resolution 3314, or what came to be
123 UNGA resolution 177(II) 21 November 1947.
124 Jorgensen, supra note 72 at 144-145. The lLC commentaries state that by their very nature,
"these crimes can only be committed by the authorities of a state however individual penal
responsibility may result through the application of crime (11) that deals with conspiracy,
incitement, attempt, and complicity." Ibid. The only exception is crime (3) "The incursion into the
territory of a state by armed bands coming from the territory of another state and acting for a
political purpose." The lLC commentaries specify that any member of the band would be
responsible. "This difference of treatment is justified because, in the case ofstate action, it would go
beyond any logic to consider a mere soldier as criminally responsible for an action which has been
decided and directed by the authorities ofa state while in the case of armed bands the participation in
them will result from the free decision of the individual members of the band." Text ofDraft Code
of Offences against the Peace and Security ofMankind, (1951) Yrbk ILC, vol. II.
125 Draft Code of Offences, ibid.
126 UNGA resolution 1186 (XII).
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known as the 1974 Consensus Dejinition. 127 The 1996 revised Draft Code of
Crimes against the Peace and Security ofMankind scales down aggression to one
sentence. 128 Article 16 entitled, "Crimes against the peace and security of
Mankind" reads:
An individual who, as leader, or organizer, actively participates in or orders
the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of aggression committed by a
State shall be responsible for a crime of aggression. 129
Finally, in 1998 the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court was
adopted. While it includes the crime of aggression, the Court will only have
jurisdiction over the crime when a definition has been agreed upon by the Assembly
of States Parties.
2.3 Legal Premises
In addition to the fact that the crime of aggression is still in its "formative" stage of
development as an international legal norm, and a lengthy list ofkey historical
127 The four committees were: First Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression
(1953-54); the Second Special Committee (1956-57); the Third Special Committee (1959-1967) and
the Fourth Special Committee (1968-1974). For details on work undertaken by all four Special
Committees see Ahmed M. Rifaat, supra note 7 at 231-262. The definition of aggression, supra note
6, would serve as a guideline for the Security Council in its determinations of acts of aggression.
Paragraph 4 of Resolution 3314 reads: "Calls the attention of the Security Council to the Definition
of Aggression, as set out below, and recommends that it should, as appropriate, take account of that
Definition, as guidance in determining, in accordance with the Charter, the existence of an act of
aggression." See Benjamin Ferencz, "Nations seemed to have forgotten, or chose to overlook, the
fact that the 1946 General Assembly mandate was to draft a definition, not merely to serve as a
guide to the Council, but as the most important provision of a new criminal code that would legally
bind everyone and serve the cause of world peace." Benjamin Ferencz, "Deterring Aggression by
Law - A Compromise Proposal" January 11,2001 on web site visited 9 September 2004,
http://www.benferencz.org/defined.htm.
128 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1996, Yearkbook ofthe
International Law Commission, 1996, vol. II(2). Under Part I, Article 1 "Scope and application of
the present Code" provides that "Crimes against the peace and security of mankind are crimes under
international law and punishable as such, whether or not they are punishable under national law" at
para. 2.
129 Ibid.
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developments in the criminalization of aggression, three legal premises support the
legitimacy of the crime of aggression: compliance with the principle ofnullum
crimen sine lege; the jus cogens nature of the norm prohibiting the use of force
underlying the crime of aggression; and, the rising status of the individual under
international law.
Nullum Crimen Sine Lege
Now codified international criminal law, 130 the rule oflegality or nullum crimen
sine lege provides that a person cannot be tried for an act that was not a crime at the
time it occurred. Its sister rule, nulla poena sine lege, proscribes any form of
punishment unless the act was criminal at the time it was committed.
The crime of aggression has been incorporated into the Rome Statute and will be
prosecuted when it is defined. In virtue ofthe principle oflegality, this law will
only apply to acts that take place following its entry into force. Thus, the crime of
aggression will be in compliance with the rule of legality, not shrouded in the same
controversy over ex post facto that followed the Nuremberg and Tokyo judgments.
The questions raised by these decisions provide an ideal opportunity to examine the
applicability of the rule of legality to the crime of aggression, and to judge whether
the judgments constitute a precedent for the crime of aggression.
Supporters ofthe "Nuremberg precedent" postulate that this maxim did not apply to
crimes against peace, or that it applied but was not infringed. Two experts at
loggerheads over whether Nuremberg constituted a precedent provide varying
accounts of what the Tribunal held in respect of the rule oflegality.13I George
Finch, then-editor-in-chief of the American Journal of International Law, reports
130 Article 22, Rome Statute.
131 George A. Finch, "The Nuremberg Trial and International Law" (1947) 4 AJIL 20, and Quincy
Wright, "The Law of the Nuremberg Trials" (1947) 41 AJIL 38.
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that the Tribunal denied that the maxim had any application to the case. Finch, who
believed the decision violated the rule oflegality, quotes directly from the
Nuremberg Judgment:
"Occupying the positions they did in the Government of Germany, the
defendants, or at least some of them, must have known of the treaties signed
by Germany outlawing recourse to war for the settlement of international
disputes. They must have known that they were acting in defiance of
international law when in complete deliberation they carried out their
designs of invasion and aggression. On this view of the case then, it would
h h . h I·· h fi ,,132appear t at t e maxzm as no app zcatzon to t e present acts.
In contrast, Quincy Wright does not see the judgment as having violated the
principle oflegality: the Tribunal maintained that the rule ofinternational law
resting upon "general principles ofjustice" was affirmed by several then-recent
international declarations that aggressive war is an international crime. 133 The
rule, which was formally accepted by all the states concerned under the 1928
Pact of Paris condemning recourse to war to resolve international controversies, .
was the renunciation ofwar as an instrument ofnational policy, and made the
"resort to a war of aggression not merely illegal but criminal.,,134 The Tribunal
therefore, according to Wright, "considered that the well-known legal maxim
nullum crimen sine lege had been duly observed in the case.,,135
132 Finch, ibid. at 33. The first part of this excerpt (not quoted by Finch) reads: "In the first place, it
is to be observed that the maxim nul/urn crimen sine lege is not a limitation on sovereignty, but is in
general a principle ofjustice. To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaties
and assurances have attacked neighboring states without warning is obviously untrue, for in such
circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it being unjust to
punish him, it would be unjust ifhis wrong were allowed to go unpunished." Nuremberg Judgment,
supra note 44 at 49. Asserting that it is "unlawful" to punish when no crime is committed is not the
same as asserting it is "unjust". Possibly in reference to the Tribunal's reliance on a non sequitur,
Finch notes that the Tribunal did not cite any references to law, international conventions, court
decisions or customs which showed that individuals had theretofore been criminally punishable in an
international judicial forum for crimes against peace such as those charged.
133 Wright, supra note 131 at 54 (p. 220 ofjudgment).
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid. Emphasis added. Wright's conclusion is fallacious; any rule under the Pact ofParis of 1928
applied to states and did not provide for the individual criminal responsibility.
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Lador-Lederer, another proponent of the "Nuremberg precedent" who claims the
maxim does not apply to international criminal matters, draws a sharp distinction
between domestic and international criminal law. 136 The former, he argues, is
hierarchical in nature as between the state and subject while international law is a
level playing field where equal sovereign states are both law-maker and subject. I37
Lador-Lederer fashions some attractive arguments for the non-application of the
maxim. He maintains that "[w]hatever the belief in the paramountcy of treaty law
or customary law, the knowledge that penal law is not a contract with the offender
is one of the first lessons that a law student hears.,,138 He believes there are
misconceptions of the role that nullum crimen sine lege might play in international
affairs. "Casuistry in international law is a consequence" of these misconceptions,
and there has been a "dangerous oversimplification" in the analysis of the rule. 139
Lador-Lederer's first argument is that there is "normative content" in the inaction
ofthe competent domestic legislator (i.e. the legislator must have had good reason
for not criminalizing the behaviour), but the same cannot be said for any such
lacuna in international law. 140 The presumption that the legislator has considered, a
priori, all possible human behaviour - present and future - however, is easily
rebutted. 141 His second argument is based on a quote from an old American
Supreme Court decision which held that to be "open to objection, ex post facto law
is only such as has made criminal something 'which was innocent when done",.142
He points out the legal "trick" in this syllogism:
136 J.1. Lador-Lederer "International Penal Sanctions for Violations ofHuman Rights: Incipient
Developments" (1973) Israeli Yearbook ofHuman Rights 89 at 89.
137 Ibid. Much can be said about the "equality" of sovereign states in international law and
international relations.
138 Lador-Lederer, supra note 136 at 125.
139 Lador-Lederer, ibid. at 124. Causistry: "resolving problems ofconscience and duty with 'clever
but false reasoning"'. The Concise Oxford Dictionary, Ninth Edition (Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1995) definition of"casuist".
140 Lador-Lederer, ibid.
141 The absence of relevant legislation may be due to the delay involved in the law "catching up" to
technology. For example, driving under the influence was once unimaginable behaviour; and even
when it was practiced, Canada waited more than forty years to criminalize it. Another reason for
legislative inaction is the paternalist influence on law-making both at the domestic and international
law levels.
142 Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall 386, 390 (1798).
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[T]he telescoping into one sentence oflegal concepts belonging to two
distinct legal philosophies: "legal" as a matter ofPositive Law and
"innocent" as a matter ofNatural Law. (... ) if an act was not innocent in
Natural Law, and punishment is inflicted after a definite offence was
committed, the offender shall not be allowed to plead that, because ofthe
non-retroactivity of such offence, there was innocence on his part, or
impunity is due to him. In a conflict between a clear postulate in Natural
Law and Positive Law, the political agent may not enjoy impunity. 143
To side-step any positivist issues the Court expanded the notion of"innocent" to
include the moral as well as the legal concept. A pari, the Nuremberg tribunal
equated the violation of an international treaty with a moral wrong (and then
equated the moral wrong with an international crime).144 Nuremberg used the open
concept of immorality to transform a violation ofan international norm into an
international crime. Natural Law, which is neither articulated nor evidenced in
ways like customary law is, for example, and Positive Law are thereby placed into
the same category of "international law". Thus, both legal philosophies are
accorded legally-binding status as "sources" of international law, which they are
not.145 As such, they would be on an equal footing and applicable concurrently.
And so, the leap of faith the Nuremberg Tribunal took between the positivist and
naturalist realm - becomes a mere hop. Accepting that two distinct philosophies
can apply in relation to a single matter in a single decision (although recognizing
Natural Law is highly unorthodox in methodology") permits a "reasonable
correspondence between emerging new crimes and the body oftraditionallaw.,,146
143 Lador-Lederer, supra note 136 at 124-5
144 "The nul/urn crimen sine lege principle was thus regarded at Nuremberg as a moral maxim
destined to yield to superior exigencies whenever it would have been contrary to justice not to hold
persons accountable for appalling atrocities. The fact that the (...) principle, in its strict positivist
scope, had yet to be proclaimed at the international level is perhaps unsurprising, for at that stage the
corpus of international criminal law was still rudimentary and indeed rather embryonic." Susan
Lamb, "Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege in International Criminal Law" in Cassese, The
Rome Statute, Volume I, 733 at 736-7.
145 While we can point to norms in the positive law realm, natural law norms may bear a closer
similarity to principles ofjus cogens.
146 Lador-Lederer, supra note 136 at 125.
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Politicians and jurists believed that a second failure to vindicate the law, such as
that which followed World War I, would be seen as an inability to develop and
strengthen international law for the future. 147 The controversy that followed the
Nuremberg judgment is evidence that the concept of individual responsibility for
wars of aggression did not quite "take" as it violated the rule of legality. 148
The majority of authors maintain that Nuremberg infringed the rule oflegality. In
addition, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was limited both as to rationae personae
and rationae materiae. These reasons make the Nuremberg and Tokyo judgments
weak precedents in relation to the crime of aggression, if they can even be
considered as such. The crime of aggression under the Rome Statute will not
infringe the rules of nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege. Nor, is it
necessary for this crime to have a precedent.
Ius Cogens
The second legal basis in support of the legitimacy of the crime of aggression is the
ius cogens nature of its underlying norm: the prohibition on the use of force. A
source, if you will, of the crime ofaggression, the Charter prohibition on the use of
force emerged first through customary and then became conventional international
law. This norm of general application to states under international law, by
147 Finch, supra note 131 at 20. "To maintain retroactively that these invasions were international
criminal acts involving personal responsibility is to suggest that the United States officially
compounded international crime with international criminals. The United States continued to
recognize the Government of Germany as legitimate, to receive its diplomatic representatives at
Washington, and to accredit American diplomatic representatives to Berlin." Ibid. at 28.
148 "The principle oflegality and its corollaries originated in municipal law; its movement from
being a principle primarily of national law to being one clearly and fmnly entrenched in
international law was a product ofWorld War II and its aftermath. The crux of the controversy
surrounding nul/urn crimen in relation to international criminal law is the vagueness ofthe definition
of international crimes. The lack ofsystematic definition of international criminal law at Nuremberg
ensured that it fell to the Tribunals themselves to articulate many of the elements of the crimes.
Consequently, the Nuremberg trials were frequently criticized as expostfacto applications of alien
law to acts which had not been explicitly outlawed at the time they were carried out." Lamb, supra
note 144 at 735.
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extension, applies to individuals in their capacity as agents or representatives ofthe
state. A state cannot use force unless an individual so decides as a matter ofpolicy.
The UN Charter and the Declaration ofPrinciples ofInternational Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States 149 impose a positive law duty of
the highest legal order on states to refrain from using armed force against another
state. Most authors recognizejus cogens as rules ofcustomary law having
universal application:
Les auteurs relevant ainsi Ie manque de criteres permettent de cerner la
notion dejus cogens et de la son indetermination. La majorite d'entre eux
considere toutefois que Ie jus cogens se compose de regles coutumieres a
portee universelle comme celles interdisant Ie recours ala guerre, celles
relatives a la protection des droits de la personne et celles relevant du droit
humanitaire. 15o
A 1966 International Law Commission report states that the law of the Charter
concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a conspicuous
example of a rule in international law having the character of ius cogens. 151 This
report is referred to by the International Court of Justice in its decision in the case
f l\T· 152o Ivlcaragua.
A further confirmation of the validity as customary international law ofthe
principle of the prohibition of the use of force expressed in Article 2,
paragraph 4, ofthe Charter of the United Nations may be found in the fact
that it is frequently referred to in statements by State representatives as being
not only a principle of customary international law but also a fundamental or
cardinal principle oflaw. The International Law Commission, in the course
149 UNGA resolution 2625, 24 October 1970 "Declaration on Principles oflnternational Law,
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations".
150 Claude Emanuelli, Droit internationalpublic (Montreal, Editions Wilson & Lafleur, 1999). The
author cites M. Virally, "Reflexions sur lejus cogens , (1966) AF.D.I. 5, II and A Verdross, Jus
Dispositivum andjus cogens in International Law", (1966) 60 AJ.I.L., 55, 59 et seq. Emphasis
added.
151 Paragraph (I) of the Commentary of the International Law Commission to Article 50 of its draft
Articles on the Law of Treaties, ILC Yearbook, 1966, Vol. II at 247 ["ILC Commentary"].
152 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), Merits, I.C.J. Reports 1986 ["Nicargua"].
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of its work on the codification of the law of treaties, expressed the view that
"the law of the Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself
constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in international law having the
character ofjus cogens".153
The concept ofjus cogens has been codified under Article 53 of the Vienna
Convention on Treaties:
Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm ofgeneral international law
Ous cogens) - A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts
with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of
the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a
norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm or general international law having the
same character. 154
The International Law Commission considered specifying, by way of example,
some of the most obvious and best settled rules ofjus cogens in order to indicate the
general nature and scope of the rules contained in the article. 155 The first two such
examples of prohibited treaties were: (a) a treaty contemplating the unlawful use of
force contrary to the principles of the Charter; and (b) a treaty contemplating the
performance of any other act criminal in international law. 156 These examples are
important in two respects. First, the ILC's use of the word "other" in example (b)
implies that the unlawful use of force referred to in paragraph (a) constitutes a
153 Nicaragua at para. 190. Both Nicaragua and the United States had officially recognized that
the principle prohibiting the use of force embodied in the Charter had "come to be recognized as
jus cogens". The United States was particularly emphatic as it averred that it was "material to
quote the views of scholars that this principle is a 'universal norm', a 'universal international
law', a 'universally recognized principle of international law' , and a 'principle ofjus cogens'.
The fact that the United States and Nicaragua were accusing one another ofviolating this norm
perhaps might explain why both states easily agreed on the issue.
154 Article 54, The Vienna Convention.
ISS ILC Commentary, supra note 151 at 247-248.
156 Ibid.
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"criminal act". Second, the examples support the theory that all international
crimes fall within thejus cogens category.157
Since World War II international law recognizes a limited number ofperemptory
nonns that have the character of"supreme law". 158 Precisely which nonns are
peremptory is not universally agreed, however, it is accepted that Article 2(4) of the
Charter outlawing the use of force has also become customary law binding on non-
parties and has the character ofjus cogens. 159
The concept ofjus cogens did not enter the law by convention, and has
therefore been described as "customary law." It is also assumed that this
particular customary law is not open to exception for any "persistent
objector": thus South Africa's objection to including apartheid as a violation
of customary law and ofjus cogens has been generally disregarded. 160
That the persistent objector has no escape from the jus cogens nonn renders
essential that the peremptory nonn be based on an authentic systemic consensus. 161
The concept ofjus cogens has been compared to the development of a systemic
constitutional law of fundamental values identified and adopted by the international
system. 162 If the nonn from which the crime of aggression was derived has the
character ofjus cogens then the assertion that its own nature is peremptory is
tenable. Consequently, there is no escape from the prohibition on the use of force
or the crime of aggression for a "persistent objector" such as Arend. If there can be
no persistent objector, then arguably neither rule is subject to erosion by excessively
broad interpretations of the concept of self-defence. I 63
157 Query whether the inverse is true: i.e. that all nonns of ius cogens are, or will one day be,
international crimes.
158 Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values (Dordrecht, Martinus NijhoffPublishers,
1995) at 38.
159 Ibid. at 39.
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid.
162 Ibid.
163 See discussion on self-defence in Chapter 4 below.
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Status ofthe Individual
In 1992 the United Nations Centre for Human Rights published a report entitled,
"Status of the Individual and Contemporary International Law: Promotion,
Protection and Restoration of Human Rights at National, Regional and International
Levels" which considered the rising importance of the natural person as a subject of
international law. 164
The present stage of international law should be considered as a transitional
period towards a new legal order in which the individual will be called upon
to playa more important role as a subject of international rights and
responsibilities.
In particular, it is upon respect for the human person and his dignity that the
new developments and tendencies converge in order that the individual may
be recognized as a subject of rights, responsibilities and duties in
international human rights law. 165
The report reviews the most notable developments in international law in relation to
aggression,166 and in particular references the 1954 Draft Code of Offences against
Peace and Security of Mankind that targeted individuals. 167
The principal innovation by the draft Code is that individuals shall be
punished. Although the draft Code is still under consideration by the ILC, it
could be stated that individuals acting as organs ofthe State, according to
existing international law, should be considered subjects ofinternational
duties. 168
164 "Status of the Individual and Contemporary International Law: Promotion, Protection and
Restoration ofHuman Rights at National, Regional and International Levels" a Study by Erica-Irene
A. Daes, Special Rapporteur, United Nations, New York, 1992 ["Status oflndividual Report"]
165 Ibid., Preface at paras VII and VIII. Notable developments in international human rights law
include the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 19 December 1966, International Legal Materials, 1967,368; U.N.T.S., 171 and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
166 Examples include the IMT at Nuremberg, Article 2(4) of the Charter, and the Declaration on the
Principles oflnternational Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, supra
note 149. Status oflndividual Report, supra note 164 at paras. 398-409.
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid. Emphasis added.
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Although this amounted to a fairly strong suggestion that individuals acting on
behalf of a state should be considered as subjects of international law, the question
remained whether individuals acting on behalf of an organized "political" group or
collectivity, and not a state per se, may also qualify as subjects of international
law. 169 The report reviews the four main theories that developed until 1992 on the
status of the individual under international law:
1) The natural person has no legal personality, this attribute being reserved for
States;
2) The natural person is the object, not the subject, of international law;
3) The legal personality of states is a fiction and only natural persons can be
the "real" subjects ofinternationallaw;17o and,
4) States are the "normal" or traditional subjects however the there can be
legally valid rules concerning individuals. 17I
The very development of international criminal law refutes the first two theories.
Of those that remain, we can safely conclude that individuals acting as agents of
states are subject to legally-binding international law rules, and in particular, those
under international criminal law. When an international law rule imposes a duty on
a state, it necessarily regulates the conduct of individuals, in their capacity as organs
or agents, who are in a position to violate the rule be it an illegal act or a crime. 172
The idea that the individuals are subjects of international law was formed on the
basis of developments in international criminal law. 173 Accordingly, not only are
169 See discussion on rationae personae in Chapter 4 below where the argument is made that the
crime ofaggression should apply to leaders of state and non-state entities.
170 "According to this theory concerning corporate personality, the State is unreal, because as a
corporate entity, a moral person, it cannot have a will of its own, that is to say a will other than that
of the individuals which comprise it." (G. Scelle, Precis du droit des gens, vol. I) "Subsequently, the
corporate personality of the State is a mere fiction, and fictions are by logical necessity inadequate
instruments for scientific analysis." The doctrine of state personality is a fiction for two reasons: (a)
the State, like any other corporation, is composed of human beings, and (b) its ultimate purpose is
the welfare of these human beings." Status ofIndividual Report, supra note 164 at paras. 511-518
171 Status ofIndividual Report, ibid. at paras. 519-525.
172 Ibid. at para. 408.
173 "The individual was liable for some limited offences only under classical international law, for
example, piracy. Under contemporary international law the individual is responsible for
international crimes and may be tried and punished under an international procedure. On the basis
of the theory of international crimes, the idea was developed that the individuals are subjects of
international law." Ibid. at para. 544.
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individuals the subjects of international rights, but those acting as an organ of State
are subjects of international duties. 174
[T]he individual is the beneficiary of international law and in certain cases
bears the liabilities and disabilities which it imposes; the growing and ever
changing needs and the interdependence of communities and the real interest
ofmodern society require, in most cases, the existence ofvarious subjects of
international law; and the individual, at the present time, should at least be
considered on a parallel with the State as a subject ofinternational law. 175
By targeting individuals, international humanitarian law and international criminal
law have contributed to the expansion of the application of international law. 176
Individuals accused of international crimes are being called to account for their
actions as organs of the state or in their personal capacity ifthere is no domestic
legal system in place. There are two main categories of international crimes: those
that require the direct involvement of a state apparatus or a collective organization,
and those that (while perhaps related to actions of the state) are imputable to the
individual, alone.
[O]ne may certainly rank in [the former] category the crime of aggression.
The same will be true ofmost cases of crimes against humanity and
genocide. There is by contrast another category of crimes which, while
involving direct relations with actions of the State, are liable autonomously
to be imputed to an individual. Theses are war crimes. (... ) The conjunction
of individual responsibility and State responsibility is thus manifest in
connection with aggression. ln
If state apparatus is required for genocide and the other crimes, there should be a
reference to the state (or a collective organization) in the text defining such a crime.
174 Ibid. at para. 409.
175 Ibid. at paras. 57-8. Emphasis added.
176 "Although international criminal law shares some of the goals and methods of international
human rights and humanitarian law, there is far from a perfect congruence of the fIrst with the other
two. (... ) But to the extent that those two bodies oflaw address accountability of the individual for
their violation, they overlap with international criminal law." Ratner and Abrams, supra note 31 at
12.
m Dupuy, supra note 118 at 1088.
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The Rome Statute does make such a reference to the State in its definition of crimes
against humanity. 178 The systematic removal of immunity for accused persons,
however, demonstrates the autonomy ofthe individual, and his or her responsibility
vis-a-vis that of the state (or non-state entity). 179
Here, the gravity of the act takes precedence over the person's legal position.
It entails a declassification of the act, which ceases being associated with the
public function covered by the ordinary system of immunities from
. . d·· d.c. 180Juns IctIon an enlorcement.
The view that individuals are held responsible for state crimes because that is the
only effective way to impute liability to a state belies a pre-1945 classical
conception that there are no legal persons in international law other than the state. 18I
Such a reflection, influenced by classical legal positivist ideology, seems
increasingly out ofstep with the actual evolution oflaw. 182 It is more commonly
held that individuals, therefore, are playing an increasing role in the international
system both as beneficiaries of rights and subjects of international duties.
178 "2. For the purpose ofparagraph 1: (a) "Attack directed against any civilian population" means a
course of conduct involving the multiple commission ofacts referred to in paragraph 1 against any
civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance ofa State or organizationalpolicy to commit such
attack." Article 7, Crimes Against Humanity, Rome Statute. Emphasis added.
179 Dupuy, supra note 118 at 1093.
180 Ibid.
181 Ibid. at 1091.
182 The author references N. Bobbio, 'Sur Ie positivisme juridique, et jus-naturalisme et positivisme
juridique', in Essais de theorie du droit (1998) at 23-39 and 39-55. Ibid.
Chapter 3 Role of the Security Council
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Aggression remained controversial up until the end of the conference that led to the
signing of the Rome Statute. 183 There was the question of whether to include
aggression at all, and the diverging views on both the role of the Security Council
and the definition of the crime. 184 While the two latter issues proved the biggest
obstacles, in the end the crime of aggression was included in the Rome Statute by
way of a compromise: aggression was included but left undefined. The debate over
the possible jurisdictional overlap between the ICC and the SC survived the signing
of the Rome Statute in the form of Article 5(2), with some states claim the Security
Council has a monopoly in relation to all matters aggression while others believe
that the Court's exercise ofjurisdiction over the crime of aggression should remain
as "unfettered" as it is for the other three international crimes. 185
The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a
provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the
crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise
jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent
with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. 186
Article 5(2) contains three requirements: the definition of the crime of aggression
must comply with Articles 121 and 123 of the Rome Statute; it must set out the
conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction, finally, it must be
consistent with the relevant provisions of the UN Charter. An analysis of Articles
121 and 123 is beyond the scope of this paper. The two remaining requirements,
for their part, are generally understood as meaning that conditions need to be
established to ensure that the definition does not infringe the UN Charter. But are
conditions even necessary?
183 Von Hebel and Robinson, supra note 12 at 81-82.
184 Ibid.
185 Ibid.
186 Article 5(2), Rome Statute.
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If Article 5(2) was included to essentially keep the crime of aggression in the Rome
Statute, this was a small price to pay for those who oppose excessive Security
Council powers. Why? Article 5(2) provides that the Court's jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression shall be "consistent with the relevant provisions" of the UN
Charter. As this is stating nothing more than the obvious, it is a truism. 18?
Although he suggests that this requirement is redundant and superfluous, Condorelli
maintains that it is nevertheless significant. I 88
[E]lle temoigne, en effet, de la reconnaissance generale qu'il y a bien un
probleme tres delicat qu'il faudra regler a l'avenir sans apporter des entorses
ala Charte. L'art. 5 met ainsi indirectement en exergue Ie nreud
fondamental a trancher par les negociations futures : celui de savoir
comment se raccordent les competences de la Cour en matiere de crime
individuel d'agression a celles du Conseil de securite relatives a l'agression
aux termes de la Charte, c'est-a-dire dans les relations interetatiques.189
The nceudfondamental is the configuration or notion of a workable relationship
between the ICC and the SC in relation to the crime of aggression. The carefully
constructed phrase, "shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter
ofthe United Nations" ofArticle 5(2) ofthe Rome Statute is indeed understood as a
reference to the role the Council "mayor should play in relation to the crime of
aggression.,,190
Conceivably, special conditions may be required if there is a potential for
jurisdictional conflict. This however remains to be proven in regard to the roles the
Security Council and the ICC play in relation to aggression. One would think that
any potential jurisdictional overlap has been addressed by Articles 13(b) and 16 of
187 A rule of international law cannot contradict the UN Charter. "In the event of a conflict between
the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations
under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall
prevail." Article 103, UN Charter.
188 Luigi Condorell, "Conclusions Generales" in ICCCA, supra note 96,151 at 153.
189 Ibid.
190 Von Hebel and Robinson, supra note 12 at 85. Another author goes so far as to suggest that 5(2)
calls for a provision "on the relationship of the Security Council with the Criminal Court." Saeid
Mirzaee Yengejeh, "Reflections on the Role of the Security Council in Determining an Act of
Aggression" ICCCA, supra note 96,125 at 126.
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the Rome Statute. Article 13(b) provides that the Security Council can refer a
matter that would not otherwise fall under the jurisdiction of the Court to the ICC.
Article 16 states that the Council can suspend or defer proceedings at the ICC for a
renewable period ofone year. The latter, requires the support of all five permanent
members of the Security Council for a resolution requesting the suspension or
deferral of a matter before the Court. As they stand, these rules ensure that no
single permanent member ofthe Council has absolute authority over what matters
ofaggression go before the Court.
The suggestion that the Council requires additional powers (over the Court) in
dealing with aggression - in particular, the proposal that a Security Council
"determination" of aggression is necessary - reduces the role of the ICC to that of a
bureaucrat. If a Council "determination" that "an act of aggression occurred"
becomes a condition precedent for ICC jurisdiction, each permanent member will
effectively be in a position to veto each and every potential investigation or
prosecution of the crime of aggression This, would result in a most flagrant
politicization of the court. It would also mean that a definition for the crime of
aggression is, at the very worst, unnecessary and at the very best, unimportant. For
these reasons, and for the sake of consistency with regard to the other three
international crimes, the Court's exercise ofjurisdiction over the crime of
aggression should not be subject to conditions that involve the determinations or
otherwise by political bodies.
It is interesting to observe that pre-conditions for the ICC exercise ofjurisdiction
over the crime of aggression, for some, are not only a future requirement but a
reality.
[T]he Statute stipulates in Article 5(2) that a future provision adopted by
States Parties defining the crime of aggression 'shall be consistent with the
relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations'. By requiring the
future ICC definition of aggression to defer to the primary responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace, Article 5(2)
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clearly deprives the ICC ofa primary jurisdiction to review a Council
decision that an act ofaggression has occurred. 191
This is a misreading of the provision. Not quite depriving the ICC of primary
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression or deferring responsibility to the SC,
Article 5(2) states that the definition will need to be consistent with the UN Charter.
What is more, Robinson opines that it is theoretically possible for a definition to be
adopted without the establishment of further conditions for the Court to exercise its
jurisdiction. I92It must not only be theoretically possible; it must become a reality.
If it can be demonstrated that a) the crime of aggression is not "unique", and b) the
Court's exercise ofjurisdiction will not enter into direct conflict with the authority
191 Dan Sarooshi, "The Peace and Justice Paradox: The International Criminal Court and the UN
Security Council" in Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe and Eric Donnelly, eds. The Permanent
International Criminal Court (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2004) 95 at 110. "At about the middle of
the Rome Conference, it became clear that support for the inclusion was increasing despite the
knowledge that no agreement could be reached at the conference either on its definition or on the
role of the Security Council. The permanent members indicated that they could agree on the
inclusion (... ) only if the proper role of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter were
recognized. (... ) [That] these issues must be consistent with the Charter of the United Nations (... )
is intended to take account ofthe concerns ofthe permanent members ofthe Security Council that
the statute not be used to amend the Charter by infringing on the competence ofthe Council to
determine acts ofaggression." See also M. Arsanjani: "The mandatory language of Article 39 of the
Charter seems to indicate that a primary role must be given to the Council to determine the existence
of aggression on the part of a State as a pre-condition to the institution of criminal proceedings
against individuals by the Court." M. Arsanjani, "The Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court" (1999) 93 AJIL 22 at 29-30 quoting Lionel Yee. Yee, however, writes in a footnote: "It
could be argued that the word "consistency" used in Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute simply means
ensuring that the Court does not make a finding which contradicts a determination, if any, made by
the Council on the existence or non-existence of an act of aggression by a State". Lionel Yee, "The
International Criminal Court and the Security Council: Articles 13(b) and 16" in Lee, ed. supra note
12,143 at 145.
192 "It is theoretically possible for there to be agreement that no preconditions are needed.
However, as a practical matter, I don't think there is any realistic prospect that such an approach
would be adopted. Aggression is a distinct crime that would require the Court to examine public
international law issues (use of force, self-defence, anticipatory self-defence, humanitarian
intervention, etc.) which have at least some difference from classic individual criminal responsibility
questions. Too many states are concerned about possible politicization and, I suppose, the power
that would be granted to the Court if there were no preconditions. The predominant view, on all
sides, is that some precondition is useful to depoliticize the issue. So these political questions would
go first to a body more equipped to handle the policy/political questions of aggression. Then the
ICC focuses on the criminal responsibility aspects, which it is well equipped to do." Darryl
Robinson, Email message sent to the writer dated 4 January 2005 (permission received to include the
text in this thesis).
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of the Council to take decisions in respect of an act of aggression, then no
conditions beyond those already required by Articles 13(b) and 16 are necessary to
further circumscribe the Court's jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.
Notwithstanding any new conditions that may be established to further usurp the
Court's jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, it will remain vulnerable to the
challenge that aggression is a "political matter". A challenge on this basis however
stands little chance of success. In The Prosecutor v. Tadic, the ICTY Appeals
Chamber held that international tribunals, duly constituted with clear jurisdictional
parameters, are not subject to jurisdictional challenges on the basis of a purported
political question argument.193
The doctrines of "political questions" and "non-justiciable disputes" are
remnants of the reservations of "sovereignty", "national honour", etc. in very
old arbitration treaties. They have receded from the horizon of contemporary
international law, except for the occasional invocation of the "political
question" argument before the International Court of Justice in advisory
proceedings and, very rarely, in contentious proceedings as well.
The Court has consistently rejected this argument as a bar to examining a
case. It considered it unfounded in law. As long as the case before it or the
request for an advisory opinion turns on a legal question capable of a legal
answer, the Court considers that it is duty-bound to take jurisdiction over it,
regardless of the political background or the other political facets of the
issue. On this question, the International Court of Justice declared in its
advisory opinion on Certain Expenses ofthe United Nations:
"[I]t has been argued that the question put to the Court is intertwined with
political questions, and that for this reason the Court should refuse to give an
opinion. It is true that most interpretations of the Charter of the United
Nations will have political significance, great or small. In the nature of
things it could not be otherwise. The Court, however, cannot attribute a
political character to a request which invites it to undertake an essentially
judicial task, namely, the interpretation of a treaty provision." (Certain
Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. Reports 151, at 155 (Advisory
Opinion of20 July).
193 Le Procureur c/ Dusco Tadic, Alias "Dule" 2 octobre 1995 (La Chambre d'Appel) - Arret relatif
al'appel de la defense concernant l'exception prejudicielle d'incompetence.
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This dictum applies almost literally to the present case. 194
Is it hoped that conditions will buffer potential collisions between the two spheres
ofcompetence? Is there any realistic possibility ofa collision at all? Is the ICC
afraid ofthe Council, or vice versa? Complementarity or the notion of concomitant
jurisdictions, without the rigidprocedural mechanics special conditions would
entail, is not an impossible or unimaginable prospect.
The first section of this chapter will review the Security Council's jurisdiction in
regard to acts of aggression. Section 2 will demonstrate how the jurisdictions of the
SC and the ICC are complementary and do not give rise to conflict in relation to
matters of aggression. The section that follows will examine the analogous
relationship between the SC and the International Court of Justice. Finally, the
fourth section will compare aggression to the other international crimes and
establish how it shares characteristics of genocide and crimes against humanity.
Throughout this chapter it should become apparent how current discourse on the
issue ofthe role ofthe Security Council often confuses rather than clarifies the
issues. To conclude, we will review the statutory relationship as established by the
Rome Statute and demonstrate how it is unnecessary to establish additional
conditions for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.
194 Ibid. at para. 24. See also 1993 Bosnia v. FRY and Serbia application for provisional measures at
ICJ at para. 33 "whereas however in any event, as the Court has observed in a previous case, while
there is in the Charter, 'a provision for a clear demarcation of functions between the General
Assembly and the Security Council, in respect ofany dispute or situation, that the former should not
make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so
requires, there is no similar provision anywhere in the Charter with respect to the Security Council
and the Court. The Council has functions ofa political nature assigned to it, whereas the Court
exercises purely judicial functions. Both organs can therefore perform their separate but
complementary functions with respect to the same events. "'(Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, pp. 434-435, para. 95).
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3.1 Security Council Jurisdiction over Acts of Aggression
The UN Charter establishes the role of the Security Council in relation to acts of
aggression. Article 24 of the Charter confers upon the Security Council the
responsibility to ensure, maintain and restore international peace and security.
Article 24
1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its
Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying
out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their
behalf. (... )195
Article 39 under Chapter VII, for its part, vests the Security Council with the
authority to determine the "the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act ofaggression (... ) [and] make recommendations, or decide what
measures shall be taken (... ) to maintain or restore international peace and
security."I96 Articles 40 through 42 further empower the Council to call upon the
parties concerned to comply with the provisional measures it deems necessary. I97 If
measures not involving the use of force prove inadequate, the Security Council may
then take such action involving the use of force as is necessary to re-establish the
peace. 198
Article 11 of the Charter evidences the non-exclusive nature of the Security
Council's primary responsibility and empowers the General Assembly with the
complementary duty to consider, discuss and make recommendations on any
questions that relate to the maintenance of international peace and security. Only
when the same question or matter has been submitted to the Security Council for its
195 Article 24(1), UN Charter. Emphasis added.
196 Article 11, UN Charter.
197 "(•.• ) Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of
the parties concerned." Article 40, UN Charter.
198 Article 42, UN Charter
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consideration is the General Assembly precluded from exercising this
responsibility. I99 Article 10 additionally provides that the General Assembly may
discuss and make recommendations regarding any matters within the scope of the
Charter and regarding the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the
Charter.200
Thus the Charter vests the Council with the primary responsibility to maintain
international peace and security. Since the creation of the United Nations, however,
the Security Council has only determined that aggression occurred in but a handful
of cases. Cassese explains,
The mechanism set up in San Francisco could have worked if the cold war
had not broken out at once and the world had not split into two blocks. It is
easy to imagine the effects ofthis rift on the 'system of collective security'.
The armed forces ofthe United Nations were never created; the West, which
had the majority in the General Assembly tried to deflect to the General
Assembly the powers that had been attributed to the Security Council
(blocked by the Soviet veto); the tension grew and the whole collective
mechanism broke down.201
For nearly a quarter of a century the Council was effectively unable to carry out its
responsibilities. This situation changed after the Cuban Missile Crisis. The early
1970s ushered in a series ofSecurity Council resolutions that condemned acts of
aggression.202 In particular, it dealt with matters involving Southern Rhodesia,
South Africa, Benin, Israel and Iraq.203 Aggressions in these regions took the form
of armed attacks, air raids, invasions and illegal occupations and assassinations,
199 Article II (2), UN Charter.
200 "The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present
Charter or relating to the powers and functions ofany organs provided for in the present Charter,
and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United
Nations or to the Security Councilor to both on any such questions or matters." Article 10, UN
Charter.
201 Antonio Cassese, Violence and Law in the Modern Age, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986) at 33.
202 "Historical Review of Developments Relating to Aggression", UN Doc.
PCNICC/2002IWGCAlL.1 and "Historical Review ofDevelopments Relating to
Aggression (Addendum)", UN Doc. PCNICC/2002IWGCAlL.11Add. I at 115 et seq.
203 Ibid.
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among others?04 In 1985 and 1988, for example, the Security Council vigorously
condemned the "act of armed aggression" Israel perpetrated against Tunisian
territory "in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, international
law and norms of conduct,,?05
For the last half century the Council has, in general, demonstrated a reluctance to
characterize the illegal use of force as an act of aggression. Moreover, to take
action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter it is not necessary for an "act of
aggression" to occur; it is sufficient that there be a threat to the peace or a breach of
the peace. (There being no tangible benefit to using the "A" word, the Council is
unlikely to risk stigmatizing a state and if it can achieve the same purpose by
downgrading a situation to a threat to international peace and security.) There is
nothing to indicate that the Council will be more willing to "determine" that an act
of aggression occurred after the crime of aggression is defined.
3.2 The Inevitable Link of Complementary Jurisdictions
The Rome Statute establishes a privileged relationship ofjurisdictional
complementarity between the U.N. Security Council and the International Criminal
Court?06 Articles 13(b) and 16 of the Statute provide the Council with explicit
204 Ibid. at 120. Specifically, between 1973 and 1979 the Security Council passed a series of
resolutions condemning the repeated acts of aggression committed by Southern Rhodesia against
Angola, Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia (UNSC Resolutions 326 (1973), 386 (1976), 411
(1977),427 (1978),445 (1979) and 455 (1979)). In the case of the latter the Security Council
expressed its grave concern and condemned the "repeated", "continued, intensified and unprovoked"
and "wanton acts of aggression"; Ibid. 115-6. It later condemned acts of aggression committed by
South Africa against Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Seychelles, and other states. UNSC Resolutions
387 (1976), 546 (1984), 571 (1985),568 (1985),572 (1985), 527(1982), supra note XX at 117-9. In
1977, when Benin was attacked by foreign mercenaries, the Security Council strongly condemned
"the armed attack perpetrated against the People's Republic ofBenin". UNSC Resolution 405
(1977).
205 Ibid. Resolutions 573 (1985) and 611 (1988).
206 The establishment of a relationship between the ICC and the U.N. is provided for under Article 2
of the Rome Statute: 'The Court shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations through
an agreement to be approved by the Assembly of States Parties to this Statute and thereafter
concluded by the President ofthe Court on its behalf." Article 2, Rome Statute. Articles 13(b) and
16 of the Rome Statute further accord a special status to the Security Council.
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authority to refer to the Court a situation that would otherwise not fall under the
latter's jurisdiction, and to defer or suspend the investigation or prosecution of a
matter for a renewable period of twelve months.207 These provisions spell out the
virtually seamless integration of the Security Council in the Court's jurisdiction and
the latter's role in the traditionally political system of international collective
. 208
secunty.
The link between the Security Council and the ICC can be characterized as a
"divider" or a "connector". The relationship is a connector when the respective
jurisdictions of these two entities are regarded as complementary rather than
conflicting. In our discussions below, we will examine the link as a divider to
determine to what extent, if any, such a characterization encourages and advances
reasoned discussion on the issue of aggression. The view that prima facie the link
is a divider leads to claims such as: the Charter vests the Security Council with the
primary responsibility of determining aggression. The Charter however makes no
such provision.209 It does stipulate that the Council must first determine that a
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or an act of aggression has occurred if it is
going to take measures to establish or maintain international peace and security.2IO
This authority to so "determine" or characterize a given situation operates as a
condition precedent to measures taken pursuant to Articles 41 or 42 of the Charter.
Thus the essence of this authority is neither quasi-judicial nor its goal to lay blame
on a particular party to a conflict. It enables the Council to take the next step and
decide on the action necessary to discharge its duty.
207 Article 13(b) "The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article
5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: (... ) (b) A situation in which one or more of
such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; (... )." Article 16: "No investigation
or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months
after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the
same conditions." Articles 13(b) and 16, Rome Statute.
208 "Warning about the risks ofpoliticizing the ICC has been a powerful argument in the debates of
the Preparatory Commission - but also an intriguing one." See Matja Lehto, 'The ICC and the
Security Council: About the Argument ofPoliticization", ICCCA, supra note 96, 145.
209 See supra note 191 and text.
210 The provision under Article 39 is mandatory in nature.
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Condorelli anticipates little, if any jurisdictional overlap between the ICC and the
Security Council.211 The competencies of each entity pertain to related but distinct
objects, "de sorte que de veritables conflits entre les resultats de leur exercice
respectif sont tres improbables et, it la limite, d'une gravite bien reduite, vu
I'etendue fort circonscrite de I' effet de la chose jugee qui se rattacherait en tout etat
de cause it une condamnation ou it un acquittement prononces par la c.p.I.,,212 If
establishing conditions under 5(2) renders the Court's jurisdiction conditional on a
prior Council determination of aggression, then the court will be a politicized
institution in that its authority will depend on purely political determinations.
The proposed precondition requiring a Security Council determination of an act of
aggression before the Court exercises jurisdiction is controversial in that it
encourages the very outcome that it purports to prevent: the politicisation ofthe
ICC. Still, some authors seem resigned to the eventuality that the Council will
exercise ultimate control over the Court in this respect.213 This section begins to
address the very serious threat to the Court's independence with a review ofthe
implications of the Article 39 Determination theory?14 We will then examine what
current discourse ironically refers to as arguments ofpoliticization which Article 39
Determination theory advocates actually posit in support of their position.
3.2.1 Article 39 Determination Theory
Of the various maintstream formulae advanced to address concerns about the
Court's jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, the most drastic calls for the
2ll CondoreIli, supra note 188 at 16 I.
212 Ibid.
213 "How the provision on the preconditions to the jurisdiction of the Court will be fonnulated, will
depend on the political choices of the future Review Conference. The Conference may, if it so
wishes, opt for an express exclusion and decide that a prior detennination of the Security Council of
an act of aggression is always a prerequisite for the Court to deal with a complaint related to a crime
ofaggression." Marya Lehto, supra note 208 at 148-9.
214 It is suggested that "Article 39 Detennination theory" is a more accurate and telling way of
describing the underlying premise of the position that holds that the Court's jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression is conditional upon a Security Council detennination that "aggression" has
occurred.
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deferral of any potential matter ofaggression to the Security Council so that it may
make a "determination" as to whether aggression has actually occurred.215
Advocates of this proposal argue that it represents the easiest way to avoid the
situation of "contradictory findings" by the two entities. They further maintain that
a Council determination is necessary as Article 39 of the Charter vests the Council
with a power to determine that an act ofaggression has taken place, or has not
taken place. This contention is problematic for the reasons discussed above. In
addition, the implication is that an act of aggression will be "recognized" if and
only if the Council so determines.
The Security Council is authorized to determine that a threat to the peace or an act
of aggression occurred as a condition precedent to adopting measures under Chapter
VII. This is an operational, not ajudicial authority, that is not even exclusive to the
Council; the General Assembly has a complementary duty to restore and maintain
international peace and security and can also adopt resolutions relating to matters of
aggression. Nevertheless, the Article 39 Determination theory, which underpins the
proposal that all matters relating to aggression be deferred to the Security Council,
is based on the fear ofcontradictory findings and the claim that the Council is the
sole entity able to decide when aggression has occurred.
Leaving every potential case involving the crime of aggression to the discretion of
the Security Council would be a logistical and procedural nightmare. First, it is
entirely possible that a situation would not even undergo a review by the Council as
it may not be deemed of sufficient political importance to one of the permanent
members. In that case, would the ICC be expected to insist that the Council issue a
resolution on the matter? Ifnot, would that be where it ended even ifthere was
sufficient evidence to warrant an investigation by the Prosecutor's Office? What if
the Council did determine that an act of aggression occurred, and referred the
matter to the ICC pursuant to Article 13(b), would the Court then be bound to
215 See, generally, Sylvia Fernandez de Gunnendi, "Discussion Paper Prepared by the Coordinator"
of the Working Group on the Crime of Aggression. UN Doc. PCNICCI2002/WGCA/RT.I/Rev.2.
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accept the actus reus as a given? Would it then only need to try an individual for
his or her mens rea? If the Council exercised the exclusive power to determine that
an act of aggression occurred, and if in the course ofcarrying out his own
investigation the ICC prosecutor detennined that there was insufficient evidence to
warrant a charge ofaggression, then there would be a serious problem of so-called
contradictory findings. If the Council determined that an act of aggression occurred
could it subsequently justify deferring or suspending proceedings under Article 16?
And if the Council downgrades an act ofaggression to a "threat to" or "breach of'
the peace to avoid stigmatizing a state, should this be taken to mean that "no act of
aggression occurred, period? Ifone of the stated objectives of the proposed deferral
of situations of aggression to the Security Council is to avoid "conflicting findings",
then it fails in this regard.
The discourse framing the Article 39 detennination theory pits Security Council
"findings" against Court findings as though the two were on a judicial par and
scenarios of litispendens or res judicata were conceivable.216 However, as stated
above, the purpose of an Article 39 detennination ofaggression is to trigger
measures under Chapter VI or VII and is not subjected to rigorous judicial analysis
as, say, the crime ofaggression would be. And so, conflating the act of aggression
with the crime ofaggression removes the "degree ofgravity" that arguably serves a
distinguishing role between the two. By definition, the Council's characterization
of an event is naturally political and the process leading up to a detennination is
fundamentally different from that which results in a criminal indictment. The ICC
detennination ofa crime of aggression also takes place within a highly fonnal
adversarial framework. A major problem with the theory is that a Council
216 "[O]ne must notice a significant development in the practice and policy of the Security Council
over the past ten or twelve years. The role of the Security Council has become increasingly central
in the enforcement of international legal norms. The Council has not only, increasingly, taken into
account legal considerations but has also made legal determinations, sometimes ofa type "that is in
the heart of what is normally seen as judicial activity. (... ) Determinations of international law are
now part and parcel on decision-making on collective measures". So much so that it has become
customary to speak of the quasi-judicial role of the Security Council. The expansion to the legal
realm has been coupled with a change in the Council's agenda, a growing sensitivity for issues like
international crimes, protection of civilians, and international humanitarian law." MaIjo Lehto, supra
note 208 at 147.
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detennination of aggression will create expectations to the effect that the
individuals who are responsible will automatically be found guilty. Individuals
tried under such circumstances are hardly likely to avoid conviction.
Gaja considers the possibility of "conflicting findings on aggression - a positive
detennination by the Court and a negative one by the Council, or vice versa".217
Although he recognizes the desirability of avoiding conflict, he sees the attraction
ofnot tying the Court to a previous assessment by the Security Council.218
Otherwise, "[a]ny of the pennanent members of the Council would (... ) be entitled
to prevent the ICC from taking criminal proceedings on aggression. Moreover, the
Security Council, in case of a positive finding, would impinge on the Court's
judicial function, since an aggression necessarily implies that at least some of the
leaders of the aggressor State are criminally responsible.,,219 And, were the Council
detennination of an act of aggression to remain "notionally separate" from the
Court's questions relating to the crime of aggression (i.e. we accept that the "act of
aggression" is not detenninative of a crime of aggression), then there would be no
point to the Council making a prior detennination at all.
According to the theory, if the Council makes an Article 39 detennination then the
Court can exercise jurisdiction over the crime. At that point, if the Court fails to
find a legal nexus between the aggression and the act of the individuals alleged to
be involved, it will undoubtedly call into question the Council's detennination and
thus create a conflict between the ICC and the Security Council.22o For there to be a
conflict, however, Gomaa is assuming two things: that the accused is the only
217 Gaja, supra note 21 at 432.
218 Ibid.
219 "It could not be argued that under the Charter the Security Council has been given an exclusive
power to take a decision on the existence ofaggression, nor that a finding by the Security Council
would have to be binding also for a treaty body entrusted with the repression of individual crimes.
Any such binding effect is not required under Article 103 of the U.N. Charter or under Article 5(2)
of the ICC Statute, but is only one of the ways in which a link between the Security Council and the
ICC could be established." Giorgio Gaja, "The Respective Roles of the ICC and the Security
Council in Determining the Existence ofan Aggression" in ICCCA, supra note 96, 121 at 123:
220 Mohammed M. Gomaa, "The Definition of the Crime of Aggression and the ICC Jurisdiction
over that Crime" in ICCCA, supra note 96, 55 at 75.
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possible individual responsible for the act, and that an Article 39 detennination is
the equivalent of a "crime of aggression" detennination. Based on the assumption
that the Council is the only entity capable ofdetennining that an act of aggression
has occurred he asks,
How could it be expected in the case of aggression that individual
responsibility be established first without a prior detennination of the wrong-
doing on the part of the State? Whence, what is needed for the purposes of
criminal prosecution of an individual is the attribution to that individual of
the wrongful acts resulting in or leading to the aggression. This inevitable
link between the international responsibility of the State for aggression and
individual criminal responsibility requires a detennination on the
commission of aggression, rationae materiae. Only after a State has been
declared as an aggressor (pursuant to the Charter ofthe United Nations and
the definition ofaggression annexed to General Assembly resolution 3314),
mayan individual - for the purposes of individual criminal responsibility,
and more particularly the Statute of the ICC - be tried on the basis of that
legal nexus.221
Gomaa's reasoning is on solid footing until he suggests that the connection between
state and individual responsibility "requires a detennination on the commission of
aggression". The sentence that follows is flawed in that it is narrow in scope and
precludes the possibility that an individual can be tried on the basis of a second
legal nexus: that between the Court's finding that aggression occurred (based on the
definition of the crime of aggression) and the individual's actions or involvement.
To his credit, Gomaa recognizes the weightlessness of the Court's authority.
On the other hand if the Council failed - for whatever reasons - to make a
detennination that there existed an act of aggression, the ICC would not be
able to exercise its jurisdiction with respect to aggression if the Council were
to be the only body allowed to make such detenninations. ( ...i 22
221 Ibid. at 65. Emphasis added.
222 Ibid.
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Gomaa can see the far-reaching implications of the Article 39 determination theory
especially if the Council refrains from making the determination: "The Council's
inability to react to cases of aggression most of the time is not fictitious. From the
day ofits inception up to 1990, and despite all the atrocities and acts of sheer
aggression that the world has witnessed, the Council had only in one single instance
declared that there was a case of aggression. That was the Korean case, ... " 223
Still, to some, deferring to the Security Council on matters of aggression simplifies
the situation.224 Politi suggests that this essentially means that it is pointless for the
Court to define the crime of aggression because ultimately aggression would simply
be what the Security Council deems it to be.225 Like Gomaa, Politi wonders what
should be done in the event that the Council not make an Article 39 determination.
We know that this situation could be very frequent. History shows that the
Council is very reluctant to say that an aggression took place. The use or
threat ofveto by the permanent members increases the likelihood ofno
decision being made by the Council. ( ... ) But let me say that, despite all the
odds, there is now a widespread conviction among delegates of the need to
find a way out that would allow the Court to repress one of the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community.,,226
Garvey is of the view that the Council should never make a determination of an act
of aggression as it conflicts with its pacification function and may be incompatible
with the U.N.'s efforts to achieve international peace and security?27 Labelling a
State an aggressor indicates the assertion of a condemnatory and punitive posture
223 Ibid. at 75-76. In fact, though authors often suggest that the Council has only addressed
aggression on "one" or "two" occasions, the Security Council has in fact addressed acts of
aggression in a number ofsituations: Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, Benin, Israel (curiously, the
heading of this situation in the PCNICC document is entitled "Tunisia" - not "Israel"), and Iraq. See
Historial Review Document, supra note 202 at paras 382 et seq.
224 Mauro Politi, "The Debate within the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal
Court" in ICCCA, supra note 96, 43 at 49-50.
225 "There seems to be an agreement today at least on the point that there cannot be individual
responsibility for the crime ofaggression unless the State concerned has international responsibility
for aggression." Ibid.
226 Ibid. at 50-5 I .
227 Jack Garvey, "The U. N. Definition of "Aggression: Law and Illusion in the Context ofColIective
Security" (1977) 17 Virginia. J.LL. 177 at 18I. Garvey's comments are on the 1974 a priori
definition ofaggression (i.e. the consensus definition adopted under UNSC resolution 33 14).
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by the Security Counci1.228 More importantly, it places the subject State (i.e. the
"aggressor") "outside the institutional process otherwise provided by the United
Nations for negotiation ofdisputes". As demonstrated by the Arab-Israeli situation,
among others, crisis resolution usually requires a concentrated effort to avoid
normative judgment.229 Garvey describes the political dynamics involved in a
Council determination of an act of aggression.
The preconditions for judicial neutrality in the application of a legal standard
simply are not present. Judicial neutrality has no bearing on the posture of
the members of the Security Council in a crisis situation. The debate is
infused with propaganda and the expression of self-interested points of view,
not judicial deliberation. The final disposition cannot be independent of the
very parties rendering it. The prime desideratum is neither justice nor
legality, but mutual interest centered in the possibility of collective action for
'fi . 230pact tcahon.
The Article 39 determination interferes with the political, policing and pacification
function of the Security Council by adding to its purposes the role ofadjudicator.231
The function ofwords such as 'aggression' in the context of collective security
arrangements is critica1. 232 'Aggression', just like 'breach of the peace' or 'threat
to the peace', reflects in its application a situation that may result in peace-
enforcing action under the Charter.233 In a world where no international body has
jurisdiction over a non-consenting State, the determination of "aggression" must be
the creature of political decision.234 In a world where there is an international body
with jurisdiction over a non-consenting State (i.e. the International Criminal
Court), the crime of aggression can be brought squarely within the judicial arena.235
228 If so condemned, the "aggressor" may intensify its aggression on the theory that, having been
condemned, its most prudent course of action is to improve its bargaining position. "This tends to
amplify the alleged aggressor's need for vindication and to increase national resolve, resulting in the
disparagement and dismissal of the United Nations as an instrument of settlement." Ibid. at 184.
229 Ibid.
230 Ibid. at 192. Emphasis added.
231 Ibid.
232 Ibid.
233 Ibid.
234 Ibid. at 195-6.
235 Ibid.
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The Security Council's tendency to understate a situation (i.e. "downgrade")
suggests it has difficulty reaching the required majority for adopting a resolution?36
Accordingly, the Article 39 determination theory is likely to deprive any future
crime of aggression of almost all its meaning?37
Moreover, one cannot assume that when the Security Council uses its
powers under Chapter VII on a basis which is alternative to aggression, the
Council necessarily takes a negative view on the existence ofaggression.
The Security Council's powers are not in any way affected; downgrading in
the text of a resolution a situation of aggression to a breach ofthe peace or
even to a threat to the peace may be due only to considerations ofpolitical
expediency. Thus one cannot assume that the absence ofafinding by the
Security Council that aggression occurred necessarily implies that in its
view there is no aggression and that therefore a coriflict would arise with a
positivefindinJ! by the ICC that an individual has committed a crime of
. ,,238
aggresszon.
The Coordinator of the Working Group on the Crime ofAggression reports that the
exclusivity of the Security Council to determine an act ofaggression was contested
by those who stressed the fact that the Charter assigned competence in the area of
international peace and security to several organs.239 The Council's exclusivity lay
in the capacity of taking "action" through the imposition ofsanctions, be they of an
armed or non-armed character.24o Delegates in the Working Group argued that the
Security Council had no role at all in this individual criminal responsibility and the
conditions for the exercise ofthis jurisdiction lay solely in the ICC.241 It was
emphasized that practice over the years had shown that Council decisions on
aggression was, at best, sporadic and as the Council resisted making such
determinations.242 The failure ofthis UN organ to fulfill its responsibility cannot
render ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression "inoperative and
nonexistent".243
236 Gaja, supra note 21 at 434.
237 Ibid.
238 Ibid.
239 Silvia A. Fernandez de Gurmendi, "An Insider's View" in ICCCA, supra note 96, 175 at 184.
240 Ibid.
241 Ibid.
242 Ibid.
243 Ibid.
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3.2.2 The "Politicization" Arguments
There are at least two ways to imagine the politicization ofthe ICC, substantively
and procedurally. The first form ofpoliticization relates to a confusion of the ICC
and SC mandates leading some to believe that the ICC is making so-called political
decisions when all it is doing is exercising its jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression. The second form involves the contamination ofICC jurisdictional
integrity when the Council inappropriately interferes with the Court's exercise of
jurisdiction, deciding, for example, what potential crimes of aggression will
undergo initial investigation. The first scenario is borne out of a confused notion of
the different entities' mandates; in the second case, selective justice is rendered.
At one extreme ofthe first politicization argument is Meron who believes that
asking the ICC to decide on matters relating to the crime of aggression is the
equivalent ofcontaminating the ICC with "tainted subject matter".244
To ask the Court in the absence of a determination by the Security Council
to decide that an act of aggression has taken place (... ) would endanger (... )
its judicial role and image. (... ) Imagine the immense difficulties that the
ICC, as a court oflaw, would face in dealing even with relatively simple acts
of aggression. (... ) is it equipped to consider such matters as historical
claims to territory, maritime boundaries, legitimate self-defence under
Article 51 or Iegitimate reprisals? (... ) And is the competence of the Court,
in any event, not limited to jurisdiction over natural persons? (... ) we must
not tum the ICC into a political forum discussing the legality of use of force
by States.245
244 Lehto, supra note 208 at 146.
245 Ibid. Statement by the Representative ofthe United States, Professor Theodore Meron, at the
ICC Preparatory Commission, Working Group on the Crime ofAggression, 6 December 2000, as
cited by Lehto, ibid. Ratner and Abrams share this general distrust of international tribunals in
relation to "crimes against peace": "[A]uthoritative determinations ofcrimes against peace in many
cases encompass complex factual inquiries for which courts may well prove less than fully equipped.
[... ] The shortcomings in the handling of the question ofaggression by the International Court of
Justice in the Nicaragua case (which did not even concern implication ofcriminal conduct) cast
some doubt upon the ability of tribunals to handle crimes against peace responsibly". Ratner and
Abrams, supra note 31 at 125-6.
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The very suggestion that the legality of the use of force is the domain ofpoliticians,
and not jurists, flies in the face of the rule oflaw.246 To contend that the Court's
image and role would be "endangered" if it fulfills its judicial function and
prosecutes aggressors, is tantamount to fear mongering.
At the essence ofthe politicization argument is a concern about a confusion of
mandates.247 Lehto acknowledges the concern to safeguard the judicial role and
integrity of the Court as well as that to avoid an encroachment by the Court on the
responsibilities of the Security Council.248
Determining that an act of aggression has taken place is said to lie outside
the scope of the judicial function. At the same time, there are many who see
that the politicization argument would only apply to the ICC, and not to the
International Court of Justice - a useful distinction that leaves room for
innovative mechanisms to allow the ICC to use its particular jurisdiction also
in the absence of a Security Council determination.249
On a substantive level, it has yet to be demonstrated how, at one end, an
investigation, and at the other end, a finding of guilt for the crime of aggression,
encroaches upon the responsibilities of the Council. At all times the Council isfree
to make any determination under Article 39 it sees fit in view of adopting Chapter
VII measures. An ICC investigation into a matter of alleged aggression or its
prosecution of an individual, do not prevent the Council from performing its duties
under the Charter, i.e. restoring and maintaining international peace and security.
The two separate functions can exist simultaneously without interference.
Ifthe Council determined that a particular case of genocide constituted a "threat to
the peace", one might argue that the ICC's investigation or prosecution into the
matter could encroach on the Council's responsibilities in that case. In fact, all
246 On more than one occasion the Ie] has quite ably demonstrated that this is not the case. Supra
note 194 and accompanying text.
247 Lehto, supra note 208 at 146.
248 Ibid.
249 Ibid.
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indictments that would issued by the Court would arguably result from situations
that - at the very least - constituted a threat to international peace and security.
Carrying this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion, reductio ad absurdum,
every matter the Court investigates or prosecutes encroaches upon the Council's
responsibility to maintain international peace and security.
Much has been said about the "guarantee" that the ICC will remain a non-political
entity. ICC President Kirsch was reported to have said that "the work ofhis
tribunal will prove skeptics wrong,,?50 "We have laid a strong legal foundation," he
said, "[t]his is a guarantee ofa purely judicial body. Some states do not draw that
conclusion, so our job is to demonstrate in practice that indeed we are what we say
we are.,,251 Appearing purely judicial is as important as being purely judicial. How
states choose to apply 5(2) will, no doubt, reflect their priority: judicial integrity or
political control.
Deferring to the Council on matters related to aggression will only complicate
matters, not simplify them. Moreover, it will negatively impact on the Court's
integrity. The only reason left that remains in support ofthe Article 39
determination theory is to provide the Council with a monopoly over all matters
aggression. This purely political purpose however will make the ICC, the
Council's puppet in relation to the crime ofaggression.
Les interets de haute politique qui alimentent les differentes theses en
presence sont trop connus ( ... ) [1]1 n'est d'ailleurs pas vraiment utile
d' exprimer des positions militantes, inevitablement acaractere politique, en
faveur de 1'une ou de l'autre. II convient par contre de se pencher sur
l' argument juridique fondamental dont on pretend qu'il fonderait la primaute
du Conseil sur la Cour, pour en verifier la consistance. Reconstruisons done,
d'abord, ce que je n'hesite pas aappeler Ie pseudo-raisonnement propose par
les partisans de la primaute, puis deconstruisons-le (voire demystifions-le)
, ·d ..c: h 252en mettant en eVl ence ce qUI en lausse c aque passage.
250 "Top judge at world war crimes tribunal aims to convince U.S., others to sign up to court"
Associated Press Worldstream (29 October 2003), online: The Coalition for the International
Criminal Court <http://www.iccnow.org>.
251 Ibid.
252 CondoreIli, supra note 188 at 159-160.
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Condorelli maintains that the theory is based on two premises.253 First, an
individual cannot be found guilty for the crime of aggression unless there is an
"aggressor state" and second, according to the Charter, a state cannot be an
aggressor state unless the Security Council has determined that it is one in virtue of
its exclusive power under Article 39.254 His deconstruction of this argument is
made easy because both premises are wrong.255 In regard to the first, we can easily
imagine cases where the acts of individuals would not or could not be attributable to
a state.256 The second premise, for its part, is equally unsound as it is based on a
very rough and partial reading of the Charter.257 It is absolutely not true that the
Charter gives the Council a monopoly over the determination of aggression. What
is true is that the Council is the only body that can adopt Chapter VII collective
security measures - provided that it has determined the existence of either: a threat
to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. No monopoly. What is
more, and so long as the Council has not adopted Chapter VII measures, the Charter
expressly provides that the inherent right to individual and collective self-defence
permits all states to assess whether they are the victims of aggression. Most
importantly,
[1]1 convient d'insister sur un point: il n'est absolument pas vrai que les
futures dispositions sur Ie crime d'agression, pour etre compatibles avec la
Charte, devront sauvegarder un pretendu monopole du Conseil de securite en
matiere de constatation de l'agression. La Charte ne prevoit ni n 'exige rien
de parei/o Certes, la Charte n'interdit pas non plus qu'une subordination de
la C.P.I. au Conseil soit creee aI'avenir; une telle solution pourrait done bien
etre choisie aI'issue des negociations, si les membres permanents du Conseil
de securite parvenaient aconvaincre un nombre suffisant de delegations que
leurs interets personnels correspondent aI'interet general. Mais ilfaut
d'avance mettre au clair qu 'une telle solution serait dherminee, alors, par
253 Ibid.
254 Ibid.
255 Ibid.
256 Ibid.
257 Ibid.
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des choix et des equilibres purement politiques, et non pas imposee par fa
Charte.258
3.3 SC & ICJ: A Case Study
Jurisdictional overlap has been studied in another context: the relationship between
the Security Council and the International Court of Justice. In this section we
examine this relationship to see how it applies to the current question of the role of
the Council in relation to the crime of aggression. The interplay between the
Council and the ICJ on politico-legal matters raises interesting questions as to the
limits, if any, on Security Council functions and impact on the integrity of the
Court. These questions, in turn, will inform our analysis of the eventual role of the
Council in regard to the crime of aggression. This discussion begins with a review
and analysis of the Lockerbie case with a close reading of the dissenting opinion of
Justice Bedjaoui. This will be followed by a review of the highlights from a 1993
conference on the legality ofUN resolutions and the relationship between the
Council and the ICJ and how they bode for the ICC-SC relationship. We will
conclude with a review of the existing statutory framework governing the
relationship between the ICC and the Security Council, and how it impacts the
conditions under which the ICC can exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression, if at all.
3.3 .1 Lockerbie
The decision in Lockerbie,259 and in particular the Bedjaoui dissenting opinion,
presents us with a fascinating analysis of the jurisdictional overlap that sometimes
258 Ibid. at 162. Emphasis added.
259 Affaire Relative it des Questions d'!nterpretation et d'Application de la Convention de Montreal
de 1971 Resultant de l'Incident Aerien de Lockerbie (Jamahiriya Arabe Libyenne c. Royaume-Uni)
Demande en indication de mesures conservatoires, Decisions de la CD 14 avril 1992. ["Lockerbie"].
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happens between Security Council and the International Court of Justice. In this
case, each entity was seized of distinct but related disputes.
On 3 March 1992 Lybia brought an application for provisional measures
(injunction) against the United Kingdom and the United States to enjoin them from
taking any measures to force the extradition of two of its citizens. More than a
month prior, the UK and the US had petitioned the Security Council to issue a
resolution against Lybia so that it would surrender two of its nationals the US and
UK accused of being involved in an aircraft bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland.26o
Lybia wanted to conduct its own trial and believed it had this right under the
Montreal Convention and customary international law. Accordingly, Lybia brought
an application before the ICJ seeking both a confinnation of this right, and an
injunction against the UK and the US. While the Court was seized of the
international legal dispute of establishing the rights ofLybia, and the respective
obligations of the UK and the US regarding the extradition of two individuals, the
Security Council was addressing the broader matter of labelling Lybia a terrorist
state.
The parties pleaded their case before the ICJ in March 1992. On 31 March 1992,
three days after arguments closed, the Council issued a second resolution on this
matter (this time under Chapter VII) forcing Lybia to hand over the two suspects.261
The timing of this resolution is crucial. While the Court was considering the
legality of an injunction, the Council took a decision that essentially rendered any
judicial decision on the matter, moot. To use Bedjaoui's words, the resolution
annihilated the rights of Lybia. On 14 April 1992 the International Court of Justice
refused the application for provisional measures as requested by Lybia.
Essentially, it decided not to decide the matter as a consequence of a Security
Council Chapter VII resolution issued after hearings were closed.262
260 The Security Council then adopted Resolution 731 pursuant to Chapter VI, on 21 January 1992.
261 UNSC Resolution 748 dated 31 March 1992.
262 Lockerbie, supra note 259 at 14-15.
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In support of this decision not to apply international law, the Court took judicial
notice of a Security Council resolution passed after the case was heard. The
contention that the indication ofprovisional measures would have impeded the
UK's new-found right (to demand extradition) shows a clear bias for the
Respondents, unfounded on any norm or principle of international law, and
arguably the result ofpolitical interference.263
Justice Bedjaoui took issue with the Court's majority decision?64 He began his
dissenting opinion by introducing the complexity of the case as it relates to the
"concomitant exercise of concurrent but not exclusive powers". This case, he
explained, presents the Court not only with "the grave question of the possible
influence of the decisions of a principal organ on the consideration of the same
question by another principal organ, but also more fundamentally, with the question
of the possible inconsistency between the decisions ofthe two organs and ofhow to
deal with so delicate a situation.,,265
The dissent's analysis is premised on the existence oftwo distinct but related
disputes.266 The first is the precise legal dispute Lybia brought before the Court.
The second is the dispute of a political nature which the UK and the US brought
before the UN Security Council. Though it required judicial assessment, the latter
dispute was resolved in a strictly political forum?67 A judicial solution would have
set higher procedural standards, requiring, inter alia, the production of evidence,
adversary proceedings and respect for due process oflaw?68 Bedjaoui recognized
that Lybia was "fully within its rights in bringing before the Court, with a view to
263 "Considerant en outre qu'une indication des mesures demandees par la Libye serait de nature a
porter atteinte aux droits que la resolution 748 (1992) du Conseil de securite semble primajacie
avoir conferes au Royaume-Uni". Ibid.
264 "This rejection [of the provisional measures requested by Lybia] does not appear to stem from the
actual merits of the case and the intrinsic value of the Application, but rather from the considerations
and decisions external to the case, which couldpose the problem ojthe integrity ojthe legal
junction" Ibid. at 16. Emphasis added.
265 Ibid. at 33. Emphasis added.
266 Ibid. at 33-4.
267 This dispute involved the possibility of Lybia being found "responsible", a demand for
compensation, and the imposition of an obligation on Lybia to renounce terrorism.
268 Lockerbie, supra note 259 at 34.
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judicial settlement, the dispute concerning extradition" just as the UK and the US
could bring their dispute before the Security Council. The "respective missions of
the Security Council and the Court are thus on two distinct planes, have different
objects and require specific methods of settlement consistent with their own
respective powers." This particular situation involving two distinct procedures
before two principal organs of the United Nations having parallel competences is
not, according to Bedjaoui, an unusual one.269
But the difficulty in the present case lies in the fact that the Security Council
not only has decided to take a number ofpolitical measures against Lybia,
but has also demanded from it the extradition ofits two nationals. It is this
specific demand ofthe Council that creates an overlap with respect to the
substance ofthe legal dispute with which the Court must deal, in a legal
manner, on the basis ofthe 1971 Montreal Convention and international law
in general. The risk thus arose of the extradition question receiving two
contradictory solutions, one legal, the other political, and of an inconsistency
between the decision of the Court and that of the Security Council.27o
Such an inconsistency between the decisions oftwo United Nations organs
would be a matter ofserious concern. For it is as a rule not the Court's role
to exercise appellate jurisdiction in respect ofdecisions taken by the Security
Council in the fulfillment ofits fundamental mission ofmaintaining
international peace and security, no more than it is the role ofthe Security
Council to take the place ofthe Court, thereby impairing the integrity ofits
internationaljudicialfunction. 271
A pari, the same may be said of the interplay between the Council and the ICC. It
is not the role ofthe ICC to exercise appellate jurisdiction in respect of decisions
taken by the Council in the fulfillment of its mission to maintain international peace
269 Ibid.
270 Ibid. at 34-5. Underlining added. Therefore, the Council's demand for extradition created the
overlap ofsubject-matter. Until the Council made this demand, there was no potential for conflict.
We might apply this observation to the situation where the Council determines that an act of
aggression has occurred (a determination ofstate responsibility). In this event, unless the Council
makes a determination on the criminal liability ofan individual, there will be no potential for
conflict.
271 "For the facts of this case give the Court the power to indicate provisional measures to preserve
the possible right of the Applicant to refuse the extradition of two of its nationals, whereas the
Security Council has just taken a decision that is mandatory under Chapter VII of the Charter calling
for the extradition of these two individuals." Ibid. at 35. Emphasis added.
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and security, no more than it is the role of the Council to take the place ofthe ICC,
thereby impairing the integrity of its international judicial function.
In his dissenting opinion, Bedjaoui indicated that the Council could have requested
an advisory opinion of the Court although the Charter does not compel it to do
SO.272 Nevertheless, Article 36, paragraph 3 of the Charter imposes a "certain duty"
on the Council to direct parties with legal disputes to the International Court of
Justice.
In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should
also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be
referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance
with the provisions of the Statute ofthe Court.273
Bedjaoui questioned ofthe legitimacy ofthe Security Council resolutions in
Lockerbie at a time when the legal validity of UN resolutions on the Charter or
other international law generally was already the subject of academic scrutinyY4
The bombing took place three years before the resolutions were issued, yet Council
deemed the extradition an "urgent" matter? The eloquent distinction between the
specific legal dispute of the extradition matter and the wider political dispute
brought before the Council, enables Bedjaoui to conclude that,
[G]iven its functions and powers, the Court has no alternative but to refrain
from entertaining any aspect whatever of the political solutions arrived at by
the Security Council. The Court's attitude in this respect continues to be
defensible so long as no aspect of these political solutions adopted by the
Council sets aside, rules out or renders impossible the juridical solution
expected of the Court.275
272 Ibid. at 42.
273 Article 36(3), UN Charter.
274 "[H]ow can the Court, which is not seized of the wider dispute, dispute the fact that the Security
Council is responsible for qualifying international situations and that it can place itself within the
purview of Chapter VII of the Charter, even if no small number ofpeople may find it disconcerting
that the horrific Lockerbie bombing should be seen today as an urgent threat to international peace
when it took place over three years ago?" Lockerbie, supra note 259 at 43.
275 "It is clear that, in this case, it is the judicial function itself which would be impaired. Indeed, this
is what is happening here in the area where these two disputes overlap, where the solution arrived at
by the Council to the question of extradition of two individuals deprives a solution found by the
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In other words, the Court fully respects and accordingly will not question the
"political solutions" that are the subject-matter of the Council. However, it will
refrain from such comment so long as no aspect of these solutions interferes with a
judicial solution expected ofthe Court. If the same were true in the reverse,
because the general political matter was already before the Council, should the
Court have refused to hear the application brought by Lybia? If so, this would
render the notion of an international court rather empty.
The question of the validity ofthe Council's resolutions raises two problems "at
once, serious and complex,,?76 The first relates to whether the United Nations
Security Council should respect the United Nations Charter, and respect general
internationallaw.277 Article 24(2) of the Charter "expressly states that 'in
discharging its duties, the Security Council shall act in accordance with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations".278 The question then arises
"whether one organ can act in a way which renders the role ofthe other
impossible.,,279 This applies as much to the Security Council as it does to the Court
inasmuch as it is true that the Charter lays down that each ofthe United Nations
organs shall carry out its taskfully?80 The second problem is more complicated.
Clearly, the Council must act in accordance with the 'principles ofjustice' just as it
Court ofall meaning. (... ) Such a situation, in which, on the basis of the inherent validity of the
case, the Coup. should have indicated provisional measures solely in order to protect a right that the
Security Council annihilates by its resolution 748 (1992) when the case is sub judice, is not
satisfactory for the judicial function. It is even less so when one of the two Respondents, the United
States ofAmerica, (... ) had stated [in writing and during the hearings] that "in order to avoid any
conflict with the Security Council the Court should decline the request to indicate provisional
measures in this case" (... ) Such invitations clearly made to the Court to refrain from exercising its
judicial function independently are puzzling. In the past, the Security Council awaited the Court's
decision (... ) Also today, in the Security Council, a number of member States, whether or not they
voted for resolutions 731 (1992) or 748 (1992), have expressed their deep conviction that it is
necessary to allow the Court to perform its task and, in fact, they are expecting the Court to lay down
intemationallegality." Ibid. at 44. Emphasis in original.
276 Ibid. at 45.
277 Ibid.
278 "In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes
and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for
the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII." Article 24(2) UN
Charter.
279 Lockerbie, supra note 259 at 45.
280 Ibid.
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should draw inspiration from other principles of a political or other nature?81
However, is not the essential point of concern the fact that the Council is bound to
respect "the principles of international law", an expression that holds a more precise
meaning for international lawyers?282
Applying the reasoning in the Bedjaoui dissent in Lockerbie to the prosecution of
the crime of aggression raises interesting questions. Assuming the delegates have
decided that no special conditions were necessary for the ICC to exercise its
jurisdiction over the crime, let us imagine the case where a matter involving an
alleged aggression has been brought before the Court. Let us also imagine that the
Security Council has been considering the matter for a number ofweeks pursuant to
its duty to maintain international peace and security. Each body has its own
jurisdiction: the Council addresses subject matter that may threaten the peace and
has the authority to take decisions to restore or maintain the peace under Chapter
VII; the ICC has the jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute an individual for the
alleged crime of aggression.
If the Security Council is sufficiently interested in a matter that it determines an act
of aggression has taken place and adopts the necessary emergency measures to deal
with the situation under Chapter VII, and the matter stops there, there is no overlap
with the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. If, however, for political or
maintenance ofpeace reasons the Council deemed a criminal investigation or
prosecution undesirable then, as we saw in Lockerbie, the Council would then
intervene. To this end the Council would request a suspension or deferral pursuant
to Article 16 of the Rome Statute. In this scenario, the only way there could be
contradictoryfindings is if the ICC found an individual innocent of a particular
crime of aggression. Such a decision may, or may not be related to the fact that an
aggression occurred. In this sense, we can see how the using the term
"contradictory findings" can be misleading. What a decision of the Court does is
281 Ibid. at 45-6.
282 Ibid.
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notionally independent of a decision reached by the Council on a possible
aggression. If the Court finds that no aggression occurred, after a Council
resolution to this effect, it mayor may not relate to any "findings" by the Council.
Indeed, the process of the Council's consideration of a particular matter will be very
different from that of the ICC. Ifthe Council determines that an aggression
occurred, then the independence of the Court requires that it exercise its own
discretion based on all the facts available. And ifthe Court subsequently finds that
an individual has not committed the crime of aggression, this does not mean that its
decision contradicts the SC resolution. The two decisions will not be
"contradictory" for two reasons: each entity will have a different set of facts before
it and the processes by which each will reach a decision will be fundamentally
different.
The existing collective security system that permits the Council to refer and defer
matters of aggression works, and there is no need for additional conditions. Under
the current rules, proceedings will only come to an effective halt if all permanent
members on the Council are not in disagreement. The general rule is let the Court
take care ofits own business, and exceptionally, when all P_S283 members
determine proceedings are in agreement they will invoke Article 16. A contrario, if
the Article 39 determination theory prevails because national interests ofP-S
members dominate, the general rule becomes: unless all P-S members agree to, or
do not veto, a resolution stating that an aggression occurred, the ICC will not
exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. Under the latter formula, if a P-S
member or one of its friends is involved in the aggression, the matter will not go
before the ICC. Under existing rules, if a P-S member is involved in an aggression
then, theoretically, the Court may proceed with an investigation provided, inter alia,
rationae personae jurisdiction is established and the state ofwhich the accused is a
national is either unable or unwilling to prosecute the individual for the crime of
283 "P-5" means the five pennanent members of the Security Council: China, Russian, United States,
Great Britain, and France.
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aggression.284 Under this system, although the P-5 member has less control over
the net outcome, the chances are greater that cases of flagrant aggression will be
brought to the ICC. Ifthe fortunate five are vested with yet more power over the
Court, because it will be they who ultimately decide who gets punished and who
does not, then it is futile to go through the process of reaching a consensus on the
definition of the crime of aggression.
3.3.2 Joint Conference Panel Discussion on the Legality ofUN Resolutions
In 1993, a panel discussion co-sponsored by the American Society of International
Law and the Nederlandse Verinniging Voor Internationaal Recht entitled "UN
Checks and Balances: The Roles ofthe ICJ and the Security Council" highlighted
several important features ofthe relationship between the two entities. 285
Discussions ranged from the legality of certain UN resolutions to whether the ICJ
can function as a "review body" for Council decisions, and vice versa. The group
discussion on the Lackerbie case was particularly interesting, yet there was not a
single reference to the Bedjaoui dissenting opinion. 286
Oscar Schacter opened the discussion citing complaints that the Security Council
pays no attention to international law, and that many UN members believe the
Council is in breach ofa central Charter requirement, i.e. that Council members are
supposed to act an behalfafUN members. 287 Instead, it is widely held that Council
members are seen as doing whatever they believe is in their own countries'
284 Articles 12 and 13, Rome Statute.
285 "UN Checks and Balances: The Roles of the ICJ and the Security Council" in Contemporary
International Law Issues: Opportunities at a time ofmomentous change; 1993 Joint Conftrence :
The American Society ofInternational Law, Nederlandse Veringing Voor Internationaal Recht,
(Dordrecht, The Netherlands; Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994). ASILINVIR Proceedings, 1993,
Friday, July 23,1993.280 ["Joint Conference"].
286 See subsection 3.3. labove, generally.
287 Schacter points to the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary, and the Lockerbie Extradition cases. Joint
Conference, supra note 285 at 280.
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interests. To a large extent the discussion focused on "competing jurisdictional
spheres" and the fact that this is nothing new. The "simultaneous seizing ofthe
Court and the Security Council of related but distinct aspects of the same dispute
has played a role in a number of cases with which both organs have had to deal"
including Hostages (Tehran), Nicaragua and Lockerbie.288 Arguably, the crime of
aggression is such a situation, where the matters before the ICC and the Council are
"related but distinct".
Gill suggested that the relationship between the ICl and the Council is one of
equals: that is, each body has exclusive jurisdiction as to its own jurisdiction, and
the authority to determine the scope of its own competence.289 The fact that a
matter is before both the Court and the Council does not bar one entity from
exercising its jurisdiction. He added, however, that the Council is not "precluded
from or limited in taking any action which it determines to be necessary for the
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter. ,,290 On its face, this last statement more or less backtracks from the
original comment that the two entities are equals. Moreover, it is not certain
whether Gill would favour a Security Council request to suspend or defer
proceedings before the ICl. He might suggest that the Council should be free to
make such a request, provided this was necessary to maintain international peace
and security. This calls into question, however, whether the two entities are indeed
operating from a level playing field?91 Gill is unable to imagine how the Council
can "set itself up as a sort of review board for the Court." 292
288 Ibid. at 284. Emphasis added.
289 This is on the basis of both the UN Charter and the Court's Statute. "Consequently, neither the
Court nor the Council has the authority to determine that the decisions or actions of the other are
ultra vires or "unconstitutional". Both organs are under a duty in the exercise of their respective
functions to respect the authority, integrity and competence of the other and can in no way serve as a
court ofappeal or supervisory body with regard to the actions or decisions of the other organ." Ibid.
290 Ibid. at 285.
291 This is an interesting point for our analysis in that the relationship between the ICJ and the
Council can be distinguished from that between the Council and the ICC. In the case of the latter,
the Council can request a deferral pursuant to Article 16 of the Rome Statute. The ICC could not
"refuse" a request pursuant to Article 16 of the Rome Statute.
292 Joint Conference, supra note 285 at 291.
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It is not to say that the Council is not interested in international law, but I do
not think it could get into that depth of technicality. If, for instance, in a
border delimitation case, the Court decided in favour ofparty A versus party
B, and party B did not get off the territory which the Court said belonged to
party A, and there was an attempt to enforce it, I think the question of
whether the Council would act would depend on the political aspects
whether there is support enough to take action under Chapter VI or ~erhaps
even Chapter VII because Article 94 does not say one or the other. 2 3
This remark recognizes the appropriate role of an international court to decide
matters such as border disputes.294 It is hard to imagine, however, how the
politically-charged Security Council is in a better position to make such weighty
determinations, in particular, when it is acting in emergency situations under
Chapter VII.
The Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security, and while the IC] is not precluded from dealing with a dispute which
falls within its jurisdiction by the fact that the Security Council is seized ofthe
matter (or a related matter), Gill maintains that it may not take any action which
would hinder or impede the Council in the exercise of its authority under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter.295 This is a direct throwback to Lockerbie and, although
Gill does not specifically refer to this decision, his remarks are telling.
Consequently, the Court has no power to indicate provisional measures
which couldfrustrate the Councilfrom taking enforcement action on the.
basis ofa determination by the latter organ that a threat to the peace existed
or a breach ofthe peace or act ofaggression had occurred, even if such
action had a bearing upon, or was directly related to the rights of a state
which was the subject matter of a dispute before the Court. This would not,
however, preclude the Court from taking interim measures directed towards
293 Ibid. Article 94 of the UN Charter reads: "94(1) Each Member of the United Nations undertakes
to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a part. (2)
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered
by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems
necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the
judgment."
294 Some authors argue the contrary suggesting that the ICC is "ill-equipped" or simply not possess
the "ability" required to handle such technical matters. See Ratner and Abrams, supra note 40 and
accompanying text.
295 Joint Conference, supra note 285 at 285.
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preventing an aggravation ofthe dispute or detennining the respective rights
ofthe parties to a dispute - provided that this in no way frustrated or
impeded the Council in the exercise of its functions and responsibilities.296
By stating that the Court cannot frustrate the Council from "doing its job" Gill is
suggesting that the Cou~cil benefits from a position of "authority" over the Court,
at least in tenns ofcollective security matters.297 This is not to say that the Security
Council's authority is unlimited.298
The Council is bound in the exercise of its authority by the purposes and
principles ofthe UN, by pre-emptive nonns (sic) of international law
including, especially but not exclusively, respect for humanitarian and
human rights nonns and by what the members ofthe Security Council and .
the Organization as a whole are prepared to accept in political and policy
tenns.299
These remarks are pertinent to our analysis regarding the crime of aggression.
"Concurrent jurisdiction" seems to be at the heart ofthe "contradictory findings"
analysis. Let us examine the two jurisdictions. First, the "act of aggression" under
Article 39 exists alongside two other vague concepts: "threat to the peace" and the
"breach ofthe peace". All three relate to international collective security, and
constitute triggers for the Security Council to exercise its authority under Chapter
VII. Aggression, therefore, is not sui generis or a cas d'espece. All three tenns
were left undefined by the framers ofthe UN Charter. The second jurisdiction is
that of the crime of aggression under the ICC. This subject-matter involves a crime,
not the "act" found under Article 39. There is concurrent jurisdiction between the
Council and the Court insofar as the Court will be examining a particular event, or
series of events, to detennine whether it merits a charge of the crime of aggression.
The Court is not looking to hold a state or organized collectivity liable for the
aggression, nor can the Council convict individuals for the crime of aggression.
296 Ibid. Gill is referring to the official decision in Lockerbie, and not the dissenting opinion by
Justice Bedjaoui - who asserts that the Court will not interfere with a "solution" of the Councilor
any of its aspects. Emphasis added.
297 On its face, this seems to support the official holding in Lockerbie.
298 Joint Conference, supra note 285 at 286.
299 Ibid. "Pre-emptive" should read "peremptory". See Bedjaoui dissent, generally.
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Acknowledging the perception that the Council in Lockerbie "overruled" the Court
by obliging Lybia to surrender its two nationals, or interfered with the Court's
prerogatives and judicial function, Gill does not agree that this is what happened.30o
He rejects this view on the basis that had the Court decided that Lybia was not
obliged to tum over the suspects, "this would in no way have precluded the Council
from taking the measures that it did in Resolution 748 on the basis of its assessment
that Lybia's actions and policies constituted a threat to international peace".301 But
Lybia was seeking recourse by applying for provisional measures in the form of
injunctive relief- not an advisory opinion, and the Court's decision is not normally
subject to a Council "overruling". While one might easily suggest that, in theory,
the Council can do as it pleases, one may encounter some difficulty to make this
assertion in the face of a legally-binding ICJ decision ordering the US and the UK
not to petition the Security Council for a resolution forcing Lybia to hand over the
suspects. Perhaps not all P-5 members would have been supportive of such a move.
Duursma, questioned whether Lockerbie constituted "good case law" and noted the
desirability of reviewing Security Council resolutions.302
Judge Oda said that the right not to extradite a national is not only a right
under the Montreal Convention but also a rule of customary international
law. Thus, the Security Council Resolution could have been contested on
that point. However, the Court was very hesitant in examining the legality.
I wonder whether this is a good development of the Court's case law.303
Ginther suggests that the Council has no "sovereign powers" and must therefore
legitimize the use of its powers: "[i}n the case ofaggression, it is obvious, e.g. the
invasion of South Korea by North Korea. (... ),,304 He wonders whether the decision
300 Joint Conference, supra note 285 at 286.
301 Ibid. In other words, regardless of what the Court had to decide, the Council would still have
been free to "overrule" the Court with a Chapter VII resolution demanding the extradition of the two
Lybian nationals.
302 Joint Conference, supra note 285 at 293.
303 Ibid.
304 Ibid. at 297.
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in Lockerbie belied the even bigger issue of individual criminal responsibility, as it
was rendered the same year the ICTY was established.305
Whatever the constraints the Council believes actually exist on its authority, "[i]n
extreme cases, the Court may have to be the last resort defender of the system's
legitimacy if the UN is to continue to enjoy adherence of its members".306 Schrijver
is aware of the criticism of how the Council functions, particularly in relation to
issues such as "double standards" and the lack oflegitimacy referred to above.307
The Council, being a highly political organ, is bound to get its hands dirty yet, he
cautions, judicial review of Security Council decisions is more appealing than
feasible. 308
With regard to the matter of aggression, it is unlikely one entity will have occasion
to "review" a decision of the other. Article 16 specifically avoids this type of
situation. Any further constraints on the Court will translate into greater power for
each individual veto-holding member of the Security Council. The Council does
not and cannot decide the legal merits the crime of aggression. Should the Council
come to believe that an eventual finding ofguilt of an individual is likely to lead to
a de-stabilization of international peace and security, then it may under existing
rules defer or suspend proceedings. If Article 16 doesn't go far enough for some P-
5 members, then perhaps it is a good thing that some have yet to sign onto, or ratify,
the Rome Statute.309 A window ofopportunity has presented itselfto craft a proper
definition that does not include any additional conditions for the Court's exercise of
jurisdiction of the crime of aggression.
305 Ibid. "It could be seen as support for the introduction of individual responsibility in international
law. What in effect the Court's decision amounted to was that the procedure to try persons
individually on the suspicion of state terrorism should be sped up, and that a practice which might
obstruct or put more obstacles in order to let this principle materialize, should be cut. In putting the
whole set of facts and arguments in the broader context of promoting the concept of crimes against
peace and humanity, the Court somehow accepted a kind ofprovisional function of the Security
Council in order to bring war criminals to trial at a moment when a more permanent system of
international criminal justice is still lacking."
306 Nico Schrijver quotes Thomas Franck (1992) 86 AJIL 523.
307 Joint Conference, supra note 285 at 289.
308 Ibid.
309 China, Russia and the United States.
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3.4 The Crime ofAggression is Not Unique
The "close and complex relationship" between the ICC and the Security Council
Lehto describes portrays the inevitable link as a divider rather than a connector.310
Divider discourse strands often lead to dead end concepts such as the notion of
aggression as a "unique" or "state" crime; the concern for conflicting "findings" by
the ICC and the SC; and the requirement of a Council determination that an act of
aggression occurred before the ICC exercises jurisdiction. These contentions are
based on what are arguably false dichotomies: aggression vs. other crimes; state vs.
individual; act of aggression vs. crime of aggression; Security Council vs. ICC; the
political realm vs. the judicial realm.
Take, for example, the assertion that the crime of aggression is different from all the
other crimes. Not only does this state the obvious, it ignores the fact that each
crime is different from the other (with the possible exception of genocide and
crimes against humanity which are similar in nature). After all, the four
international crimes need to be different otherwise there would be no need to
include them under the Rome Statute.
If there is one crime that is especially different from the remaining three, it would
have to be "war crimes". War crimes can be conceived of and carried out by the
individual soldier. Although the state is responsible for the soldier being where he
or she is in a context of armed hostilities, the war crime is not necessarily
sanctioned by the soldier's state. The same cannot be said about genocide, crimes
against humanity and the crime of aggression. In the case of these three crimes, at
the heart of the crime is a state (or non-state entity) policy to either engage in a
particularly grave illegal use of force against another state or against one's own
people. The policy is state (or collectivity) driven; the crime is driven and carried
310 "The Conference may, if it so wishes, opt for an express exclusion and decide that a prior
determination of the Security Council of an act ofaggression is always a prerequisite for the Court to
deal with a complaint related to a crime ofaggression. (... ) I will mention only one such reason,
namely the close and complex relationship between the two institutions." MaIja Lehto, supra note
208 atI49.
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out by individuals.3IJ Nevertheless, there are still those who argue that aggression
is not committed by individuals.
Aggression has particular features which distinguish it from the other crimes
under the Statute. It is not a crime committed by individuals. It is an
unlawful act which could only be committed by a collectivity. Therefore
aggression per se cannot be entertained directly by the ICC as it does not
pertain rationae personae to individuals who come under its jurisdiction.3J2
This reasoning is flawed. First, it reflects a misconception of"state crimes"
ignoring the reality that individuals act as agents of the state. Second, it fails to
specifically tie the state crime feature to the crime ofaggression alone and the
argument remains that if aggression is an unlawful act or crime "committed by a
collectivity", so are genocide and crimes against humanity. True, the "unlawful" or
"wrongful" act (delict) can be attributable to a state and give rise to state
responsibility. However, the crime of aggression, just as the crime of genocide and
crimes against humanity, is committed by individuals and therefore the ICC does
have jurisdiction over this crime. So long as the mantra that aggression is unique
goes unchallenged, aggression will remain in the eyes of some the enigma, or
paradox.
Characterizing the crime of aggression as a "state crime" as such is not
problematic provided we recognize that individual criminal liability attaches,
and we include "organized collectivities" or "non-state actors" in our concept of
state.313 To argue that this is what distinguishes aggression from the other
crimes, however, is specious. The other crimes also require state, quasi-state or
military infrastructure as well as organisational capability. Genocide, crimes
311 While acknowledging that individuals are behind the crime of aggression, Schuster asserts that
aggression has "traditionally expressed itself in actions undertaken by the State against another
State". Schuster, supra note 4 at 15. It is unclear however whether he makes his point to suggest
that aggression does not normally happen between "individuals and states" or between "states and
their own people". Muller-Schieke goes further still, suggesting that aggression is "inherently a state
crime". Irena Kaye Muller-Schieke, "Defining the Crime of Aggression Under the Statute of the
International Criminal Court" (2001) 14 LJIL 409 at 410.
312 Gomaa, supra note 220 at 58.
313 See discussion on rationae personae under Section 4.5 below.
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against humanity, even "war crimes" require at least the initial involvement of
the state, quasi-state or paramilitary forces.
As Robinson correctly points out, aggression possesses involves issues not
associated with the other core crimes: the prohibition on the use of force, the
notion of self-defence, humanitarian intervention questions.314 However, these
features are not sufficient to place aggression in a class by itself. Certainly, not
to the extent where it warrants the imposition of special conditions on the
Court's exercise ofjurisdiction over it.
3.5 The Role of the Security Council
Before applying the principles raised in the foregoing discussions to the relationship
between the ICC and Security Council over matters ofaggression, we must first
establish the nature of the legal relationship between the two bodies. The Security
Council was created under Chapters III and V of the United Nations Charter as the
organ authorized to take decisions and measures for the purposes of establishing or
maintaining international peace and security. For its part, the International Criminal
Court was established under Article 1 ofthe Rome Statute.315 Article 2 of the
Statute provides that "[t]he Court shall be brought into relationship with the United
Nations through an agreement to be approved by the Assembly of States Parties to
this Statute and thereafter concluded by the President of the Court on its behalf.,,316
In September 2004 the Draft Relationship Agreement between the International
Criminal Court and the United Nations was adopted at the Third Annual Assembly
314 See note 192 supra and accompanying text.
315 "An International Criminal Court ("the Court") is hereby established. It shall be a permanent
institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious
crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to national
criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed by the
provisions of this Statute." Rome Statute, Article 1.
316 Article 2, Rome Statute.
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of States Parties (hereinafter the "Agreement,,).317 The Agreement provides in its
preamble, "the International Criminal Court is established as an independent
permanent institution in relationship with the United Nations system" and more
specifically,
Noting the responsibilities of the Secretary-General of the United Nations
under the provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
Desiring to make provision for a mutually beneficial relationship whereby
the discharge of respective responsibilities of the United Nations and the
International Criminal Court may be facilitated, (... )318
Articles 2 and 3 of the Rome Statute contain the provisions under which the two
bodies agree to be governed.319 Article 17 of the Draft Relationship Agreement,
entitled, "Cooperation between the Security Council of the United Nations and the
Court" contains three ways in which the Council can become involved in the affairs
of the ICC:
1. The Council can refer a matter to the Court pursuant to Article 13 b) of
the Rome Statute;
2. The Council can request the Court not to commence or proceed with an
investigation or prosecution, in accordance with the Statute's Article 16;
and
3) The Court makes a finding pursuant to Article 87, paragraph 5 (b) or
paragraph 7 of the Rome Statute.320
3/7 Negotiated Draft Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the
United Nations, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/3/l5 [Draft Relationship).
3/8 Ibid. Preamble, paras. 8-9.
3/9 Ibid. "Principles: I) The United Nations recognizes the Court as an independent pennanent
judicial institution which, in accordance with articles I and 4 of the Statute, has international legal
personality and such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the
fulfillment of its purposes." Article 2, Rome Statute. "Obligation ofcooperation and coordination:
The United Nations and the Court agree that, with a view to facilitating the effective discharge of
their respective responsibilities, they shall cooperate closely, whenever appropriate, with each other
and consult each other on matters of mutual interest pursuant to the provisions of the present
Agreement and in confonnity with the respective provisions of the Charter and the Statute." Article
3, Rome Statute.
320 Article 17, Rome Statute.
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Article 18 of the Draft Agreement, "Cooperation between the United Nations and
the Prosecutor", specifically provides that "[wlith due regard to its responsibilities
and competence under the Charter of the United Nations and subject to its rules, the
United Nations undertakes to cooperate with the Prosecutor and to enter with the
Prosecutor into such arrangements or, as appropriate, agreements as may be
necessary to facilitate such cooperation, in particular when the Prosecutor exercises,
under article 54 of the Statute, his or her duties and powers with respect to
investigation and seeks the cooperation of the United Nations in accordance with
that article.,,32J
Read together, the provisions in the UN Charter, the Rome Statute and the Draft
Agreement do not lend themselves to the interpretation that there is a fundamental
and constitutive "inequality" between the United Nations and the ICC, nor between
the UN Security Council and the ICC. We must therefore look to provisions within
the Rome Statute for a more detailed description of the relationship between these
two bodies: namely, Articles 13 b) and 16. In deference to the primary jurisdiction
the ICC exercises over all its crimes, any such request would need to be
characterized as a measure taken within the context of collective security (i.e. under
Chapter VII).
Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute provides that the definition of aggression and the
conditions of the Court's exercise ofjurisdiction shall be consistent with the
relevant provisions of the Charter. Articles 13(b) and 16 are a "built-in
mechanism" to take the ICC off or to put it on a particular file. Lockerbie
demonstrated what can happen when such a mechanism did not exist. An Article
16 provision would have created the "loophole" for the Council to request that the
IC] to suspend proceedings.
321 Article 18(1) Rome Statute.
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As potentially obtrusive as Article 16 is, it has one saving grace; the beauty ofthis
provision is that it is "reversible", in that it is "renewable". Ifsituations truly
threaten international peace and security, the Council can adopt strong measures.
Twelve months hence, however, circumstances may have changed and the decision
to defer will be up for review and require, once again, Council agreement. As
Condorelli notes, "II est alors parfaitement logique d'imaginer un systeme dans
lequel, independamment de toute intervention du Conseil de securite et sans que
soient d 'aucune far;on contredits les principes fondamentaux de la Charte, ces Etats
joueraient de la possibilite de saisir la Cour en lui soumettant eux-memes la
situation les concernant, dans laquelle un ou plusieurs crimes individuels
d'agression paraissent avoir ete commis.,,322
The decision ofwhether any matter involving aggression should be investigated by
the International Criminal Court should not left to the national interests ofone of
the five permanent members.
The nature and character of the processes involved at the Security Council militate
against the notions of fairness and justice required by any tribunal worthy of
respect. 323 To inject such a highly politicized process in the independent judicial
proceedings of the Court would contaminate the Court with political considerations
and the interests of the Security Council members.324 Since its permanent members
dominate the Council, the political interests ofthese members will also dominate
the Court if the Council is allowed to interfere in its processes, and the Court's
independence and fairness would be in grave jeopardy.325
The crime of aggression is not unique and there are no more jurisdictional issues
between the ICC and the SC than there are between the SC and the IC}. There is no
need for the conditions that are specified in Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute,
322 Condorelli, supra note 188 at 160.
323 Anacleto Rei Lacanilao, "The International Criminal Court in the Balance: Should the Security
Council be Given a Role in the Crime of Aggression" (2004) 1 Eyes on the ICC, 98 at 110.
324 Ibid.
325 Ibid.
90
especially an absolute power over the crime of aggression vested with each one of
the P-5 members. There is no prima facie justification for treating this crime
differently from the other three categories ofcrimes.
If special conditions usurping the jurisdiction of the ICC over the crime of
aggression are adopted, the ICC will become a politically-tainted entity. It is
incumbent upon states now, to ensure that the Court's jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression not be subject to political influence in its jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression. Articles 13 b) and 16 of the Rome Statute already render the Court
subject to the Council's political controlfor matters related to its duty to maintain
international peace and security. This "collective security regime" is more than
sufficient to deal with volatile situations. If it is essential that "conditions" under
which the Court shall exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression be
established, then the relevant provision should read as follows:
The conditions under which the Court shall exercise its jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression are, mutatis mutandis, those that apply to the Court's
exercise ofjurisdiction over the other three categories of crimes; namely
those provided for in Articles 12, 13 and 16 of the Rome Statute.
A working relationship between the ICC and the Council is feasible under the
existing provisions of the Rome Statute. As Bergsmo observes,
It is a matter ofconsiderable importance that one aspires to address such
future tensions on the basis of fundamental premises and in the proper forum
recognized by the ICC Statute. The Security Council's pre-eminent role in
the maintenance of international peace and security is fully recognized by
the ICC Statute. The Council is the forum is which the essential dictates of
the making, enforcement and keeping of international peace and security
must be measured against the requirements of international criminal justice.
The UN Charter and the ICC Statute both point in the same direction. It
would serve the objects and purposes ofneither the Charter nor the Statute to
prevent a natural and dynamic relationship between the Security Council and
the ICC from evolving, on the grounds that the jurisdictional regime of the
Court is not entirely as one had wished.326
326 Morten Bergsmo, "Occasional Remarks on Certain State Concerns about the Jurisdictional Reach
of the Internatioanl Criminal Court, and their Possible Implications for the Relationship between the
Court and the Security Council", (2000) 69 Nordic Journal ofIntemational Law 87 at 91-92.
Chapter 4: General Scope of the Crime ofAggression
91
The core concepts of aggression and the crime ofaggression are essentially one and
the same, and if they are not then they are closely intertwined.327 Similar to the
concept ofnational self-defence, aggression requires a dual level of analysis which
confounds the simple attempt to model the rights of states or other collective
entities on the rights ofpersons.328 Our analysis of the scope ofthe crime of
aggression begins with a review ofthe general prohibition on state use of force to
establish the parameters ofwhat constitutes an unlawful use of force. As it is then
necessary to identify the recognized exceptions to this prohibition, we will examine
the concepts ofnational self-defence and Chapter VII collective use of force. In the
context of this analysis we will review the "hard cases" of so-called "humanitarian
intervention" (or, responsibility to protect) and the more nebulous anticipatory self-
defence. If a case of unlawful use of force is not justified on the basis ofan
established exclusion it remains, under international law, an unlawful use afforce
that may constitute aggression.
It is the nature, not the degree ofgravity, which determines whether a particular
unlawful use of force constitutes aggression. Theoretically, therefore, all unlawful
use of force is aggression of one form or another - to some degree or another. 329
Conceiving ofvarying degrees of aggression enables us to move the discourse from
the traditional "either / or" debate to a more inclusive and flexible process to define
aggression. To define aggression, we must identify its nature and characteristic
feature(s). At its essence, aggression is the unlawful use afforce that gives rise to a
327 The same can be said for assault; we can conceive of assault as a delict or tort, or as a crime. The
facts giving rise to one characterization over the other are the same and therefore it serves no useful
purpose to keep the two separate in the effort to derme them. Notionally, the act and the crime are
the same.
328 David Rodin, War & Self-Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 6. The author's
comment pertains to self-defence; the reference to aggression has been added.
329 This is not as far-fetched as it may sound. We know that simply touching a person without their
consent constitutes an assault. Whether it constitutes the crime ofassault or whether a Crown
Attorney would take the time to prosecute an individual in this case is an entirely separate matter.
The de minimus principle also addresses the "degree ofgravity" factor. Similarly, there can exist
different degrees or forms of aggression.
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breach ofthe peace. Article 39 ofthe UN Charter is instructive as it establishes the
continuum ofsituations ranging from threats to the peace to acts of aggression that
may trigger an international response. The "act of aggression" on this continuum
necessarily constitutes a breach ofthe peace, just as every breach of the peace
constitutes, at a minimum, a threat to the peace.
Proceeding on the basis that aggression can exist in varying degrees (and fOTITIs)
and that it must result in a breach of the peace, it becomes possible to conceptualize
the crime of aggression as a sufficiently grave unlawful use of force that breaches
the peace. As is the case with assault, not every act of aggression will be or needs
to be prosecuted as a crime of aggression and consequently, the distinction between
the act and crime of aggression becomes less important.
The first section will examine the prohibition on the use of force under the law of
the Charter. This will be followed by a review of established exceptions to the
prohibition on the use of force and intervention, namely, Security Council mandates
authorizing the use of force pursuant to Article 39 and 42 (i.e. Chapter VII use of
force) and individual or collective self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter.
This section will also examine recent developments in the area of"humanitarian
intervention" that reflect the international community's growing willingness to
authorize (via the UN Security Council) the collective use of force in situations of
grave humanitarian crises. Section 3 presents a fairly thorough analysis of
anticipatory self-defence, concentrating on both pre and post-Charter fOTITIulations
of the purported exception to the prohibition on the use of force.
Section 4 reviews the two major categories of defences to crimes (excuses and
justifications) and analyses the consequences of each in the context of the crime of
aggression. This is followed by a discussion on the rationae personae jurisdiction
of the ICC in regard to the crime of aggression. The last section on the definitional
parameters draws together the principal conclusions reached throughout the chapter.
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4.1 The Prohibition on the Use ofForce
Based on the law ofthe UN Charter, the prohibition on the use of force is a general
nonn prohibiting states from using military (or other) force against each other. For
the purposes of establishing the general parameters of the crime of aggression, this
prohibition should be seen as applying to states and other collective entities.
Article 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of force in any manner "inconsistent with the
Purposes ofthe United Nations".33o The first Purpose under Article 1(1) includes
the "suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace". Thus
Articles 2(4) and 1(1) establish a category ofbreaches ofthe peace that, in part,
consists ofaggression. In addition, Article 39 ofthe Charter lists three triggers that
potentially give rise to Security Council decisions or collective action, in order of
increasing gravity: threat to the peace, breach of the peace and act of aggression.
While aggression, per se, is not mentioned under 2(4) it is therefore implicit in the
provision in that it is constitutive ofthe prohibited force. 331 The concept of
aggression therefore is necessarily dependent on the scope of2(4). The prohibition
on the use of force extends to such uses as are inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations and, theoretically at least, indirect and non-military uses offorce.332
Query whether aggression requires any use of armed force at all, be it direct or
indirect.333 Since the United Nations came into existence states have increasingly
resorted to "indirect force". While they initially showed an ostensible willingness
330 The four Purposes of the United Nations under Article: "1. To maintain international peace and
security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of
threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and
to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles ofjustice and international
law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of
the peace; 2. To develop friendly relations [... ]; 3. To achieve international co-operation in solving
international problems [ ] and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms [ ]; and 4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions ofnations in the
attainment of these common ends." Article I, UN Charter.
331 Belatchew Asrat, Prohibition afForce Under the UN Charter; A study ofArticle 2(4)
(Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell, 1991) at 104.
332 Carroll Carpenter, supra note 77 at 229. "Indirect aggression refers to State actions that support
or control rebels in another State. It is a notion similar to agency theory and has been described as
'intervention in the internal affairs of a state' ... " Ibid. at 230.
333 Ibid.
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to abide by the rule against the use of force in the fonnal sense (i.e. "against the
territorial integrity or political independence ofany state") they had a completely
different attitude in the course of their actual dealings with one another. 334 States
began seeking out other methods of covert pressure in order to pursue their national
policies without direct anned confrontation.335
Based on the law of the Charter the prohibition on the use of force applies to the
threat of force, as well as a) anned and unanned coercion used against the territorial
integrity or political independence ofa state or in a manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations; and b) indirect uses of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence ofa state or in a manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations.336
In Corfu Channel the International Court of Justice considered, inter alia, the
legality of the November 1946 passage ofU.K. warships in Albania's territorial
waters. The United Kingdom argued that it was applying a new and special theory
of intervention, and subsidiarily, that it was engaging in a fonn of self-protection.337
Dismissing the U.K. 's second argument the Court found that "[bJetween
independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of
international relations.,,338 Although it recognized the failure by Albania to fulfill
its international duties, the ICJ declared that subsequent actions taken by the British
334 Rifaat, supra note 7 at 217.
335 "The incompatibility of the classical external anned aggression with the present rules regulating
international relations, led to the development of other methods ofcovert or indirect aggression.
These methods include, inter alia, economic, diplomatic and ideological pressure. Other more
dangerous modes of indirect aggression are subversion, fomenting ofcivil strife, aiding armed bands
or the sending of irregulars to assist rebel groups in the target State. These acts are usually
conducted by the strong and powerful nations against the weaker, newly independent and developing
States. The covert indirect aggression, by the fomentation ofcivil strife is vitally concerned with
destroying the target State's political independence and gaining control over its resources by the help
of the newly brought into power 'puppet', 'affiliated' or 'dictator' government." Ibid.
336 The last category of indirect force may include "unarmed" indirect force as well, although no
examples have been discussed by the authors reviewed. Perhaps this is because the concept of
unarmed coercion itself includes both "direct" and "indirect" fonns.
337 Assessment ofthe amount ofcompensation due from the People's Republic ofAlbania
to the United Kingdom ofGreat Britain and Northern Ireland (CorfU Channel) Ie] Reports 15
December 1949.
338 Ibid. at 35.
95
Navy nevertheless "constituted a violation ofAlbanian sovereignty.,,339 Since the
Charter's inception the UN General Assembly has acted formally, adopting
numerous resolutions and declarations, to tighten the prohibitions ofArticle 2(4),
essentially, reminding states of their international duties and obligations.34o
4.2 Established Exceptions to the Prohibition on the Use ofForce
While Article 2(4) of the Charter appears to introduce its own opportunities for
interpretation, states have only rarely chosen to exploit them electing instead to
"quantify their actions in terms of exceptions to the rule under international law.
(SiC),,341 The qualification ofjustifications for the use of force as exceptions reflects
a tendency on the part of states to use international law to legitimize their actions -
even if they happen to be in flagrant violation of the widely accepted rules.342 In
Nicaragua the IC] held that so qualifying one's actions further validates the norm.
If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule but
defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained
within the rule itself, then whether or not the State's conduct is in fact
339 Ibid. "These developments constitute a consolidation of the rule against the use of force and
weaken the prospects for making arguments in support ofprohibited state behaviour." Dino
Kritsiotis, "When States Use Armed Force" in The Politics o/International Law, Christian Reus-
Smit, ed. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 59.
340 Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values (Dordrecht, Martinus NijhoffPublishers,
1995) at 116. Examples of resolutions and declarations include, inter alia, Essentials 0/peace
(UNGA resolution 290 (IV) I December 1949, 261st plenary meeting); Uniting/or Peace
(resolution 377(V) adopted 3 November 1950 at the 302nd plenary meeting); Declaration on the
Inadmissibility o/Intervention in the Domestic Affairs o/States and the Protection o/Their
Independence and Sovereignty (General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX) adopted on 21 December
1965); Declaration o/Principles o/International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States (General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) 24 October 1970, I883rd plenary
meeting).
341 "There has thus been a major change of circumstances - in terms of the formulation of the rule
itselfbut also in terms of contemporary political attitudes - which has impacted upon the working of
this rule. We know this because when states have attempted to pick apart the composite elements of
the rule - an endeavour surely designed to thwart the intended impact of this rule - they have not
met with even a modicum of success. Kritsiotis, supra note 339 at 58.
342 See Kritsiotis, supra note 339, generally, for an esoteric discussion on how law and politics
commingle and the role the former plays in foreign policy.
96
justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confinn rather
than to weaken the rule.343
Jessup reviewed self-defence, defence ofnational lives and property, intervention,
and retaliation or reprisals in the context oftraditional practices of forceful action as
listed in treatises on international law.344 While the use of force by a state in
defence ofnational lives and property found on the territory of another state may, in
theory, escape the first and second provisions ofArticle 2(4)/45 it is inconsistent
with the Purposes ofthe United Nations.346 The first Purpose of the United Nations
is to "maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for
the suppression ofacts of aggression .... ,,347 Landing one's anned forces in another
state is a "breach of the peace" or "threat to the peace" even though it was
considered lawful under traditional intemationallaw.348 It was a measure of
forcible self-help pennitted by international law because there was no international
. . . 349
orgamzatIon competent to act In an emergency.
Jessup also reviewed situations of state intervention and retaliation as a means of
vindication for past wrongs.350 His examples are taken from various regions of the
world, with a focus on the Republics ofthe Caribbean area.351 Only collective
intervention is contemplated under Article 2(6) of the Charter relative to ensuring
343 Nicaragua supra note 152 at p. 98.
344 Philip Jessup, A Modern Law ofNations, (New York: MacMillan Company, 1958) at 163-187.
345 " •.• against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state... " Article 2(4), UN
Charter.
346 Jessup, supra note 344 at 169.
347 Article 1(1), UN Charter.
348 Jessup, supra note 344 at 169.
349 "The organizational defect has now been at least partially remedied through the adoption of the
Charter, and a modernized law of nations should insist that the collective measures envisaged by
Article 1 ofthe Charter shall supplant the individual measures approved by traditional international
law." Ibid. at 169-170.
350 Because powerful states can impair the political independence ofa weaker state without the use
of military force, intervention need not involve the use ofarmed force. Ibid. at 172.
351 In 1948, Jessup writes: the history ofAmercian and Caribbean relations is "fortunately now
ancient history (... ) Because interventions have played so vivid a part in inter-American relations,
the movement to secure agreement by treaty on the illegality of intervention gathered momentum in
the Inter-American Conferences." Ibid. at 172-174. History has a tendency ofrepeating itself.
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the compliance ofnon-Members in the interest of international peace and
security. 352
Traditional international law recognized a state's right to reprisals or retaliation to
vindicate the rights infringed by another state. 353 This right however no longer
exists under the Charter system. Ifit is a Member of the United Nations, an
aggrieved state is under a duty to refer its case to the Security Council and not to
take forceful action on its own behalf.354
The two Charter exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force are: 1) UN
Security Council use of force mandates pursuant to Articles 39 and 42; and, 2) the
temporary unilateral or collective use of force in self-defence under Article 51.
"Humanitarian intervention" will be looked at following our review of UN use of
force mandates. Anticipatory self-defence, for its part, is not an established
exception and involves a number of complex issues that merit a separate section all
their own.
4.2.1 Chapter VII Use of Force
Security Council resolutions pursuant to Article 42 under Chapter VII of the
Charter authorizing the use of force constitute a valid exception to the general
prohibition on the use of force. Prior to taking such decisions the Council must first
meet the first formal requirement and establish that measures provided for under
Article 41 "would prove inadequate or have proved inadequate".
352 Article 2(6) UN Charter: "The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the
United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the
maintenance of international peace and security." He goes on, "the conclusion may be stated that the
acceptance of the hypothesis of community interest contemplates the admission of the right of the
organized international community to intervene in the general interest." Ibid, at 174.
353 Ibid.
354 Ibid. at 175.
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The first substantive limitation imposed on such Security Council decisions to use
force is that they must conform to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations.355 The second constraint on Security Council discretion is the category of
peremptory international legal norms, or jus cogens.356 Where the execution ofan
obligation under the Charter such as a binding Security Council decision would
violatejus cogens, member states are relieved from giving effect to the obligation in
question.357 Given that the Charter is a treaty, it is only logical that peremptory
norms apply to it as well as all others.358 Though the category ofjus cogens norms
is not definitive, de Wet lists the core of such norms as identified by authors: the
prohibition of the unilateral use of force, the right to self-defence, the prohibition of
genocide, the prohibition of the violation ofbasic norms of international.
humanitarian law, the prohibition of racial discrimination and slavery, and the right
to self-determination.359
Originally, framers of the Charter expected the Security Council to enter into
agreements with Members to assure the availability of troops when the Council
deemed armed intervention to be necessary to maintain international peace and
security.360 This plan however did not mat~rialize. Instead, the "authorization
model" provided a pragmatic and affordable way to carry out UN operations and
became the established alternative to Article 43 agreements.361 No theoretical
distinction needs to be drawn between the military mandate delegated to individual
member states and that which authorizes a regional (defence) organization to resort
to armed intervention; in both scenarios the central role of the Security Council to
355 "A [...Jcategory of limits to the discretion of the Security Council when adopting enforcement
measures flows from the purposes and principles of the United Nations, as contained in Articles 1
and 2 of the Charter. This follows from Article 24(2), which explicitly states that the Security
Council shall act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the organization when
discharging its duties." Erika deWet, The Chapter VIl Powers ofthe United Nations Security
Council (Portland, Hart Publishing, 2004) at 191.
356 Ibid. at 188.
357 Ibid.
358 Ibid.
359 Ibid. at 191.
360 Article 43(1) and (3), UN Charter
361 de Wet, supra note 355 at 308.
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maintain international peace and security requires that it maintain ultimate control
h . d ·1· . II· 362over an aut orzze mz ztary operatzon at a tzmes.
Iraq provides us with some ofthe more interesting examples of the use of force
employed pursuant to, and not pursuant to a UN use of force mandate. Indeed, the
following review demonstrates the importance ofhaving Council use of force
resolutions that a) use clear and unequivocal language that not only permits the use
of force but explicitly describes the purpose, and b) establish a clear time frame to
ensure the Council will be free to terminate the mandate authorizing the use of force
once the specific goal has been reached.
Following Iraq's invasion ofKuwait in 1990, the Security Council determined that
there was a breach of the peace. UNSC Resolution 660 demanded that Iraq
immediately withdraw all forces from Kuwait. Iraq refused to comply. In January
of 1991, the Council adopted Resolution 678 authorizing member states cooperating
with Kuwait to "use all necessary means" to uphold and implement resolution
660.363
The authorization to use force to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait terminated upon
the signing ofthe cease-fire agreement that was recognized in UNSC Resolution
687.364 This meant that any additional military enforcement that followed
Resolution 687 to ensure, for example, compliance with the cease-fire agreement
obligations, required another Security Council mandate.365 By calling an end to
hostilities and confirming that the Council would remain seized of the matter to
ensure compliance with the attending obligations, Resolution 678 provided a
"functional limit" to the force that could be used.366 Moreover, only the Security
362 Ibid.
363 Security Council resolution 678 (January 1991) It was widely recognized that the authorization to
use force was comprised in the term "use all necessary means". See John Quigly, "The United
Nations Security Council: Promethean Protector or Helpless Hostage?" (2000) 35 Tex. InCl Law J.
129.
364 de Wet, supra note 355 at 282.
365 Ibid.
366 Ibid.
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Council was empowered to decide when use of force is commenced and when it
terminates under its mandate.36? Accordingly, the use of armed force against Iraq
which has taken place since Resolution 687, and is still going on, is unlawful.368
What is more, due to the narrowness of the use of force authorization provided by
the Security Council, and the fact that it was confined to the 1991 Gulf War, it is
more than likely that many of the military actions taken by the U.S., the U.K. and
France during the course of the first Gulf War were also unlawful. 369 By 1999, the
unofficial US position was that it was acting in self-defence however it did not so
advise the Security Council. Officially, the U.S. relied on its "new American
policy".3?O
In March 2003, the United States invaded Iraq allegedly in anticipatory self-defence
based on either fabricated or dated evidence of an Iraqi stockpile ofbiological
weapons and other weapons ofmass destruction.3?! At the time of writing, with the
367 Ibid.
368 Two years after the fIrst Gulf War ended, the US, the UK and France then launched another series
of air strikes against Iraq. In January of 1993, based on Iraq's continued state ofnon-compliance
with Resolution 687, the United States launched another attack on Baghdad in which it employed the
use of forty cruise missiles. Quigly, supra note 356 at 144. Months later, the U.S. launched yet
another missile attack in downtown Baghdad targeting the Iraqi intelligence headquarters. The US
characterized the failed assassination attempt on Bush Sr. as a "direct armed attack" on the United
States (an unprecedented interpretation of the right ofself-defence in the Charter era). de Wet, supra
note 355 at 286. In September 1996 the U.S. launched more missile attacks on air defence
installations in Southern Iraq, thereby unilaterally extending the southern no-fly zones. A year and a
halflater, the U.S. sent armed forces to the Persian Gulf to put pressure on Iraq to permit greater
access to UN weapons inspectors. From December 1998 on, the U.S. carried out missile and air
attacks in the no-fly zones fIring at air defence installations it identifIed as "having fIred on them or
having threatened them. Finally, in early 1999 when Iraq began challenging US and UK aircraft
flying in the no-fly zones a number of shooting incidents resulted." Quigly, supra note 363 at 141-
151.
369 "The United States gave little detail to the Security Council about these military operations, even
though Resolution 678 included an obligation to keep the Council informed of operations. As a
result, the Council was in no position to monitor what was being done pursuant to its authorization.
The Council barely met during the period ofhostilities carried out in its name against Iraq." Quigly
adds that "[o]ne analyst found the lesson to be extracted from the Persian GulfWar was, that if there
is to be an effective institutional means ofconstraining military adventurism, at least by the United
States, it must be located in the international arena. The danger of the 'new' world order is that it
will simply replace a system of two superpowers with that of a single superpower. If that comes to
pass, the most pressing need of the new order will be to devise mechanisms to constrain the use of
military force by U.S. Presidents." Quigly, supra note 363 at 155.
370 Ibid. at 151.
371 The US relied on UK intelligence which has since been discovered as less than reliable. 'Thanks
to evidence presented to Lord Hutton, a senior judge who is carrying out an inquiry into David
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war still raging in Iraq, the United States finally called off its own search for
weapons ofmass destruction in Iraq, not having found a single one. 372
U.N. sanctioned uses of force engage the full responsibility of the United Nations,
not the individual member states employing force on its behalf. If member states
proceed to use force under the purported authority of the U.N., without there being
an explicit UNSC mandate to this effect, then such actions fall under the general
prohibition on the use of force and are unlawful. In these circumstances, it is
possible that such uses of force would not only be unlawful. Depending on the
circumstances, they may also constitute aggression.
4.2.2 Humanitarian Intervention
"Humanitarian intervention" describes the use of armed force to protect civilians
from a humanitarian crisis.373 Finding arguments in support of it unpersuasive,
Henkin also believes they contribute to an erosion of the prohibition on the use of
force. 374
Kelly's death, we know that the officials had in front of them a draft of a dossier on Iraq's W.M.D.
that the British intelligence services and the Foreign Office, the British equivalent of the State
Department, had produced in the spring and summer of 2002. It said that "Iraq has a capability to
produce chemical and biological weapons," but did not say that Saddam had actually produced any
such weapons in recent years. It also said, "Iraq has a nuclear weapons program," but added that
Iraq "will find it difficult to produce fissile material while sanctions remain in place," and went on to
say that even if sanctions were lifted "Iraq would need at least five years to produce a weapon." John
Cassidy, "Letter from London: The David Kelly Affair", The New Yorker, 8 December 2003, 90 at
92. The Iraq dossier permitted a change in the official government statement from "The Iraq
military may be able to deploy chemical or biological weapons within forty-five minutes of an order
to do so" to "the Iraqi military are able to deploy chemical or biological weapons within forty-five
minutes of an order to do so." Ibid.
372 "A spokesperson for George W. Bush said the U.S. president still believes he was right to invade
Iraq even though investigators have not turned up proof to back up his primary argument for going
to war: 'Based on what we know today, the president would have taken the same action because this
was about protecting the American people (... ) This was about advancing freedom and democracy in
a dangerous region ofthe world.' Sheldon Alberts, "NO WMDs IN IRAQ - PERIOD" The
Montreal Gazette, 13 January 2005 at A14.
373 Quotes are used in deference to exceptions taken by humanitarian groups to attach the word
"humanitarian" with a term signifying the use of force.
374 "If any presence or exercise ofauthority perceived to be unlawful or unjust is an "armed attack"
against the "proper sovereign" of the territory, any use of force against it becomes plausible as "self-
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Violations ofhuman rights are indeed all too common, and if it were
permissible to remedy them by external use of force, there would be no law
to forbid the use of force by almost any state against almost any other.375
Nevertheless, the international community must face the critical issue ofhow to
protect people caught in new and large-scale humanitarian crises. While
humanitarian intervention has been controversial both for its over-zealousness in
the case ofKosovo and its complete absence during the Rwandan genocide, there
appears to be general agreement that the international community should not refrain
from intervening in cases ofmassive violations ofhuman rightS.376
UN sanctioned "humanitarian intervention" falls under the Chapter VII regime
where force is authorized pursuant to a Security Council determination of a threat to
the peace, a breach ofthe peace oran act of aggression and the limitations that
apply to the Council's discretion there would also apply to humanitarian
interventions. Indeed, a threat to the peace need not, technically speaking, be
international per se. However, additional conditions have been developed to guide
the Security Council in its decisions regarding humanitarian intervention.
In 2000, Canada established the independent International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), the first international concerted effort
to clarify questions associated with humanitarian relief and intervention.377 The
Commission's report, "The Responsibility to Protect", stresses the primary
responsibility of sovereign states to protect their own citizens from avoidable
catastrophe, and suggests that when states are unable or unwilling to do so this
responsibility must then be borne by the broader community of states. The
defence," and Article 51 will have destroyed the prohibition of Article 2(4)." Louis Henkin, How
Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, 2nd Edition, (New York, Council on Foreign Relations,
Columbia University Press, 1979) at 144.
375 Ibid. at 144-45.
376 See, generally, 'The Responsibility to Protect" The Report of the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (lCISS), (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001)
Introduction. ["Responsibility to Protect"].
377 Ibid.
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Commission established four categories of criteria that must be met before force is
employed during any military operation involving humanitarian intervention: the
Just Cause Threshold; the Precautionary Principles; the Right Authority; and the
Operational Principles. These guidelines are relevant to the scope ofthe crime of
aggression in that they provide more objective parameters for the legitimate use of
force. The humanitarian intervention "litmus test", if you will, can inform our
analysis ofanticipatory self-defence, what constitutes an unlawful use of force, and
aggreSSIOn.
The Report issued by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes 378
transcribes nearly verbatim the conclusions reached in the Just Cause Threshold
and Precautionary Principles sections of the ICISS report.379 In its
recommendations to the Security Council, the High-level Panel identifies what it
calls the five basic criteria of "legitimacy" for the use offorce.38o
(a) Seriousness ofthreat. Is the threatened harm to State or human security of a
kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima facie, the use of
military force? In the case of internal threats, does it involve genocide and
other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of
international humanitarian law, actual or imminently apprehended?381
(b) Proper purpose. Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed military
action is to halt or avert the threat in question, whatever other purposes or
motives may be involved?
378 In 2003 the Secretary-General of the United Nations appointed a High-level Panel of experts and
commissioned a report to address recent and purportedly new collective security threats, and to make
recommendations as to how to re-vamp the United Nations so that it may properly address these
developments. The report is entitled, "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility". Seeking
to apply the express language of the Charter, the high panel concludes that three particularly difficult
questions arise in practice: First, when a State claims the right to strike preventively, in self-defence,
to a threat that is not imminent; secondly, when a State appears to be posing an external threat, actual
or potential, to other States or people outside its borders; and thirdly, where the threat is primarily
internal to a State's own people. (footnoted version at: http://www.un.org/secureworld/report3.pdt)
["High-level Panel Report"]
379 Though the two texts are identical, with the exception of one or two words, the footnoted version
of the High-level Panel Report makes no reference to the ICISS report.
380 Supra note 378 at para. 207.
381 Originally, the "Just Cause Threshold" in the ICISS report.
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(c) Last resort. Has every non-military option for meeting the threat been
explored, with reasonable grounds for believing that other measures will not
succeed?
(d) Proportional means. Are the scale, duration and intensity of the proposed
military action the minimum necessary to meet the threat in question?
(e) Balance ofconsequences. Is there a reasonable chance of the military action
being successful in meeting the threat in question, with the conse~uences of
action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction? 38
The Panel suggests that if the SC is to win the respect it must have as the primary
body in the collective security system, it is critical that its most important and
influential decisions, those with large-scale life-and-death impact, be better made,
better substantiated and better communicated.383 Second, and more importantly, the
Panel recommends the Council should adopt and systematically address a set of
agreed guidelines going directly not to whether force can legally be used but
whether, as a matter of good conscience and good sense, it should be.384 These
criteria can inform our analysis ofwhat constitutes an unlawful use of force, and
what constitutes aggression.
If a state purports to use force in "humanitarian intervention" and does so without
the authorization of the UN Security Council, said use of force is prima facie
unlawful, and may constitute a crime of aggression. Nevertheless, if such use of
force is deemed justifiable by an international political or judicial body then there is
no individual criminal liability. A UN-authorized use of force in humanitarian
intervention is prima facie lawful, however, it must remain within the parameters
established by the mandate.
382 High-level Panel Report, supra note 378 at 205.
383 Ibid.
384 Ibid.
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4.2.3 Self-Defence
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter codifies international law on individual
and collective self-defence. Its limitations are implicit and explicit.385
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in
the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
. . I d· 386mternatlOna peace an secunty.
Article 51 explicitly provides that the exercise of self-defence is based on three
conditions: there must have been an armed attack; any measures so taken by a state
must be immediately reported to the Security Council; and, such measures, being
temporary, are subordinate to the Security Council's authority to adopt measures in
furtherance of international peace and security. The inherent constraints in the
concept of self-defence have their source in international humanitarian law. They
are the principles ofnecessity and proportionality.387
385 Legality ofthe Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) 8 July 1996 ICJ General
List No. 95 at para. 40. ["Nuclear Weapons"]
386 Article 5 I, UN Charter.
387 In Nuclear Weapons the IC] confinned that the right of self-defence was recognized under
customary international law and that the submission of the exercise of the right of self-defence to the
conditions of necessity and proportionality is a rule ofcustomary international law. The Court stated
in Nicaragua: "there is a specific rule whereby self-defence would warrant only measures which are
proportional to the anned attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in customary
international law". Nicaragua, supra note I52 at para. I76. "This dual condition applies equally to
Article 5 I of the Charter, whatever the means of force employed." Nuclear Weapons, at para 4 I.
Both Nicaragua and the United States had officially recognized that the issue of whether a particular
response to an attack is lawful depends on observance of the criteria of necessity and proportionality
of the measures taken in self-defence. "The Parties also agree in holding that whether the response
to the attack is lawful depends on observance of the criteria of the necessity and proportionality of
the measures taken in self-defence. Since the existence of the right of collective self-defence is
established in customary international law, the Court must define the specific conditions which may
have to be met for its exercise, in addition to the conditions of necessity and proportionality to which
the Parties have referred." Nicaragua, supra note 152 at para 194.
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The one explicit condition that remains controversial provides that the right of self-
defence can be exercised "if an armed attack occurs".388 An ordinary reading of
Article 51 can lead to no conclusion other than an armed attack triggers the right of
self-defence. The ICJ holding in Nicaragua confirms this position. It concluded
that Nicaragua did not engage in an armed attack against El Salvador, Honduras or
Costa Rica, and therefore no right of individual or collective self-defence was
triggered.389 The Court further held that the conduct of the United States was not
indicative of the existence of an armed attack under Article 51 of the Charter. For
instance, at no time did the United States advise the Security Council of the
measures it deemed were necessary in self-defence.39o The Court confirmed that an
armed attack was a sine qua non to the exercise of the right of self-defence.391
This interpretation reflects the views of the United States as expressed in regard to
proposals for the control of atomic warfare at the end ofWorld War 11.392 In a
memorandum dated 12 July 1946, after quoting from the text of Article 51, the
United States made this very important statement:
Interpreting its provisions with respect to atomic energy matters, it is clear
that if atomic weapons were employed as part of an "armed attack," the
rights reserved by the nations to themselves under article 51 would be
applicable. It is equally clear that an "armed attack" is now something
entirely different from what it was prior to the discovery ofatomic weapons.
It would therefore seem to be both important and appropriate under present
conditions that the treaty define "armed attack" in a manner appropriate to
atomic weapons and include in the definition not simply the actual dropping
of an atomic bomb, but also certain steps in themselves preliminary to such
action.393
388 Article 15, UN Charter.
389 Nicaragua, at para. 229.
390 Ibid. at para. 235.
391 Ibid. at para. 237.
392 Jessup, supra note 344 at 165.
393 U.S. Memorandum No.3, of July 12, 1946, International Control ofAtomic Energy: Growth ofa
Policy, Dept. of State Pub. 2702 (1946). Ibid. at 164. Emphasis added. The argument is often made
that since the invention of the nuclear bomb, self-defence has changed dramatically, or, as the point
is made in this quote that the concept of an armed attack must be expanded to include preliminary
steps leading up to actual attack (i.e. the dropping ofbombs). Although the point is well taken here
to demonstrate the US interpretation of Article 51, the premise of the argument that our notions of
"armed attack" and "self-defence" need to change is dubious. Evidently, the premise is that states
ought to be permitted to use force in anticipation of an on-coming attack. Julius Stone refers to Tom
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Had Article 51 already authorized the use of force in "self-defense" when there was
no anned attack yet, or in anticipation ofone, the suggested clarification would not
be necessary.394 "Certain steps in themselves preliminary to such action" therefore
did not fall under the notion of"armed attack".395 The significance ofthis
document is even more far-reaching. The exclusive reference to the nuclear context
tends to show that steps taken in preparation ofdropping atomic or other nuclear
weapons were viewed as the only possible exceptions to the condition of an anned
attack. Barring a nuclear (or theoretically equivalent) crisis, then, according to the
United States, there must be an anned attack before force can be used in self-
defence. Read in conjunction with the IC] holding in Nuclear Weapons,396 one
could argue that a threat or use ofnuclear weapons might only be lawful if the very
existence ofthe threatened state was at issue. In Henkin's view, the only exception
to the Charter regime requiring an armed attack before self-defence is exercised, is
an all-out nuclear threat.397
Among the two implicit limitations to the exercise of self-defence, the requirement
of necessity raises the most questions.398 In the context ofhis discussion on self-
Farer's convincing response to the movement in favour of anticipatory self-defence. In anticipation
of the next subsection, suffice it to say that Farer argues the "use of nuclear weapons in an
anticipatory strike would result 'in the murder of a substantial proportion of the inhabitants of the
country erroneously perceived to have been preparing an attack'. A pre-emptive nuclear strike
would also 'catalyze retaliation', and would end in the massive hemorrhage and devastation ofboth
societies'. In both situations, the use ofan anticipatory attack, therefore, seems to him never to be
justified. He further challenges the thesis that a pre-emptive advantage (in a nuclear context) is
decisive and would result in 'victory' and 'destruction of the enemy's forces'. Tom Farer does not
contend 'that a pre-emptive strike is necessarily and invariably irrational', but that the challenged
thesis, at least, is hardly self-evident as a general proposition." Julius Stone, Conflict Through
Consensus (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977) at 49-50. Emphasis added.
394 Jessup, supra note 344 at 167.
395 This memo is critical to the issue of anticipatory self-defence in that it reflects what the framers
of the UN Charter (most notably, the United States) had in mind in regard to the notion of "anned
attack".
396 Wherein it was concluded that the threat and use ofnuclear weapons was unlawful with the
possible sole exception that there exists an "extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very
survival of a State would be at stake." (Nuclear Weapons, conclusions.)
397 The framers of the Charter did not appear to contemplate the extreme case where a country
learns certainly and unimpeachably that another is about to destroy it. Henkin, supra note 367.
398 The other implicit limitation is "proportionality".
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preservation, Oppenheim wrote that uses of force are excusable as are necessary in
self-defence "because otherwise the acting State would have to suffer, or have to
continue to suffer, a violation against itself.,,399 Oppenheim's original text does not
distinguish uses of force in self-defence employed when there is an armed attack
and those where no armed attack has occurred. Following the creation of the
United Nations, Lauterpacht's revisions articulated an important modification.
While acknowledging that a state should judge for itselfwhether a case of
"necessity in self-defence" exists, Lauterpacht added that it was also obvious that
the question of the legality of action taken was suitable for and "must ultimately be
determined by a judicial authority or by a political body like the Security Council of
the United Nations, acting in ajudicial capacity.,,4oo Nevertheless, he insists that
the determination of legality of any such use of force be made, and believes
The refusal on the part ofthe State concerned to submit to or to abide by the
impartial determination of that question must therefore be deemed to be
prima facie evidence of a violation of International Law under the guise of
action in self-preservation.401
Self-defence as provided for under Article 51 ofthe UN Charter is an established
exception to the prohibition on the use of force. It is possible that the provision
signifies a technical "departure" from the pre-Charter traditional right to self-
defence in that the right now depends on the trigger ofthe "armed attack,,.402 This
399 Oppenheim, Lauterpacht ed., International Law a Treatise, Volume I "Peace", (Melbourne,
Longmans Green and Co. Ltd., 1955) at 298.
400 Therefore, we may then say that the condition of necessity is reviewable by either the UN or a
world court. "But, unless the notion of self-preservation is to be eliminated as a legal conception, or
unless it is used as a cloak for concealing deliberate breaches of the law, it is obvious that the
question of the legality of action taken in self-preservation is suitable for determination and must
ultimately be determined by a judicial authority or by a political body, like the Security Council of
the United Nations, acting in a judicial capacity." Ibid. at para. 130.
401 This view differs substantially from that expressed in previous editions where there was no
reference to an outside body determining the legality ofa state's use of force in self-preservation.
See, generally, discussion on Lauterpacht's call for an "obligatory judicial settlement" ofthe
question of legality. While making clear reference to the Security Council, he refrains from
mentioning Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Perhaps this omission is attributable to a
reluctance to stray too far from the substance ofwhat Oppenheim wrote. This, however, is pure
speculation. Oppenheim, supra note 392 at 297-298.
402 In fact, technically, it is not a departure as the law essentially remains the same. The only legal
use of force in self-defence is that which meets the conditions of necessity and proportionality. The
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possibility does not necessarily mean, however, that the traditional right of self-
defence was more extensive. The use of force in self-defence, pre and post-Charter,
was subjected to a variety of constraints, they just may be more obvious under the
Charter.
4.3 Anticipatory Self-Defence
Some authors believe that traditional (i.e. pre-Charter) international law rules apply
and that the conditions imposed by the Charter are not limitative of the right of self-
defence.403 In particular, Asrat maintains that the word "inherent" preserves the
customary law scope of the right to the extent that anticipatory defence "would
continue in effect under the Charter in justified cases.,,404 The prevailing school of
thought however supports an ordinary reading of Article 51 that does not provide
for anticipatory self-defence, to avoid abuses of the use offorce.405 According to
the Charter, alarming military preparations by a neighbouring state would justify a
resort to the Security Council, but would not justify resort to anticipatory force by
the state which believed itself to be threatened.406
Grotius did not believe that the use of force was necessary if one state believed
another to be a potential threat to the security of that state.407 The idea of using
Charter codifies the clear case where self-defence is legal. If there are any other situations in which
the exercise of this right exists, this is up to a world body to decide, on a case by case basis. This is
hardly a basis to argue an inherent right to anticipatory self-defence.
403 Asrat, supra note 331 at 209-210.
404 Ibid. at 211. Asrat argues that since"Article 41 does not exhaust the available right of forcible
self-defence implied under Art. 2(4), the scope of that right will depend on the construction of the
term "force" in the latter Article." Ibid. at 216. He adds that because authors fault the draftsmanship
of Article 51, "[t]his should serve as a caveat for not relying exclusively on the literal interpretation
of the Article. (... ) A legal provision in a textually deficient Article should not by itself warrant an
interpretation that would alter established rights." Ibid. at 219-220. Although he presents no
evidence of any "faulty draftsmanship", Asrat nevertheless asserts that we are not to rely on its basic
construction.
405 Jessup recognizes that under traditional international law, a case for self-defence could have been
made where injury was threatened but no attack had yet taken place. Jessup, supra note 337 at 166.
406 Ibid.
407 'That the possibility ofbeing attacked confers the right to attack is abhorrent to every principle of
equity. Human life exists under such conditions that complete security is never guaranteed to us.
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force in anticipation of an attack did not begin with the proliferation of nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction. The concept dates back
several centuries, and has been controversial ever since. In this section we will
explore the notions associated with the concept of anticipatory self-defence,
namely, self-preservation, necessity, and, of course, self-defence. This will be done
in two parts to trace developments occurring before and after the UN Charter came
into existence.
4.3.1 Pre-Charter Conceptions
At the beginning of the twentieth century, most authors maintained that states had a
"right of self-preservation,,.408 Oppenheim disagreed. He did not deny that state
actions were often based on self-preservation, but believed that interventions using
force should only be permitted to repulse or repel the intruder. In the end, he
concluded that self-preservation was an excuse, not a legal basis for intervention.409
Actions based on self-preservation, in tum, were excusable if they were necessary
for the purposes of self-defence. The notion of self-preservation went from being a
basis of action to being the premise of the basis of the action. This transformation
had the effect of limiting the number of situations where self-preservation could be
asserted, while necessity became the principle condition for the so-called right or
concept of self-defence.4Io
The scaling down of self-preservation was necessary to preclude a state from basing
its use of force on "self-preservation" when its own existence was not threatened.411
It was up to states to decide when a case of necessity (i.e. self-defence) had arisen
For protection against uncertain fears we must rely on Divine Providence, and on a wariness free
from reproach, not onforce." Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law, Volume 2 The Law ofPeace,
Part L International Law in General (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) at 348.
408 L. Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. I Peace (London, Longmans & Co 1905) at 177.
409 Ibid. at 178.
410 Self-preservation could only be invoked on the condition that the circumstances warranted self-
defence, or it was necessary.
411 Oppenheim, supra note 408 at 178.
111
and Oppenheim acknowledged that it was impossible to lay down a hard and fast
rule regarding the question when and when not a state can take recourse to self-help
which violates another state.412 As noted earlier, the Lauterpacht revisions to
Oppenheim introduced the development of a world body or "international and
objective" standard, in the organization of the United Nations against which the
lawfulness of the use of force could be assessed.413 For an act of defence to be just
it must be necessary; there must be "clear evidence, not only of the power, but also
the animus of the party; and such evidence as amounts to moral certainty.,,414 Thus,
the condition of necessity, based on the two sub-conditions of power (ability) and
animus (a display of animosity or hostility)415 is thereby entrenched in the notion of
self-defence.
Two and a half centuries after Grotius, Westlake expressed the view that there is no
absolute right of self-preservation.416 First, at that time, there was no "superior" to
judge the respective merits of the alleged competing claims or ofthe alleged rights.
Second, international society had not "consented to an absolute right of self-
preservation".417 Westlake argued that self-preservation was a "primitive instinct,
and an absolute instinct so far as it has not been tamed by reason and law, but one
great function of the law is to tame it.,,418 He approved of a right of self-defence in
exceptional cases expressly allowed by law, and denied such a right by the mere
412 Ibid. at 179.
413 What is interesting about the original Oppenheim text is that it provides examples of uses of force
in "anticipatory self-defence" but refrains from making any comment as to their legality or
justification. See case of the Danish fleet, the Caroline incident and others. Ibid. at paras 131 et seq.
414 "Neither did [Grotius] concede to States the absolute faculty of action in self-preservation - a
right which, till recently, writers coupled with the legal power of the State to determine, with finality
and to the exclusion of any outside tribunal the justification of action in self-defence." Lauterpacht,
supra note 407 at 328. "By way of example he discusses the case of the justice - which he denies -
of a war undertaken against a neighbouring State on the ground that it engages in building a fortress
or fortifications which might prove a source of danger. Against such apprehension, he says, the
proper remedy is to build counter-fortifications, not to resort to arms. 'Advantage does not confer the
same right as necessity.'" Ibid. at 348.
415 Definition of "animus", Della Thompson ed., The Concise Oxford Dictionary ofCurrent English,
Ninth Edition, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
416 Lauterpacht, supra note 407 at 398.
417 Ibid.
418 "In principle we may not hurt another or infringe his rights, even for our self-preservation, when
he has not failed in any duty towards us." Ibid. at 328.
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fact of the internal growth of a neighbouring state, or of the danger of contagion of
revolution.419 The international society, he opined, is not for the mutual insurance
ofestablished Govemments.420
Nevertheless, as late as the 1920s many international law writers continued to assert
a broad right of self-preservation which, in their view, took precedence over all
others as an "absolute right in the last resort".421 Such a right would not, therefore,
be limited to situations ofnecessity and was broader than the traditional notion of
self-defence. If self-preservation were an absolute right as some authors claimed,
according to Brierly, it would destroy the imperative character of any system of
law, for all obligations to observe law would become merely conditiona1.422 Even
municipal law was far from recognizing an absolute right in the individual to
"preserve himself at all costs".423
While it was often maintained that every violation ofthe rule against force was
excused so long as it was motivated by self-preservation, Brierly observed that in
reality, more and more, such violations came to be excused in cases ofnecessity
only.424 Thus, by the 19th century the issue ofnecessity took on central importance
in determining the "legality" of actions taken in self-defence.
One well-recorded incident involving the use of force before an attack is the
celebrated case of The Caroline. This event did not give rise to a legal case, rather,
419 Ibid. at 399.
420 Ibid.
421 Brierly, Law ofNations (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1928) at 158-9.
422 Ibid.
423 "The truth is that, self-preservation is not a legal right but an instinct, and no doubt when this
instinct comes into conflict with legal duty either in a state or an individual, it often happens that
the instinct prevails over the duty. But we ought not to argue, because states or individuals are
likely to behave in a certain way in certain circumstances that therefore they have a right to
behave that way. Strong temptation may affect our judgment of the moral blame which attaches
to a breach of the law, but no self-respecting system can admit that it makes breaches ofthe law
legal; and the credit ofintemational law has more to gain by the candid admission of breaches of
it when they occur, than by attempting to throw a cloak oflegality over them." Ibid. at 160.
Emphasis added.
424 Ibid.
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it was an international dispute that triggered what would become a highly
celebrated exchange of diplomatic messages between two world powers of the day:
Great Britain and the United States. It marked the winds of change from the
previous reliance on self-preservation to the more legally formal plea of self-
defence based on necessity.425
In anticipation of an uprising, and on behalf of the Canadian government, Great
Britain sent its soldiers to bum a ship on US territory that was being used to
transport arms and rebels. Great Britain alleged that its actions were based on "self-
preservation and self-defence". The United States Government, however,
demanded a show "necessity ofself-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice ofmeans, and no momentfor deliberation".426 Great Britain responded by
stating that its course of action was necessary. Although this marked the end of the
official dispute, and the British believed that their actions were justifiable under the
Law ofNations, they also apologized.427 The Caroline is generally cited as
authority for anticipatory self-defence, as well as its contribution to the definition of
self-defence.
Jennings provides a comparison ofthe notions of self-defence and self-preservation
which can be applied to the modem day juxtaposition of self-defence and
anticipatory self-defence.428
[S]elf-defence presupposes an attack, self-preservation has no such
limitation, and, broadly applied, would serve to cloak with an appearance of
legality almost any unwarranted act ofviolence on the part of a state.429
425 In 1837 the Government of the Colony of Canada ordered British soldiers to cross the American
border at Niagara to destroy a vessel that was being used to transport ammunition and American
sympathizers loyal to the cause of Canadian insurgents. Diplomatic efforts to put an end to the
operation were apparently unsuccessful. During the night ofDecember 29, 1937 the American
steamer The Caroline, moored on the American side of the Niagara River, was invaded by British
forces, set on fire and sent over the falls ofNiagara. In the process, two Americans were killed and
several others were injured. When the U.S. Government complained about the attack Great Britain
defended its actions, inter alia, based on "self-defence and self-preservation". See, generally, R.Y.
Jennings, "The Caroline and McLeod Cases" (1928) AJIL 82.
426 Ibid. at 90.
427 Records show that two individuals were killed during the attack. Jennings, supra note 425.
428 Ibid. at 91.
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Just as the prima facie unlawful use of force in self-preservation may be justified,
similarly the use of force in anticipatory self-defence is unlawful, although it may
be justified. Necessity is what makes either use of force justified.
In its commentary on the draft articles of state r~sponsibility, the International Law
Commission reviewed the history of the notion of necessity as it applied to state
action.43o The ILC first acknowledged that most writers consider it incorrect to
speak of a 'subjective right' of the State which invokes the state ofnecessity.431
While in the past there were several cases like the Caroline in which the doctrine of
necessity was invoked, it must be borne in mind that 2(4) of the Charter requires
states to refrain from the use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of another state, or in another manner contrary to the purposes of the
Charter.432 With this rule ofjus cogens in place, can or should necessity be invoked
to preclude wrongfulness in the context of state responsibility?433 The central issue,
as formulated by the ILC, is whether the Charter intended to impose an obligation
which cannot be avoided by pleading necessity.434 Put differently, should we infer
that the drafters of the Charter implicitly exclude the applicability of the necessity
plea "however well founded it might be in specific cases, to any conduct not in
conformity with the obligation to refrain from the use of force?,,435 Unfortunately,
the ILC chose not to answer its own question.436
429 It is to be "doubted whether this distinction, which appears so obvious to the modem lawyer, was
at all appreciated in the earlier stages of the development of international law. Indeed, Vattel ...
speaks of self-protection (droit de siirete) as the complement of a duty which every state owes to
itself of self-preservation (Ie soin de se conserver)." Ibid.
430 With jurists having rejected the existence of a right of self-preservation, the justification for
intervention was then said to have been embodied in a "no less theoretical 'right of necessity'. ILC
Yearbook, 1980 at 35.
431 Ibid.
432 Ibid. at 44.
433 Ibid.
434 Ibid.
435 Ibid. at 44-45.
436 The ILC said that it was not "called upon to take a position on [it]" and the task of interpreting the
provisions of the Charter "devolves on other organs of the United Nations. At this juncture, the ILC
discussion on necessity blended into a review of humanitarian intervention and the facts and
circumstances that warrant the use of force in that context. Ibid.
115
The plea ofnecessity will excuse certain uses of force in certain situations.437
Rodick refers to the tests as developed by the courts at the beginning ofthe
twentieth century such as, for example, the rule that the burden ofproofmust rest
upon the person setting up the plea, that the necessity must be real and not
imaginary, and that it must be genuine and not tainted with collusion orfraud. 438
Rodick also believes that a plea of exceptional necessity may rightfully be asserted
to excuse the action of the invaded state in using force to repel such an attack.439
In the 1920s, forced intervention to maintain the balance of power frequently
related to policies of regional control and the alleged necessities ofnational
defense.44o In the case ofthe Monroe Doctrine, the United States defended its acts
not only upon the ground of expediency, but also on the basis that circumstances of
necessity required it to assume a certain degree of responsibility for the condition of
governments in Latin America, and it would be dangerous to its safety if there were
foreign intervention in this area.441 The United States made such a plea under the
Monroe Doctrine in connection with the affairs of Mexico in 1861-65, the northern
frontier ofthe United States in 1867, Cuba, and also the Caribbean and Lower
California.,,442 The point Rodick makes is that the "danger" ought to be ofsuch a
nature as to seriously threaten the existence ofthe state, and be so imminent that
other means ofdefense are lacking.,,443
437 Burleigh Cushing Rodick, The Doctrine ofNecessity in International Law (New York, Columbia
University Press, 1928) at 12.
438 "The plea of exceptional necessity will also excuse the action of a vessel in making an
involuntary entrance in the case of stress of weather, lack ofvital materials in the form of equipment,
provisions, water and fuel, and in the case ofpursuit by pirates and enemies." Ibid. at 32.
439 "It is true that in so doing it is in turn forced to violate the sovereignty of the state responsible for
the attack; but such violation may be made the subject of an excuse because the state that receives it
has not only compelled the first state to act in self-defence; but it is also held directly responsible for
the first violation, and indirectly responsible for the violation which it suffers in return, which results
from the first, because it had knowledge of the condition that produced the first violation and
through sufferance permitted it to continue" Ibid. at 33-34.
440 Ibid. at 47.
441 Ibid. at 47-48.
442 Ibid.
443 "Judged by these standards, it is believe that a legal justification for the type of intervention under
discussion is rarely, if ever, to be found; and the writer cannot be too emphatic in giving his opinion
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By these standards, Rodick was unable to recall a single instance in his day in
which it was clearly established that the plea ofnecessity was lawfully asserted to
excuse an act of intervention solely for the purpose ofproperty rightS.444 Given the
state of the law at that time, therefore, it appeared that the only cases that should
benefit from the doctrine ofnecessity were those where force was used in defence
against sudden invasion where the circumstances were so exceptional in their nature
as to set them apart from "normal cases of self-defence exercised against an
invasion by a foreign power.,,445
Lauterpacht believed that all these principles must become an integral and non-
controversial part ofinternationallaw.446 When this happens, by their educative
influence and their deterrent effect, the rules will promote the cause of international
security.447 His hope was that the United Nations, without necessarily interfering
with the task of the International Law Commission, would succeed in placing these
principles, with all requisite clarity, on the international statute book.448 These
concepts ofnecessity, self-defence and anticipatory self-defence are necessary
components to the concept ofaggression and will therefore figure in the definition
of the crime of aggression.
4.3.2 Charter-Era Formulations
While sel.fdeftnce and necessity are the core concepts ofthe Caroline dictum, and
this incident continues to be cited as the justification for state use of force in
anticipatory self-defence, the notion of self-preservation is controversial and hardly
figures at all in post-Charter doctrine. Similarly, the notion of anticipatory self-
defence, an expanded notion of self-defence, is not considered lawful.
to the effect that the cases of intervention that have been discussed in this chapter are political in
their nature, and are not to be considered as subject to legal justification and excuse." Ibid. at 48-9.
444 Ibid. at 51.
445 Ibid.
446 Lauterpacht, supra note 407 at 83.
447 Ibid. at 83-4.
448 Ibid. at 84.
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Even though there may not be an established consensus in support of the
permissibility of anticipatory self-defence, there is certainly not a consensus
opposed to it. In consequence, it would seem to be impossible to prove the
existence of an authoritative and controlling norm prohibiting the use of
force for preemptive self-defence.,,449
Arend maintains that there exist two Charter-era schools of thought in regard to the
notion of anticipatory self-defence.45o The first "restrictionist" school includes
writers such as Brownlie, Dinstein, Henkin and Jessup. The second group known
as "Counter-restrictionists" includes Bowett, O'Brien, McDougal and Stone.451
Restrictionists take the view that Article 51 restricts the right to self-defence to
situations where an armed attack has occurred. Counter-restrictionists base their
broader interpretation of Article 51 on a variant reading of the provision and the
possible impact of certain post-World War II developments - such as the failure of
collective security.452 They take the view that international law adapts to political
realities. The use of armed force in anticipation of an attack is "permissible",
"excusable", "legitimate" and even "legal" state behaviour.453
Arend argues that developments since World War II challenge the validity of the
Charter paradigm, whereby the failure to enforce international law has contributed
to the "emergence of new values concerning the recourse to force" in a new "Post-
Charter Self-Help" paradigm.454 The second purported development, he believes, is
449 Arend, supra note 80 at 79.
450 Ibid.
451 Interestingly, the authors do not place Thomas Franck into one category or the other. They do
refer to Professor Franck as the strongest proponent of what they term the 'rejectionist' approach.
452 Arend, supra note 80 at 73.
453 Henkin believed that the disparity between these views might disappear with the decision in
Nicaragua. Henkin, supra note 340 at 121. Henkin adds "at least there had been [a division among
lawyers]; it remains to be seen whether the opinion of the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua
v. United States will dispel doubts and persuade the doubters." This situation appears to be similar
to that described by the classical writers who often reported that "many" or "the majority of writers"
believed that self-preservation (or anticipatory self-defence) warranted the use of force if deemed
necessary by the threatened state.
454 Anthony Arend, "International Law and the Recourse to Force: A Shift in Paradigms" 27 (1990)
Stan. J. Int'l L. I at 2.
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the emergence of a "new value hierarchy" recognizing a right to use force for: self-
determination; reprisals; and, correction for past injustices.455 In view ofhis
opinion that Article 2(4) is "dead" Arend presents three Charter interpretation
models: the legalist approach; the "core interpretist" approach; and, the
" . . ." h 456reJectlOlllst approac .
Thomas Franck's article entitled "Who Killed Article 2(4)?" encapsulates the
classical elaboration of the rejectionist, legal realist and counter-restrictionist
view.457 Franck foresaw the abuse of anticipatory self-defence, if it was generally
permitted.458 Then, in 1990, Franck delivered a paper in which he spoke of an
emerging belief that the use of force was permissible against illegitimate regimes to
promote the self-determination ofpeoples.459 States, Franck argued, were gradually
455 Reminiscent of the "new American policy" adopted during the 1998 bombing campaigns in Iraq,
Arend reports that in 1987 the United States Government had recently advocated the use of force to
correct "unjust" conditions abroad and to create "just societies" (S. Rosenfeld, The Guns ojJuly, 64
Foreign Aff. 698 (1986). Ibid. at 12.
456 The legalist approach supports the condition of an "armed attack" actually occurring prior to any
right of self-defence. The "core-interpretist" approach, Arend suggests, believes there is at its
essence a basic norm within 2(4) that must be respected while interpretations loyal to this core
obligation are still free to change form depending on the circumstances. Ibid. at 19-26.
457 Thomas Franck, "Who Killed Article 2(4) or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by
States" (1970) 64 AJ.I.L. 809. At the time Franck wrote this article, he argued that "[t]he
prohibition against the use of force in relations between states has been eroded beyond recognition.
According to Franck, this erosion was due to three main factors: "the rise of wars of 'national
liberation'; the rising threat of wars of total destruction,' and 'the increasing authoritarianism of
regional systems dominated by a super-Power"'. Arend and Beck, supra note 80 at 184.
458 "Tested against the perceptions of the reasonable man, most of the instances when states
perceived themselves about to be attacked or in imminent danger are simply not credible. Perhaps
only in the case ofIsrael's invasion of the Arab states in 1967 does it seem at all convincing, on the
facts, that the use of force was truly pre-emptive in a strict sense, i.e. undertaken in reasonable
anticipation of an imminent large-scale armed attack of which there was substantiated evidence"
Franck, ibid. at 821.
459 T. Franck, Secret Waifare: Policy Optionsjor a Modern Legal and Institutional Context, Paper
Presented to the Conference on Policy Alternatives to Deal with Secret Warfare: International Law,
U.S. Institute of Peace, March 16-17, 1990 (on file with the Standford Journal ofInternational Law).
"Whatever decent instincts came to cluster around the magnet of 'self-determination,' creating a
widely-accepted exception to article 2(4), must now carry forward, in the post-colonial era, to imbue
a new internationally-recognized human right to political freedom", and "kin to such a right would
be another: a right of the democratic members of the international community to aid, directly or
indirectly, those fighting for their democratic entitlement." "When the most basic of these rights
have been found to have been violated - and only then - an enunciated international consensus might
now be ready to form around the proposition that the use of some levels of force by states could be
justified to secure democratic entitlements for peoples unable to secure them for themselves." ." (pp.
17-18 ofpaper) Arend, supra note 454 at 41-42.
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coming to agree on a right to democratic governance.460 Ten years later, he
published Recourse to Force arguing in favour of the doctrine ofprevention.461 A
central hypothesis to his theory was the Charter's quasi-constitutional nature that
enabled it to evolve through the interpretive practice.462
But Franck's support for anticipatory self-defence appears to have waned as his
intolerance of states that flout international law for their own national interests, has
grown.463 The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States ("NSS") is a
restatement of several presidential statements in which a focused effort was made to
redefine the concept of self-defence as an entitlement under international law to
take into account the exigencies ofmodem terrorism, including the possibility of
nuclear attack by non-statal actors such as Al Qaeda.464 Franck examines two of its
assertions: that the U.S. cannot let its enemies strike first; and that while the U.S.
will strive to enlist international support, it will not hesitate to act alone, if
necessary, to exercise the right to self-defence by acting pre-emptively against such
terrorists.465 The glaring absence of a "higher authority" to determine the
460 Ibid.
461 Thomas Franck, Recourse to Force; State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002).
462 Franck cites the transformation of the meaning of the P-5 abstention as an example of an
"evolving interpretive practice". Article 27(3) of the Charter provides that an abstention by a P-5
member is the equivalent of a negative vote, while today an abstention is viewed as an abstention
and not a vote against the proposed resolution. This is hardly an example of an "evolving practice"
as this has been been the practice of the Council since it began functioning as a UN body. Eranck's
list of examples demonstrate this point: there was no evolution - rather - it was realized at a very
early stage that the Council would be paralyzed unless the "abstention" was regarded for what it is
and not a vote against a particular resolution. Ibid.
463 Franck criticizes the American use of force in its dealings with Iraq. See Thomas Franck, "What
Happens Now? The United Nations after Iraq" from Selections from the American Journal of
International Law "Future Implications ofthe Iraq Conflict" September 2003 AS.I.L. at 55.
464 Ibid. at 67.
465 In regard to the first assertion Franck writes, "To meet that threat, the president promises that "the
United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively." To the same end, he introduces the concept of
"anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the
enemy's attack" By itself, this seems a reasoned extrapolation of existing rights of self-defense.
"After all, the principle of anticipatory self-defence has been known to international law for almost
two centuries and has gained a certain credibility, despite the restrictive terms of Charter Article 51.
(... ) However, the president appeared in his statement to be exponentially expanding the range of
permissible preemption, from that of the Caroline doctrine (... ) to something like a balancing of
reasonable probabilities. Whether, and how wisely, this interpretation seeks to transform
international law is debatable, even if it is widely acknowledged that a strict reading of Article 51 is
no longer tenable in the fact of modern terrorism and aggression." Ibid.
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lawfulness of a unilateral decision to use force belies a refusal to submit to
international norms. Accordingly, the current u.s. administration conflates an
expanded concept of anticipatory self-defence with a militant and highly
transformative assertion of a right to determine for itself whether and when the
conditions exist to justify recourse to this expanded right.466
The High-level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Change raised the issue of
the pre-emptive self-defence as being one of the three problematic situations where
international law needed some clarification.467 Introducing Article 51 as
"restrictive", the panel wrote
A threatened state, according to long-standing international law, can take
military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means
would deflect it and the action is proportionate".468
This suggests that international law recognizes - as lawful - that force can be used
ifthree conditions are met: necessity, proportionality and imminence. However,
technically speaking, no such legal right exists under international law. At best,
some authors are willing to concede that anticipatory self-defence is not unlawful if
it is justified - and this would be only under very limited circumstances such as an
all-out nuclear threat. Nevertheless, in support ofthe blanket assertion the panel
cites three Columbia University law professors.469 First, Friedmann focuses on the
prospect of an all-out nuclear attack.470
466 In this statement, Franck appears to believe that there is room to argue that anticipatory self-
defence is warranted in the case of terrorism. Ibid.
467 High-level Panel Report, supra note 378 at 15.
468 Ibid. Section on "Use ofForce", Section A "Question ofLegality" para. 187. Emphasis added.
469 Wolfgang Friedmann, The Changing Structure ofInternational Law (New York, Columbia
University Press) at 259-260; Louis Henkin, supra note 374 at 143-145; and Oscar Schacter, "The
Right of States to Use Armed Force" 82 (1984) Mich L. Rev. 1620.
470 "The ability of missiles and nuclear warheads, to paralyze and destroy the nerve centres even of
vast countries such as the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A, and to kill or maim major parts of their
populations in one blow, may make it a form of suicide for a state to wait for the actual act of
aggression (i.e. armed attack) before responding. (..) It was to avoid and eliminate the political and
military dangers of letting nations judge by themselves the vital issues ofattack and defence that the
relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter were formulated. But the inability of the UN, as at
present organized, to act swiftly has handed the power of decision back to the national states. (... )
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But while this immensely increases the necessity for a reliable international
detection organization and mechanism, in the absence of effective
international machinery, the right ofself-defence must probably now be
extended to the defence against a clearly imminent aggression, despite the
apparently contrary language ofArticle 51 of the Charter. The dangers of
such an interpretation should not be underestimated.471
The phrase "should probably be extended" demonstrates an understanding that no
international legal right to use force in a pre-emptive manner exists, but that
perhaps one should exist. The Friedmann reference, therefore, does not support the
contention that long-standing international law supports the use of force if the
threatened attack is imminent.
The Panel's second reference Louis Henkin who, in no uncertain terms, confirms
that there exists no right ofanticipatory self-defence.472 Henkin considers whether
the Charter would permit a pre-emptive nuclear strike in the face of an imminent
nuclear attack but surmises the concern is irrelevant.473
Anticipatory self-defence as a rule oflaw has meaning only in less extreme
cases. There, anticipatory self-defence, it should be clear, is a euphemism
for "preventive war". The UN Charter does not authorize it. Nothing in
international relations, including the new weapons, suggests that
international society would be better if the Charter were changed - or read
- to authorize it.474
The judgment as to when to resort to such measures now places an almost unimaginable burden of
responsibility upon the leaders of the major Powers." Friedman, ibid at 259-260 (Section entitled:
"The Threat ofTotal Destruction and Self-Defence").
471 Ibid. at 260. Emphasis added.
472 Henkin, supra note 374 at 142-3.
473 The nation planning the attack will not be deterred by the Charter, and a nation that believes
another is planning its obliteration will not wait for the nuclear bombs to drop. Ibid.
474 Henkin adds that if the reason for a new "reading" of the Charter permitting anticipatory self-
defence is the case where a state learns "certainly and unimpeachably" that another is about to
destroy it, "responsible readings of the Charter and responsible concern for international order would
limit the new reading to that extreme case. Ibid. In regard to "preventive strikes", the Montreal
newspaper La Presse reported: "La Russie se reserve Ie droit de faire des "frappes preventives"
(agence France-Presse), specifically, the Russian leader was quoted as saying "Nous sommes contre
cette politique (d'utilisation de la force sans l'accord de la communaute internationale), mais si dans
la pratique de la vie internationale, ce comportement continue aetre un choix prioritaire, alors la
Russie se reserve Ie droit d'agir de meme. (... ) Les nations qui nous menacent doivent savoir quelle
sera notre reponse." La Presse, Montreal, 18 October 2003 at page A24.
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According to Henkin, if there is clear evidence of an attack so imminent that there
was no time for political action to prevent it, and the only meaningful defense for
the potential victim is a pre-emptive attack then arguably the Charter regime of
Articles 2(4) and 51 was not intended to bar such attack. But this argument, he
notes, would claim a small and special exception for the special case of the surprise
nuclear attack.475
The third reference in support of the assertion that pre-emption is long-standing
intemationallaw is by Oscar Schacter. Schacter's position actually comes close to
an endorsement ofthe Panel's statement, but is still not very strong. He believes it
is not necessary to read Article 51 in a way to exclude completely legitimate self-
defense in advance of an actual attack.476
In my view, it is not clear that article 51 was intended to eliminate the
customary law right of self-defence and it should not be given that effect.
But we should avoid interpreting the customary law as if it broadly
authorized preemptive strikes and anticipatory defence in response to
threats.477
All three references not only fail to support, they contradict the High Panel report
statement recognizing a right of anticipatory self-defence under international law.
Thus the Panel's view ofthe state ofthe law is incorrect, misleading and potentially
dangerous.478 Occasionally, the tone ofthe High Panel Report is alarrnist.479
475 Henkin, supra note 374 at 143-144. Emphasis added.
476 Schacter, supra note 469, generally.
477 Ibid. at 1634.
478 One redeeming feature of the High-level Panel's position concerning the use of force in self-
defence is its concluding paragraph: "We do not favour the rewriting or reinterpretation of Article
51. High Panel Report, supra note 378 at para.l92.
479 "In the world of the twenty-first century the international community does have to be concerned
with nightmare scenarios combining terrorists, weapons ofmass destruction, and irresponsible
States, and much more besides, which may conceivably justify the use of force, not just reactively,
but preventively and before a latent threat becomes imminent." Ibid. at para. 194.
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Arguably we are not living in a more dangerous world than that which witnessed
the first and second world wars.480
The Security Council is the international "higher authority" vested with the power
to use force, if necessary, in compliance with provisions of the UN Charter. The
International Court of Justice has the jurisdiction to decide the lawfulness of a
particular use of force, as it did in the case ofNicaragua. Soon, the International
Criminal Court will be the forum where individuals will be prosecuted for the
unnecessary unlawful use of force that breaches the peace, or, the crime of
aggression. With international judicial and political bodies now in place, it is
incumbent upon us to establish objective international standards to permit the use of
force, identify unlawful uses of force and those among the latter that constitute
aggression, and the crime of aggression. A comprehensive definition of the crime
of aggression requires that we establish the parameters of anticipatory self-defence
as well as the other key concepts that are directly related.
4.4. Defences for the Crime of Aggression
Most domestic criminal systems agree there is a need to distinguish between two
categories of defences: justifications and excuses.481 What is less clear is whether,
480 In 1915 the terrible technology was the submarine and torpedo. During the World War I
Germany indiscriminately hit military and civilian targets. In 1915 Germany sunk the Lucitania
killing 1189 passengers and crew, despite rescue attempts. The commercial liner carrying British
and American citizens was bombed off the coast of Cobh, Ireland. Three decades later the United
States became the first country in the world to use weapons of mass destruction. It dropped atomic
bombs killing more than half a million Japanese civilians. Countless others were born with
deformations and debilitating, life-threatening disease as an indirect result of the dropping of the
bombs. Moreover, the statement neglects to specify that any such "reactive" use of force and
"preventive" use of force "before a latent threat becomes imminent" could only be engaged at the
request of the Security Council. What distinguishes the current collective security situation from
those throughout the twentieth century is not the terrorism factor. What makes the world of today
different from that of the past is that the United States is no longer as removed from the terrorist and
other use of force threat as it used to be. This, it is suggested, is not reason to change international
law.
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and to what extent, international criminal law recognizes this distinction for either
unlawful or practical reasons.482 A case in point: while the Rome Statute excludes
criminal responsibility in particular situations, it does not specify whether the
defences to any of the crimes in its jurisdiction constitute excuses or
justifications.483 Article 31 of the Rome Statute provides that criminal
responsibility is excluded if, at the time of that person's conduct, the person suffers
from mental illness, is in a state of (non-voluntary) intoxication, acted reasonably to
defend him or herself or another person, or if the conduct in question was caused by
duress.484 The ICC may also take into consideration such grounds as may be
derived from applicable law as set forth in article 21.485
Excuses and justifications give rise to legal effects in relation to both the perpetrator
and victim ofa crime. Essentially, if an accused is excused for a certain crime, his
or her behaviour is still considered unlawful though not criminal. If, on the other
hand, a crime is justified then it is deemed neither criminal nor unlawfu1.486
Cassese lists three possible consequences of domestic criminal behaviour that is
excused. The person who aids or abets or who is an accomplice to the crime
remains criminally responsible unless he or she is entitled to the same excuse as the
principal perpetrator.487 A victim of excused violent criminal conduct is permitted
to act in self-defence (within legal parameters) as the conduct giving rise to the
action in self-defence, although excused, is per se contrary to the law.488 A third
481 "When the law provides for a justification, an action that would per se be considered contrary to
law, it is regarded instead as lawful and thus does not amount to a crime. (... ) the act is the lesser of
the two evils or (... ) is required by law. (... ) By contrast, in the case of excuses, the action contrary
to a norm is regarded as unlawful, but the wrongdoer is not punished. His misconduct is not
considered reprehensible on one of two grounds, or both: (i) mens rea is lacking; (ii) society and law,
while disapproving of that behaviour, intend to take account of special circumstances." Antonio
Cassese, "Justifications and Excuses in International Criminal Law" in Cassese, The Rome Statute
supra note 21, Chapter 24.1 at 951-2.
482 Ibid.
483 Ibid. at 953. Articles 31- 33, Rome Statute.
484 Article 31, Rome Statute.
485 Article 31 (3), Rome Statute.
486 Cassese, supra note 481 at 952-3.
487 Ibid. The excuse is therefore a personal exception that is attached to the individual.
488 Ibid.
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consequence is that the person who has been excused for the crime may nonetheless
be liable under civil law to compensate the victim.489
In contrast, if a criminal act is justified, there is no "aiding or abetting" or
"accomplice" as the behaviour in question is deemed neither criminal nor
unlawful.49o Self-defence is permitted to repel unlawful violence, and is therefore
unlawful if it is in reaction to justified conduct deemed licit from the outset.491
Finally, the purported victim of a justified criminal act is not entitled to
compensation.492 Thus, while both defence categories effectively preclude
individual criminal liability, the excused crime remains unlawful in character while
the justified crime is deemed not unlawful ab initio.
When we apply the legal consequences of the two categories of defences to the
crime of aggression, the Gordian knot begins to unravel all on its own and ceases to
be "impossible to resolve".493 By examining the consequences of defences in
relation to aggression, self-defence and anticipatory self-defence we can see how
these concepts inter-relate. On its face, this exercise may seem pointless as the
Rome Statute does not distinguish between excuses and justifications. If, in its
decisions on aggression however, the Court employs such terms as "justified" or
"excused" this would arguably open, or close, the door to certain legal
consequences.
Although unlikely, if a perpetrator of aggression raised a defence of excuse no
criminal liability attaches however a duty to compensate the victim may lie - albeit,
489 Ibid.
490 Ibid.
491 Ibid.
492 Ibid.
493 "It is an incredibly intricate problem that, at least at present, it is impossible to resolve.
However, there is one difference to the myJhical story [of the Gordian knot]: while Alexander, not
being able to disentangle the closely interwoven ropes of the knot, is said to have cut it with his
sword, present circumstances do not provide for a similar remedy, namely a decisive and legally
sound solution that would make it possible to leave aggression as one of the four categories of
crimes in the Rome Statute." See Schuster supra note 4 at 2.
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more likely than not, on the entity on whose behalf the perpetrator was acting.494 If,
on the other hand, the crime of aggression was justified then such use of force is not
unlawful ab initio and there is no duty to compensate.495 A second consequence of
the distinction merits closer scrutiny: the victim ofan excused aggression would
have a right to use force in self-defence whereas the victim of a justified aggression
would not. If, in the latter case, the victim used force in "self-defence" it would be
doing so outside the realm oflegality. Self-defence is not warranted except in
situations where the act that triggered it is illegal.496 If the original "crime" of
aggression is cleansed of its unlawfulness (and not only its criminality) then self-
defence is neither justified nor lawful. In such a case, whether the "victim" is guilty
of either the crime of aggression or a less grave violation of the prohibition on the
use of force is a question that would be decided by the ICC.
This last point is particularly relevant to the concept of national self-defence. If
State X invades State Y and the latter responds in "self-defence" with a bombing
campaign of State X's military headquarters, then the actions ofboth states must be
examined closely. State Y's allegation of self-defence does not ipso facto carve its
actions out ofthe general category ofunlawful use of force. The allegation of self-
defence must be considered by the Court and confirmed as well-founded in law and
in fact. It will be recalled that a "victim" who uses force in self-defence may, itself,
be acting outside the realm oflegality (i.e. ifthe action that triggered the so-called
self-defence was either lawful orjustified). Barring a UN Security Council mandate
for State Y to use force, if State X's invasion is justified then State Y's use of force
in self-defence becomes unlawful. Depending on the nature of State Y's use of
494 First, it is higWy unlikely given that the only real defence available to the perpetrator is
international self-defence. Second, if a distinction between excuses and justifications can
theoretically be applied by the ICC, then non-state entities (in the case of excused crimes) would be
equally subject to having to compensate the victim for its actions. This, in tum, would militate in
support of the standing of such a non-state entity before the ICl.
495 Query whether there is a difference between the significance of the word "legal" and the term
"not illegal". The former tends to characterize the behaviour in question with greater normative
force.
496 It is conceded that the notion of self-defence in domestic criminal law may differ from that of a
state using force in "self-defence". However, for the purposes of this rather simplistic analogy the
two are taken to be synonymous.
127
force, it may even constitute a crime of aggression.497 If, on the other hand, State
X's action was neither lawful nor justified then the use of force by State Yin self-
defence (in compliance with the principles of international humanitarian law), is
permissible as long as it is necessary and proportionate.498 As both State X's initial
use of force may amount to aggression, and State Y's "self-defence" may
conceivably constitute aggression (depending on its nature), it is important for the
actions of both entities, to be thoroughly reviewed before any party to a conflict is
prosecuted.499
The situation is even clearer in the case of "anticipatory self-defence" (i.e. no armed
attack, and no Security Council authorisation). A state or other entity that uses
force against another and defends its action on the basis of"anticipatory self-
defence", is engaging in a prima facie unlawful use of force that may constitute a
crime of aggression. The only time "anticipatory self-defence" will not be unlawful
is when it is deemed justified pursuant to an established set of objective criteria.
If the use of force in anticipatory self-defence is deemed justified, it follows that
there is no right on the part of the "victim" to use force in self-defence.
Consequently, any such use of force would be unlawful. Again, depending on the
nature of such unlawful use of force, it may also constitute a crime of aggression. If
the use of force in anticipatory self-defence does not meet the objective criteria, it is
not justified and remains unlawful. Again, depending on its nature, it may even
constitute a crime of aggression. A use of force that is not justified, in anticipatory
self-defence (or self-defence, for that matter) opens the door to compensatory
recourse by the victim. The most sensible and reliable mechanism to determine the
lawfulness or criminality of a particular use of force is an ICC investigation.
497 One can imagine the possibility of State Y having aggressive motives and "waiting" for the right
opportunity to "punish" or "teach a lesson to" State X.
498 If State V's use of force in self-defence violates the principles of international humanitarian law
then, as discussed in the previous chapter, it is conceivable that State V's use of force in "self-
defence" may, too, constitute aggression.
499 This demonstrates all the more the inappropriateness of the UN Security Council to deal with the
crime ofaggression. It is not equipped, nor does it possess the moral authority to fairly investigate
armed conflicts for the purposes of attributing or apportioning blame.
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Generally, a use of force is lawful if it is authorized by the Security Councilor is
necessary for the purposes of self-defence ifan armed attack occurs. Nevertheless,
to ensure that the initial "anned attack" was indeed unlawful (i.e. not justified), the
use of force in self-defence must also be subject to review and possible
investigation by the ICC Prosecutor.soo A use of force is justified, albeit not lawful
per se, if it is necessary. A justified use of force is neither lawful nor unlawful as
these concepts are commonly understood. "Self-defence" is the purpose of the use
of force; "necessity" is established ifthe use of force meets a standard of objective
criteria. An allegation of self-defence or anticipatory self-defence does not in itself
justify a use of force; necessity must be proven. Necessity therefore requires a test
to determine whether a use of force in anticipatory self-defence is necessary and not
unlawful- and - to determine whether a use of force in Article 51 self-defence (i.e.
"if an armed attack occurs") was necessary and therefore lawful.
4.5 Rationae Personae
The International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over natural persons.501 For the
purposes of defining aggression however it must be established who exactly among
natural persons will be subject to prosecution for the crime of aggression. There are
two facets or dimensions to the rationae personae jurisdiction: one horizontal (i.e.
persons belonging to which collectivities) and the other vertical (i.e. chain of
command, hierarchy of responsibility etc ... )
The horizontal dimension of our inquiry pertains to the typical feature of the
phenomenon of aggression, namely, that it requires substantial infrastructure and /
or resources to be carried out. Aggression, crimes against humanity, and the crime
of genocide, as a general rule have a massive and systemic nature that presupposes
500 What use would the odd investigation of the most flagrant examples of aggression be in deterring
would-be aggressors?
501 "1. The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute. 2. A person
who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually responsible and liable
for punishment in accordance with this Statute." Article 25, Rome Statute.
129
collective organization.502 The category of accused therefore is dependent on the
type of entity, in addition to states, that is capable of action falling within the
"summit category" of prohibited use of force. Once we establish the entities that
can be involved in aggression, we can identify the individuals who are ultimately
responsible for the unlswful use of force.
By way of analogy, Article 7 of the Rome Statute entitled "Crimes against
humanity" defines Attack directed against any civilian population as a "course of
conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1
against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or
organizational policy to commit such attack.503 If a crime against humanity can be
carried out or dictated by a state or organizational policy it stands to reason that
aggression can also be carried out in furtherance of an organizational policy.
The fact that many non-state actors can, at least theoretically, engage in unlawful
uses of force (that may amount to aggression) further "dis-embeds" or disassociates
the crime from the traditional notion that aggression is a state crime. Commenting
on the oftentimes prevailing assumption that a person who is liable for aggression is
acting on behalf of a particular state Condorelli writes,
C'est une conception qui m'apparait, quant amoi, tres discutable: je ne vois
pas, en effet, pourquoi il devrait etre a priori exclu que l'on puisse
criminaliser comme auteurs d'agressions des particuliers n'agissant pas pour
Ie compte d'Etats, mais pla<;ant leur action dans Ie cadre de puissants
groupes non-etatiques, comme des multinationales du crime organise, des
mafias, des armees privees, des cartels de la drogue ou des centrales
terroristes. Que I'on puisse ou non parler d'« agression » au sens « inter-
etatique» de la Charte lors d'attaques d'envergure venant de telles
organisations si aucun Etat n'est derriere elles, il n'en reste pas moins qu'il
ne serait pas du tout choquant d'imaginer que de telles attaques soient
502 "The Rome Statute also reflects the notion that the crime of aggression constitutes par excellence,
though still very imprecisely as regards the system of application, the archetype ofthe'double
crime', simultaneously a State crime and potentially an individual crime. Crimes against humanity,
and a fortiori the crime ofgenocide, without necessarily being undertaken by a sovereign State,
nonetheless as a general rule presuppose collective organization." Dupuy, supra note 118 at 1089.
503 Article 7(2)(a), Rome Statute. Emphasis added.
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qualifiees de « crimes d'agression »sur Ie plan de la responsabilite penale
individuelle.504
Powerful collective entities are capable ofcarrying out aggression. The events of
11 September 2001 and certain reactions within the international community to
these events confirm the well-foundedness ofthis assertion "de maniere
eclatante".505 However, international criminal organizations are not the only non-
state entities capable of carrying out aggression. International regional
arrangements and collective security organizations such as NATO are equally
capable of the summit category of unlawful use of force. The US-led NATO
invasion ofKosovo not only represented a break with the prior legal regime, it was
a supremely illegal war.506 At that time, NATO based its use of force on reasons
that only the UN Security Council can invoke: impending humanitarian disaster and
threats to peace and international security.50? The essence of aggression therefore is
not in the perpetrator-entity; rather, it is in the nature ofthe unlawful use of force.
Although the Charter outlaws the use of force by states, is anyone prepared to argue
that the general prohibition on the use of force does not or should not apply to non-
state entities?
The second, vertical dimension of the matter ofpersonal jurisdiction involves who
in the chain of command, or on behalfofan organized collectivity, can be held
criminally liable for the crime of aggression.508 This issue has already ripened to
504 Condorelli, supra note 188 at 156-7.
505 Ibid.
506 "Of course NATO tried to defend its actions on legal as well as moral grounds. [... ] As Christine
Gray put it, 'It is no longer simply a case of interpreting euphemisms such as 'all necessary means'
to allow the use of force when it is clear form the preceding debate that the use of force is envisaged;
the USA, the UK. and others have gone far beyond this to distort the words ofresolutions and to
ignore the preceding debates in order to claim to be acting on behalf of the international
community." Mandel, supra note 24 at 89-90.
507 Mandel also included "Security Council resolutions" - however that scenario constitutes an
established exception to the general prohibition on the use of force (i.e. UN authorized use of force).
Ibid.
508 See Rodin, supra note 327, generally, who makes the forceful argument that soldiers should be
held responsible for the unlawful use of force - provided the requisite knowledge and intention are
present. The trickle-down effect would be that fewer individuals would enlist in armies knowing
there was a possibility that they could be held personally accountable for their behaviour.
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the point where there appears to be ample consensus. The common understanding
and assumption at the 2002 ICC Preparatory Commission was that only state
leaders could be held criminally responsible for the crime of aggression.509 It is
unclear whether the consensus was on the word "state", "leaders" or on the
combined term "state leaders". It is suggested however that the emphasis should be
on leaders given the prospect that collective entities can be involved in aggression
has yet to be fully examined. In her discussion paper, the Coordinator for the
Working Group on the Crime of Aggression Fernandez de Gurmendi proposed a
definition based on an "updated formulation" of the Nuremberg Charter definition
and jurisprudence:
For the purpose of the present Statute, a person commits a "crime of
aggression" when, being in a position effectively to exercise control over or
to direct the political or military action of a State, that person intentionally
and knowingly orders or participates actively in the planning, preparation,
initiation or execution of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity
and scale, constitutes a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United
Nations.510
At its first informal inter-sessional meeting in June 2004, the Special Working
Group on the Crime of Aggression discussed the leadership aspect of the crime
and concluded that it remained to be determined whether the leadership could be
limited to one person or to the upper echelons of the chain of command.511
In this connection, it was also suggested that all persons in a position to exert
decisive influence over the policies of the State [or collective entity] should
be held criminally responsible, so that political, social, business and spiritual
leaders could be included within the leadership group. The point was made
that the preliminary definition had been crafted in a manner broad enough to
encompass most influential leaders. However, another view held that
responsibility for the crime of aggression should be understood to be rather
restrictive, basically limited to political leaders, excluding for example
509 Fernandez de Gunnendi, supra note 239 at 186.
510 Ibid.
511 "Infonnal inter-sessional meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression held
at the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Detennination, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University,
New Jersey, Unites States, from 21-23 June 2004" Report identified by document number ICC-
ASP/3/SWGCAlINF.l at 10.
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advisors who clearly would lack any effective control over the actions of a
State.512
Unlike the Coordinator's discussion paper the Report ofthe SWGCA concluded
that there was agreement that aggression was a crime "characterized by being
committed by those in a position ofleadership" and arguably left open the
possibility that aggression can be committed by non-state as well as state entities.513
Consequently, it is proposed that the rationae personae jurisdiction ofthe ICC
encompass individuals acting on behalf of state as well as collective entities. These
leaders must be in a position to exert decisive influence or effective control to
direct, plan, prepare or order the unlawful use of force.
4.6 Parameters for the Scope ofthe Crime ofAggression
The purpose ofthis chapter was to clarify some of the more complex issues
associated with the crime of aggression. Although there remain a number of
unanswered questions, it is suggested that we have at least managed to address the
core issues of a working definition. The concepts that form the basis of a definition
for the crime of aggression are: unlawful use of force; UN authorized use of force;
self-defence; anticipatory self-defence; defences (excuses and justifications); and,
rationae personae. "Humanitarian intervention" is relevant to the crime of
aggression if there is no UN Security Council authorization for the use of force by
one or more states in that context.
The primary concept is the category ofunlawful use of force. This is the use of
force prohibited by the UN Charter. Although technically this prohibition targets
states, it can conceivably apply to collective entities. UN-authorized use of force
512 Ibid.
513 Ibid. at 11 para 53(a).
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(including humanitarian intervention mandates) and national self-defence under
Article 51 of the UN Charter are the two exceptions and constitute lawful uses of
force. The fonner is a fonnal mandate under a SC resolution and must be explicit
(i.e. the use of force cannot be inferred) in tenns of purpose and duration. The use
of force in self-defence is only lawful "if an anned attack occurs" and it is
necessary and proportionate. No anned attack, no legal right of national self-
defence.
The more controversial anticipatory self-defence, and un-UNSC authorized
humanitarian intervention are prima facie unlawful uses of force. Both are subject
to review on the basis of an international standard as established through objective
criteria such as those proposed under tests Band C, respectively, in Chapter 5
below. If they meet the standard, which has as its source the principle ofnecessity,
they are deemed not unlawful. If they do not meet the standard, depending on their
nature, they may constitute crimes of aggression.
If an unlawful use of force is unnecessary and breaches the peace, it constitutes a
crime of aggression. An unlawful use of force is subject to review on the basis of
an international standard as established through objective criteria such as those
proposed under test A in Chapter 5 below. If the unlawful use of force meets this
standard, then it constitutes a crime of aggression. In its simplest fonn, aggression
can be defined as the unlawful use offorce that is unnecessary and a breach ofthe
peace.
Chapter 5 A Proposed Working Definition for the Crime of Aggression
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Having explored the major issues relating to the scope of the crime of aggression,
the groundwork is now laid for certain conclusions to be drawn that will become the
cornerstones of a definition. A working definition for the crime of aggression
should follow and reflect a rigorous analysis of the various concepts it touches
upon, in particular, the general prohibition on the use of force, self-defence;
anticipatory self-defence; Chapter VII use of force (Security Council use of force
mandates); humanitarian intervention or the responsibility to protect; possible
defences and rationae personae considerations.
Current proposals for a definition for the crime of aggression do not reflect such an
analysis. The 2002 PrepCom consolidated text, for example, presents two options,
neither of which touches upon the general prohibition on the use of force, self-
defence, anticipatory self-defence, the concept of necessity or justification.514 The
first option contains three variations, yet none of the four possible texts515 envisions
the possibility that a non-state entity can be involved in the crime of aggression.
The PrepCom consolidated texts are circular, referencing undefined terms or
concepts that hinder rather than advance the debate. Even the use of the term
"gravity" in Option 1's third variation is a disappointment. More static than
purposeful, it fails to establish any definitional parameters. Option 2 of the
PrepCom document conflates the idea of conditions for the Court's exercise of
jurisdiction over the crime and the definition of the crime of aggression by asking
the ICC to defer any jurisdiction that it might have over the crime of aggression to
the veto-carrying members of the UN Security Council. If a precondition requiring
a Security Council determination of an act of aggression is ever agreed to, then the
514 Proceedings of the Preparatory Commission at its Ninth Session (8-19 April 2002) UN Doc.
PCNICC/2002/L.l/Rev.l.p.19.
515 According to Schuster, there are five alternatives however "Option 1" is incomplete and does not
stand on its own without one of the ensuing variations.
135
ICC has no jurisdiction over the crime of aggression and there is no need to define
it.
In 2002, the Coordinator for the Working Group on the Crime of Aggression
prepared a "discussion paper" which further clears the way for the UN Security
Council to usurp complete jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.516 This paper
is divided into two sections entitled, "Definition of the Crime of Aggression and
Conditions for the Exercise of Jurisdiction" and "Elements of the Crime of
Aggression" however this is something of a misnomer. It may as well have been
collapsed into one large section entitled, "Conditions for the Exercise of
Jurisdiction". This paper essentially presents two possible "definitions" for the
crime of aggression: either the crime of aggression is a "war of aggression" or it is
an "act of aggression" as this term was defined in the 1974 UNGA Resolution
3314.517 Neither option is a definition for the crime of aggression.
The proposed "conditions" for the Court's exercise ofjurisdiction require a feat of
mental gymnastics. Most prominent among them, unsurprisingly, is that the
Security Council gain complete jurisdiction over the Court's crime of aggression.
Interestingly, in the event that Council should make no determination on the
act/crime of aggression at issue, one option has the Court relegated to the position
of pageboy to petition either the Security Council (after it fails to make any
detennination in regard to the situation!) or the General Assembly, in tum, to seek a
declaratory judgment from the International Court of Justice on whether or not an
"act of aggression" has occurred.518 Either that, or Option 2 proposes that the Court
dismiss the case if the Security Council cannot be bothered to make any
detennination in regard to a particular case.519
516 PCNICC/2002/WGCA/RT.l/Rev.2.
517 Ibid.
518 Ibid. Clause 5, Option 4.
519 Ibid. Clause 5, Option 2. Should the Council, in its infinite wisdom, fail to make any
detennination as to whether a particular matter constitutes aggression, wouldn't the IC] be
overstepping its own jurisdiction by rendering an advisory opinion on the matter? Isn't the Council
the only body with a monopoly on the subject (as some would argue)? Ifnot, then there is no reason
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The Coordinator's discussion paper is underhanded in that it purports to be a
definition when in fact it renders a definition unnecessary: an assault on the
fundamental principle ofjustice calling for fair and equal application of the law. In
the context of her proposals the Court's role is all but illusory. If the crime of
aggression is placed in the hands of the Security Council, selective justice will be
rendered. That both the discussion paper and the PrepCom consolidated text
demonstrate hostility towards the prospect that the Court will exercise its unfettered
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is an outrage.
Once it is agreed that the Court have not only de jure but de facto jurisdiction over
the crime of aggression, the next challenge is to ensure that the definition is not so
restrictive that it renders impossible the Court's exercise of discretion in its
application of the law. Pellet warns of the consequences of drafting definitions in
too much detail. By not trusting judges to interpret and apply international law, the
Statute may limit "the chances of making the Court an efficient instrument in the
struggle against the crimes it is supposed to repress". 520
The following proposed working definition for the crime of aggression is comprised
of three tests and five clauses addressing the central issues related to the crime of
aggressIOn.
why the ICC should have less power than the IC} in relation to the crime ofaggression, particularly
in light of the fact that it is the IC} that the ICC has jurisdiction over the crime.
520 Alain Pellet, Cassese, The Rome Statute, Volume II, 1051 at 1058.
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Crime ofAggression
For the purpose of this Statute, "crime of aggression" means an unnecessary,
unlawful use of force which constitutes a breach of the peace so grave that
individual criminal responsibility attaches to those persons in a position to control,
direct, plan, prepare, or order it.
An unlawful use of force that meets the criteria as established under Test A
constitutes a crime of aggression.
A crime of aggression is committed on behalf of a state or other collective entity.
The Court's jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is subject to the same
conditions, mutatis mutandis, as those that apply to the other three crimes under the
Court's jurisdiction.
Nothing in this provision shall be construed as extending or limiting the scope of
those provisions relating to an act of aggression contained in the Charter of the
United Nations.
Unlawful Use ofForce
For the purpose of this Statute, "unlawful use of force" means:
i) The direct or indirect, armed or unarmed use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of a state, or for a purpose
otherwise inconsistent with the purposes ofthe United Nations;
ii) The use of force in excess ofthe parameters as established in a United
Nations Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force;
iii) The use of force in excess ofthat which is necessary in a situation of
self-defence; or,
iv) Any other unlawful use of force as described herein.
The unlawful use of force can occur at the outset of a conflict or intervention, or it
can occur during the course of on-going hostilities.
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Individual and Collective Self-defence
If an anned attack occurs against a state or a non-state entity, the latter may use
such force as is necessary to repel the attack, in the manner set out below, until the
United Nations Security Council takes measures to restore or maintain international
peace and security.
A state or non-state entity may use force to the extent that it is necessary and
proportionate to repel an attack or to put an end to recurring attacks. The state or
non-state entity that is the victim of the initial anned attack may request help from
other states or non-state entities and collectively, these states and / or non-state
entities may use the force necessary and proportionate to repel the anned attack in
question.
Any use of force employed in individual or collective self-defence in excess of what
is required for the purposes of repel the initial anned attack is prima facie unlawful
and subject to review by the Court to establish whether such use of force constitutes
a crime of aggression (i.e. Test A).
Any use of force in individual or collective self-defence must be immediately
reported, in sufficient detail, to the United Nations Security Council and remains
subject to measures the latter may adopt to maintain or restore international peace
and security.
Nothing in this provision shall be construed as extending or limiting the scope of
Article 51 of the Charter ofthe United Nations.
Anticipatory Self-Defence
If no anned attack has occurred the use of force in anticipatory self-defence, to pre-
empt or prevent an anned attack, is prima facie unlawful and constitutes a crime of
aggresSIOn.
The use of force in anticipatory self-defence is subject to review by the Court and
may be deemed justified if:
i) It is established that the threat is so imminent and grave as to warrant the
use of force to avert a catastrophe (i.e. Test B); and,
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ii) The use of force in question is not in excess of what is required to repel
the imminent attack or avert the catastrophe.
If all the requirements under Test B are met then the crime of aggression was
justified and individual criminal liability for the aggression is excluded.
If a use of force was deemed justified under the circumstances, however, the Court
deems the use of force employed by the defendant exceeded that which was
necessary to repel the imminent attack or avert the catastrophe, then such excessive
use of force is unlawful and may constitute a crime of aggression. The Court will
then apply Test A.
All other uses of force employed in "anticipatory self-defence" that fail to meet Test
B requirements are unlawful and, if they meet Test A requirements constitute a
crime of aggression.
Security Council Authorized Use ofForce
("Chapter VII" Use ofForce)
The United Nations Security Council may authorize a state or non-state entity to use
force to restore or maintain international peace and security.
A state or non-state entity may therefore use force as expressly and explicitly
provided for under the UNSC mandate that is, with respect to: whom is authorized,
the type and extent of force authorized, the purpose of the force authorized, and the
period for which the use offorce is authorized.
Any use of force that exceeds the parameters as established in the UNSC resolution
authorizing the use of force is unlawful, subject to review by the Court and may
constitute the crime ofaggression.
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Test A: Aggression Threshold Criteria
An unlawful use of force constitutes a crime of aggression when it is unnecessary
and a breach of the peace so grave that triggers individual criminal responsibility.
The nature of such unlawful use of force is determined by the Court based on the
following criteria.
1) Gravity of scale (disproportionate/unnecessary/wanton)
2) Gravity of effects (disproportionate/unnecessary/wanton)
3) Unwarranted circumstances (unnecessary)
4) Unjustifiable purpose or motivation (bad faith)
Anticipatory Self-Defence Criteria (Test B)
If there is no armed attack, the use of force is illegal and may constitute a crime of
aggression. The following criteria shall assist the Court in its determination of
whether a situation of grave threat existed and warranted a unilateral use of force by
a state or non-state entity. A grave threat exists or existed, and a use of force is
warranted when all of the following criteria are met:
1) Identifiable object at risk due to threat;
2) Identifiable source of threat;
3) Identifiable nature and scale of threat;
4) Proof of seriousness ofthreat;
5) Proof of peaceful attempts to diffuse tension or resolve dispute;
6) Proof of rejection of alternative peaceful means by the source of the
threat;
7) Identifiable plan of action and goals sought;
8) Identifiable means of use of force;
9) Reasonable proofthat goals would be achieved by use of force;
10) Reasonable proof of damage due to use of force;
11) Reasonable proof that actions within bounds of international
humanitarian law.
If a situation of grave threat existed and a use of force is warranted, then any use of
force in excess thereof is illegal, and therefore subject to review by the Court, and
may constitute a crime of aggression.
Individual criminal responsibility is excluded if the Court concludes that all the
above requirements have been met and the use of force was justified.
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Responsibility to Protect Criteria (Test C)
If a state is in violation of its international duty to protect its nationals, another state
- before it intervenes for the purposes of thwarting or curtailing a humanitarian
crisis, must obtain a UNSC mandate to use force. In the event that no such mandate
is obtained, said use of force will be prima facie unlawful and subject to review by
the Court.
The following criteria shall assist the Court in its determination of whether a
situation of grave threat existed and warranted a unilateral use of force by a state or
non-state entity. A grave threat exists or existed, and a use of force is warranted
when all of the following criteria are met:
1) Identifiable object at risk due to threat;
2) Identifiable source of threat;
3) Identifiable nature and scale of threat;
4) Proof of seriousness of threat or actual harm done;
5) Proof ofpeaceful attempts to diffuse tension or resolve dispute;
6) Proof of rejection of alternative peaceful means by the source of the
threat;
7) Identifiable plan of action and goals sought;
8) Identifiable means of use of force;
9) Reasonable proof that goals would be achieved by use of force;
10) Reasonable proof of damage due to use of force;
11) Reasonable proof that actions within bounds of international
humanitarian law.
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CONCLUSION
In 2009 the Assembly of States Parties will be presented with the first occasion to
adopt a definition for the crime of aggression. The choices made between now and
the time when a consensus is reached will require continuous and rigorous analysis
to promote fruitful and enlightened discussion. It is hoped that during the next four
years the debates concerning the crime of aggression will reflect an understanding
of whether the questions at issue are of a political or legal nature. This thesis has
tried to present the issues from a legal framework standpoint while noting when
policy considerations may playa role. It is not impossible to define the crime of
aggression: an international crime over which the ICC and not the Security Council
will exercise ultimate jurisdiction (barring the situation where the Council invokes
Article 13(b) or 16 of the Rome Statute). We must simply seize the opportunity.
This focus of this thesis has been on two core issues: the role of the Security
Council, and the general scope of the definition of the crime of aggression. The
debate on the role of the Security Council can be summarized in one question:
should the ICC's exercise ofjurisdiction over the crime of aggression be subject to
the national interests of each P-5 member? If the answer to this question is what it
should be (a resounding "No") then there can be no further conditions imposed on
the ICC's jurisdiction. A carefully formulated definition will ensure that there is no
conflict with any provision contained in the UN Charter. The Council's discretion
to determine "acts" of aggression does not in and of itself create a jurisdictional
conflict between the Council and the ICC. The UN Charter vests the Security
Council with the authority to take action in the event of (what it may determine is) a
"threat to the peace", a "breach of the peace" or an "act of aggression". A
determination under Article 39 has as its object the triggering ofaction under
Article 41 or 42; the determination is not an end in itself nor is it a judicial decision.
If the Court's jurisdiction over the crime of aggression becomes subject to an
Article 39 determination, then it must be understood that this will only lead to one
conclusion: each P-5 member will have the political power under its veto to prevent
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any matter involving aggression from being brought before the ICC. While there
may be jurisdictional overlap between the Council and the Court, there is no
jurisdictional conflict per se, as one jurisdiction is political while the other is legal.
A similar overlap has existed for decades between the Council and the International
Court of Justice. Ifwe remove jurisdiction over the crime of aggression from the
hands of the ICC and place it into the hands of the Council, which is what pre-
conditions would do, not only will the ICC's reputation be tarnished but it will have
the effect of perpetuating the status quo and render meaningless any purported
definition of aggression. If the ICC must wait for a Council determination of
aggression, this will be a clear step backwards. It will also ignore the fact that the
Rome Statute was concluded in large part because the crime of aggression was
recognized as falling under the ICC's jurisdiction. Ifpreconditions on the ICC's
exercise ofjurisdiction are established, Condorelli reminds us, this will be the result
of a purely political decision, not one based on the provisions of the UN Charter.
Again, a carefully-drafted definition will render pre-conditions unnecessary. The
ICC must have the same "unfettered" jurisdiction over the crime of aggression it
enjoys over the other three international crimes.
The general scope of the definition of the crime of aggression must reflect a clear
grasp of the component concepts through which aggression can be understood. The
crime of aggression is not a Gordian Knot in the true sense of the term. It is a
complicated matter. With patience and uncompromisingly rigorous legal analysis
however we can untangle the political from the legal strands. No sword will be
necessary. It can well remain right where it is, and the rest of the work is up to us.
When the day comes that the Assembly of States Parties to the International
Criminal Court has adopted the definition of the crime of aggression, provided that
it is without pre-conditions, it shall be the first time in history that would-be
perpetrators of aggression will be on notice, at last.
When the crime of aggression is clearly defined, and it is the International Criminal
Court that has sole jurisdiction over it (barring cases under Articles 13(b) and 16)
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then, and only then, will we be taking a step towards a higher level of civilization.
Only then will states be treated on level playing field in matters relating to the use
of force. In this connection, Pierce's reply to Dr. Kokintz, the inventor of the Q-
bomb in the novel The Mouse that Roared 521 comes to mind.
[After declaring war on the United States, invading and successfully stealing the its
(and the world's) most powerful weapon, the Q-bomb, the tiny duchy of Grand
Fenwick has now become the most powerful nation in the world. Pierce and Dr.
Kokintz contemplate the future of the world... ]
(Dr. Kokintz) Whoever has the most weight in the world receives the most
consideration. That is the one international law which is recognized by all.
You must admit that it would be more disastrous for all free men ifthe
United States were destroyed than if, say, Belgium or Ireland or Grand
Fenwick were destroyed.
(Pierce) Perhaps, but a Belgian or an Irishman or one ofour own people
would not agree. And so long as the world can contemplate the destruction
of a small nation without any deep regret, so long will it be uncivilized. It is
the same in the government of communities - the rights ofthe weakest and
poorest citizen must receive the same support as those of the richest and the
most powerful. Otherwise civilization is merely a name and not a real force.
But without civilization, no individual is safe, no nation is safe, and in these
days even the world itself is not safe.
521 Leonard Wibberly, The Mouse that Roared (Boston: Bantam Books, 1955) at 146.
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